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EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES ON RISKY HEALTH 
BEHAVIORS AND HEALTH OUTCOMES 
This dissertation studies how individuals respond to the incentives in policies that aim to 
improve health outcomes and reduce risky behaviors. My research design exploits variation in 
individuals’ out-of-pocket (OOP) medical prices generated by large insurance expansions. In 
Chapter 1, I study the effect of prices on the utilization of opioids and other prescription 
painkillers. I find that new users have a relatively high price elasticity of demand for prescription 
opioids, and that consumers treat over-the-counter painkillers as substitutes for prescription 
painkillers. My results suggest that increasing OOP opioid prices, through formulary design or 
taxes, may reduce new opioid use. 
Chapter 2 examines whether increased access to pharmaceuticals improves elderly 
people’s functional outcomes and reduces their dependence on long-term care. I exploit the 
introduction of Medicare Part D, which reduced OOP drug prices and expanded drug utilization 
among the elderly. I find that the policy increased seniors’ capacity to perform activities of daily 
living and reduced the amount of time spent on informal caregiving by non-elderly caregivers. 
Chapter 3 explores unintended effects of policies that expand prescription drug coverage. 
Economic theory predicts that lowering people’s OOP health care costs may protect them 
financially from the consequences of their unhealthy behaviors. I use detailed data on 
individuals’ food consumption and find that drug coverage worsens people’s diets. 
In Chapter 4, I exploit the Affordable Care Act (ACA) dependent coverage provision to 
assess the impacts of health insurance on consumption among young adults. I find that expanded 
insurance eligibility increased total spending, particularly in the categories of food, alcohol, and 
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contraceptives. I provide evidence that increases in consumer purchasing power may be an 
important spillover effect of health insurance expansions. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the effects of the Medicaid expansions facilitated by the ACA on 
racial and ethnic disparities in cancer outcomes. We find that the Medicaid expansion had no 
detectable effect on cancer screenings for the overall population or for any specific race, but that 
the incidence of early stage diagnoses increased for Whites and by Hispanics; there was no 
detectable change for Blacks or other non-Hispanic races.
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Introduction 
Certain modifiable health behaviors – such as tobacco and drug use, risky drinking, and 
diet – are important determinants of health, particularly in the United States and other 
industrialized countries, where mortality is primarily driven by chronic illness rather than 
infectious disease. An Institute of Medicine report shows that 48 percent of premature deaths in 
the US are linked to behavioral and other preventable causes (Institute of Medicine, 2015). In 
addition to increasing mortality, risky behaviors are also associated with higher morbidity: for 
example, obesity is correlated with arthritis and Type II diabetes, and smoking is associated with 
lung cancer (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). 
Traditional economic theory assumes that individual agents are rational, take into account 
all available information, and trade off the utility from a risky behavior against the costs of future 
adverse health outcomes. Under specific assumptions, these decisions are optimal and maximize 
individuals’ net utility. In traditional economics, there is therefore little justification for 
government intervention in decreasing risky behaviors. However, behavioral economics posits 
that in reality, individuals exhibit bounded rationality, i.e. they have limited time and cognitive 
ability to make the best possible choices. Rather than maximize utility based on full 
consideration of all available information, they use heuristics, or rules of thumb, to make 
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decisions, and may be vulnerable to manipulation (H. Simon, 1955). Moreover, many risky 
behaviors are associated with addiction, and when individuals make decisions about current 
consumption, they may not take into account the expected effects that tolerance and withdrawal 
have on future utility (Cawley & Ruhm, 2011). Under the assumptions of behavioral economics, 
there could be a need for government to assist individuals in making rational decisions. 
Even if individuals are able to make independent rational decisions about optimal levels 
of risky behaviors, there may still be a role for government intervention because individuals do 
not bear all the costs of their decisions; some of the costs are borne by other individuals (e.g. 
secondhand cigarette smoke and drunk driving accidents) or by society at large (e.g. public 
health insurers, criminal justice, and lost productivity). Studies find that social costs of risky 
health behaviors are high – $289 billion per year for smoking (US Department of Health and 
Human Services, 2014b), $223 billion per year for alcohol abuse (Bouchery, Harwood, Sacks, 
Simon, & Brewer, 2011), $186 billion per year for obesity (Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 2012), and 
$78 billion per year for prescription opioid abuse (Florence, Zhou, Luo, & Xu, 2016). Since 
individuals do not take into account these external costs when deciding to engage in risky 
behaviors, government intervention may be needed to align private and social costs. 
That the government should play some role in incentivizing healthy behaviors is largely a 
politically and socially accepted idea in the United States. For decades, federal and state 
governments have attempted to reduce risky behaviors by increasing consumers’ prices (e.g. 
cigarette, alcohol, and soda taxes), removing information asymmetries (e.g. prescription drug 
monitoring programs for controlled substances), and increasing access to health care (e.g. 
through expansion of public health insurance programs). 
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In order to understand the efficacy of these and future policies intended to improve health 
outcomes and behaviors, it is essential to know how individuals respond to the incentives built in 
these policies. To that end, this dissertation studies how financial and non-financial incentives 
impact individuals’ health behaviors and health outcomes. I leverage variation in individuals’ 
out-of-pocket (OOP) medical prices generated by large health insurance expansions, such as the 
introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010-14. I study 
the impacts of these OOP price changes on behaviors – such as opioid utilization, food 
purchases, and cancer screenings – and health outcomes – such as functional limitations and 
cancer diagnosis. 
Summary of Dissertation Findings 
I find that individuals respond to price changes for certain health behaviors/products but 
not for others. In Chapter 1, I study the effect of prices on the utilization of opioids and other 
prescription painkillers. I conclude that new users have a relatively high price elasticity of 
demand for prescription opioids, and that increasing OOP opioid prices, through formulary 
design or taxes, may reduce new opioid use. However, in Chapter 5, we find that even after the 
ACA Medicaid expansion decreased the OOP price of cancer screenings, there was no detectable 
effect of these price changes on utilization of cancer screenings for the overall population or for 
any specific race. 
I also study the effect of insurance expansions on health outcomes and consumption. 
Chapter 2 examines whether increased access to pharmaceuticals improves elderly people’s 
ability to perform activities of daily living (ADL), such bathing, dressing, and eating. I find that 
Part D increased seniors’ capacity to perform daily activities and reduced their dependence on 
informal caregiving. In Chapter 4, I exploit the ACA dependent coverage provision to assess the 
4 
impacts of health insurance on consumption by young adults. I find that expanded insurance 
eligibility increased total spending, particularly in the categories of food, alcohol, and 
contraceptives. I provide evidence that increases in consumer purchasing power may be an 
important spillover effect of health insurance expansions. 
Policymakers should also be aware of the unintended negative effects of policies that 
expand coverage. Economic theory predicts that lowering people’s OOP medical costs may 
protect them financially from the consequences of their unhealthy behaviors. In Chapter 3, I use 
detailed data on individuals’ grocery purchases and find that expanded pharmaceutical access 
associated with Part D worsened people’s diets. These findings are informative about the 
presence of ex-ante moral hazard in prescription drug insurance as well as substitutability 
between certain prescription drugs and diet. 
5 
1 Health Insurance, Price Changes, and the Demand for Pain Relief Drugs: Evidence 
from Medicare Part D 
Abstract 
Overdose deaths from prescription opioids are on the rise, and policymakers seek 
solutions to curb opioid misuse. Recent proposals call for price-based solutions, such as opioid 
taxes and removal of opioids from insurance formularies. However, there is limited evidence on 
how opioid consumption responds to price stimuli. This study addresses that gap by estimating 
the effects of prices on the utilization of opioids as well as other prescription painkillers. I use 
nationally representative individual-level data on prescription drug purchases to exploit the 
introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006 as an exogenous change in out-of-pocket drug prices. I 
find that new users have a relatively high price elasticity of demand for prescription opioids, and 
that consumers treat over-the-counter painkillers as substitutes for prescription painkillers. My 
results suggest that increasing out-of-pocket prices of opioids, through formulary design or taxes, 
may be effective in reducing new opioid use. 
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1.1 Introduction  
Prescription opioid utilization has nearly doubled over the past 15 years, even as use of 
non-opioid and over-the-counter (OTC) painkillers fell.1 Although the medical purpose of 
opioids is to treat pain, these drugs are frequently misused due to their addictive properties.  
Prescription opioid misuse has devastating public health consequences, including increased 
overdose deaths, emergency department utilization, drug diversion, and crime (Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2017). Opioid overdose deaths now exceed 42,000 per year, and 
prescription opioids are responsible for between 34 and 77 percent of these deaths.2 Moreover, 
prescription opioids often serve as a bridge to illicit heroin and fentanyl; studies have found that 
80 percent of heroin users reported using prescription opioids prior to heroin (Jones, 2013), and 
heroin dealers specifically target areas with higher rates of opioid prescribing (Quinones, 2015). 
Thus, curbing prescription opioid use and initiation is a top public health priority.3 Recent 
proposals call for price-based policies to reduce opioid consumption. The goal of this paper is to 
predict potential implications of these policies by estimating the price elasticity of demand for 
prescription opioids and identifying the effects of price changes on opioid initiation.  
Policymakers can influence consumers’ out-of-pocket (OOP) opioid prices through two 
main levers. First, state governments can implement opioid taxes, which may be passed down to 
consumers in the form of higher list prices.4 So far, 15 states have introduced bills that – if 
                                                 
1 See Figure 1-1 and Figure 1-2. 
2 The Center for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) mortality data does not distinguish deaths from 
pharmaceutical fentanyl and illegally produced fentanyl, so the prescriptions deaths displayed in Panel A of 
Appendix Figure 1- 2Error! Reference source not found. may include deaths from both types of fentanyl. Panel B 
of Appendix Figure 1- 2 uses an alternative way to classify deaths: the “semisynthetic and natural opioids” and the 
“heroin” bars refer unambiguously to prescription and illicit opioids, respectively. The “synthetic opioids” bar 
consists of deaths from both prescription and illicit fentanyl.  
3 See Appendix 1-A for additional details on the opioid crisis and policy efforts to curb opioid abuse.   
4 In general, prescription drugs are exempt from sales tax in all states, except Illinois (where they are taxed 
at 1 percent at the state level but exempt from local sales tax) and Louisiana – where they are tax-exempt at the state 
level, but local areas can opt to tax. In contrast, over-the-counter (OTC) drugs are subject to sales tax in all states 
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passed – would levy taxes or fees on prescription painkillers (Potter & Mulvihill, 2018).5
Second, public insurers can revise their formularies to reduce coverage of the drugs, thereby 
increasing the portion of drug spending borne by consumers. For example, as of 2019, all 
Medicare Part D plans will reduce coverage of opioids for acute pain for opioid-naïve patients to 
7 days. The current average length of a prescription is otherwise 22 days. Over 50 percent of 
opioid spending is from public sources (Appendix Figure 1- 1), so formulary changes in 
Medicare and Medicaid will likely have substantial effects. Even private insurance companies 
are taking steps to reduce inappropriate opioid utilization: several large insurers now impose 
similar 7-day limits for opioid-naïve patients, and the insurance giant Cigna ended coverage of 
Oxycontin in 2018. 
These policies share the common goal of reducing equilibrium quantity of prescription 
opioids by increasing consumers’ OOP prices. However, the effects of these policies depend on 
the price elasticity of demand for opioids. In spite of the prominence of pain relief drugs, little is 
known about patients’ price sensitivity and the extent to which individuals substitute between 
addictive and less addictive painkillers. While an extensive literature documents a negative price 
elasticity of demand for prescription drugs in general (Coulson & Stuart, 1995; Duggan & Scott 
Morton, 2010; Gaynor, Li, & Vogt, 2007; Joyce, Escarce, Solomon, & Goldman, 2002; Ketcham 
& Simon, 2008; Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Yin et al., 2008),6 these earlier findings may not
apply to opioids because the impact of prices on drug utilization depends on the therapeutic class 
of drug (Gatwood et al., 2014; Goldman et al., 2004). Because opioids are addictive, it is 
except Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and 
Washington DC. In Illinois, OTC drugs are taxed at a lower rate than other goods.  
5 In 2018, Kentucky voted on an opioid tax which would have levied a 25-cent on drug distributors for each 
dose sent to the state. Although the bill eventually failed to pass in the state Senate, the House did vote in favor of 
the tax, which suggests that there was considerable legislative support for the measure. 
6 Appendix 1-B provides a detailed review of the literature on price elasticities for prescription drugs. 
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plausible that opioid demand is less price elastic and that price elasticities are heterogeneous 
across new and existing users (Becker & Murphy, 1988). 
The empirical challenge to obtaining unbiased elasticity estimates is to identify 
exogenous variation in drug prices. I accomplish this by exploiting shocks to OOP prices 
produced by the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006.7 My analysis distinguishes between 
opioids, which have a high risk for addiction, and non-opioid prescription painkillers (primarily 
NSAIDs), which carry relatively lower risks. I find that while the demand for non-opioid 
painkillers is not responsive to price changes, the price elasticity for prescription opioids is -0.9. 
This implies that consumers are more sensitive to the price of opioids than they are to other 
prescription drugs; previous studies that exploit Part D find price elasticity estimates of all 
prescription drugs ranging from -0.2 to -0.5 (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010; Ketcham & Simon, 
2008; Liu et al., 2011; Yin et al., 2008).8 By providing some of the first evidence of the impact of 
OOP prices on consumers’ demand for prescription opioids and other pain relief drugs, this 
paper contributes to the growing literature on price elasticities of prescription drugs. 
Individuals may not be homogeneous with respect to price sensitivity, so I separately 
study subpopulations of interest, such as new opioid users, people with joint and back pain, 
cancer patients, and those with a history of drug poisoning. Policymakers wish to reduce the flow 
of new initiates because opioid-naïve patients who are prescribed opioids for acute pain relief are 
at high risk for developing new, persistent opioid abuse (J. S.-J. Lee et al., 2017; Shah, Hayes, & 
Martin, 2017). I find that the post-Part D change in opioid utilization came primarily from new 
7 For example, the OOP price of an opioid prescription for an elderly person fell from an average of $17 
before Part D to $8 after Part D. For near-elderly individuals, in contrast, the OOP price changed from $15 to $11 
over the same time period (author’s calculations based on MEPS 2000-09).  
8 In Appendix Table 1- 4, I confirm the price elasticity of demand of all prescription drugs using a similar 
empirical approach as the approach used in the main analysis of this paper. I obtain an elasticity of -0.45, which is 
similar to that obtained in previous studies. 
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users who did not use opioids prior to 2006. On the other hand, there was no detectable effect of 
OOP prices for existing users. This finding contributes to the broader literature on how prices of 
addictive goods, such as cigarettes and alcohol, affect initiation (DeCicca, Kenkel, & Mathios, 
2008; Saffer & Chaloupka, 1999). It is also important from a welfare perspective to understand 
potential responses among people with different types of medical conditions because public 
health experts view cancer and surgery as “legitimate” reasons to use opioids, whereas the use of 
opioids to manage joint and back pain is more controversial. If, for example, I find that cancer 
patients are the most price-sensitive group, then an opioid tax may be welfare-reducing.  
Although there is some existing work on the demand for prescription opioids, little is 
known about the effects of prices on opioid initiation and heterogeneous consumption responses 
among people with different medical conditions. One previous paper uses Part D data to study 
the impact of entering the donut hole on the utilization of 150 different types of drugs; the 
authors estimate a small  price elasticity of -0.04 for opioids (Einav, Finkelstein, & Polyakova, 
2018). However, the study sample is limited to people who have spent up to the donut hole, i.e. 
those who are sicker and therefore more likely to be existing opioid users. In the Appendix of a 
working paper that studies the impact of Part D on drug diversion, the authors present evidence 
that Part D increased the number of opioid prescriptions by 28 percent and reduced OOP prices 
by 48 percent (implying a price elasticity of -0.6). However, this study does not address new 
versus existing users or other subpopulations of interest. The current paper makes important 
contributions by estimating how opioid-naïve people and existing users respond differently to 
price changes in opioids; I show that disregarding this distinction underestimates the full effect 
of price changes. I also identify price elasticities separately for people with different medical 
conditions, and show that price increases do not differentially affect cancer patients (who have 
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uncontroversial “legitimate” reasons for opioid use) and that those with back and joint pain 
(controversial justification for opioid use) are more likely to respond to price changes. Section 
1.7 offers additional discussion of my results in light of the existing literature. 
1.1.1 Substitution between Prescription and Over-the-Counter Painkillers 
 The second contribution of this paper is to estimate cross-price elasticities of demand 
between prescription painkillers and OTC painkillers. These estimates are important from a 
policy perspective because promoting substitution toward other effective but less addictive 
treatments for pain has been proposed as a way to address the opioid crisis (Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, 2016). OTC painkillers are substantially less addictive, are less costly 
for the government, and have fewer negative spillover effects such as drug diversion. However, 
there are few studies that study potential substitution between prescription and OTC drugs, and 
what little evidence exists is primarily based on observational rather than experimental data 
(Leibowitz, 1989; O’Brien, 1989; Stuart & Grana, 1995). Moreover, none of these existing 
studies specifically analyzes painkillers. 
Part D is an appropriate setting to study potential substitution between prescription and 
OTC drugs. The elderly are heavy users of both types of drugs (Qato, Wilder, Schumm, Gillet, & 
Alexander, 2016), and the implementation of the policy lends itself to quasi-experimental 
analysis, which reduces concern about selection bias. I use scanner data on households’ grocery 
and drug purchases to study the effect of the prescription OOP price reduction associated with 
Part D on people’s OTC painkiller purchases. I estimate a small but positive cross-price elasticity 
of demand for OTC painkillers (elasticity = 0.1), which implies that consumers view 
prescriptions and OTC painkillers as substitutes to some extent. My findings suggest that a 
11 
targeted subsidy for OTC painkillers may be an effective way to shift demand away from 
opioids.  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follow. Section 1.2 proposes a conceptual 
framework for predicting the effects of prices on the demand for addictive painkillers and their 
substitutes. Section 1.3 presents the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey and Nielsen Household 
Consumer Panel datasets utilized in this analysis. Section 1.4 describes the empirical methods 
and results for the impact of price changes on utilization of prescription painkillers. Section 1.5 
presents results for new versus existing users. Section 1.6 provides cross-price elasticity 
estimates for OTC painkillers with respect to prescription painkiller prices, and Section 1.7 
concludes.   
1.2 Conceptual Framework 
In this section, I develop a general theoretical framework to predict how changes in OOP 
prices of prescription painkillers will affect quantity demanded.9 I assume that the demand for 
pain relief is a derived demand for health (Grossman, 1972). Individuals maximize lifetime 
utility (𝑈) – which is a function of total consumption of all goods (𝑌), pain relief (𝑃), and 
addictive capital (𝑆) – subject to a lifetime budget constraint. Pain relief itself depends on 
consumption of addictive prescription painkillers (opioids, or 𝑂), non-addictive prescription 
painkillers (NSAIDs, or N), and non-addictive OTC painkillers (𝐶). Quantity demanded of each 
of the three types of painkillers depends on individuals’ incomes as well as the portion of the 
drug price they are responsible for paying (i.e. OOP prices). By increasing prescription drug 
9 My data measures utilization of drugs, which may not be synonymous with demand. Utilization is based 
on patients’ demand for the drug as well as physicians’ willingness to write prescriptions. A reduction in OOP price 
can increase utilization in three ways: 1) encourage patients to seek prescriptions by increasing physician visits, 2) 
increase the number of prescriptions written by physicians, and 3) increase the number of prescriptions that are filled 
(compliance).  
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coverage in the elderly population, Part D resulted in an exogenous decrease in the OOP price of 
prescription painkillers, but did not affect the price of OTC painkillers as these drugs are not 
covered by insurance companies. I assume that all three types of painkillers are positively 
associated with utility (i.e. 𝑈𝑂 > 0, 𝑈𝑁 > 0, and 𝑈𝐶 > 0). 
Proposition 1. Assuming conventional downward sloping demand curves, a reduction in 
the price of prescription opioids (non-opioid prescription painkillers) should increase quantity 
demanded of prescription opioids (non-opioid prescription painkillers), holding income and 
other prices constant. 
However, opioids are addictive goods and may not obey the law of demand: it is 
plausible that physiological forces associated with dependence and addiction may compel a 
person to continue consuming a good, even if economic incentives change. My model accounts 
for opioids’ addictive properties by including addictive capital in the individual’s utility function. 
Addictive capital is measured by the stock of total past consumption of the addictive painkiller. I 
assume that addictive goods (𝑂) have the three characteristics described below (Cawley & 
Ruhm, 2011). 
1. Withdrawal: Consumption of the addictive goods reduces symptoms associated with
withdrawal, so the marginal utility of current consumption is positive (𝑈𝑂 > 0).
2. Tolerance: Being addicted has overall harmful health consequences, so the stock of
past consumption lowers utility (𝑈𝑆 < 0).
3. Reinforcement: The marginal utility of current consumption rises with the stock of
past consumption (𝑈𝑂𝑆 > 0).
Proposition 2. For addictive painkillers, new users are more price-sensitive because they 
have not yet built up enough addictive capital to make future prices and consumption a 
significant consideration in their decision-making. 
A large literature on consumer behavior in other markets with addiction finds that while 
existing users of addictive goods are less sensitive to price changes, prices do affect the 
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probability of initiation by new users. For example, one study finds that a 10 percent increase in 
the price of alcohol was found to decrease the probability that an individual currently drinks by 
5.5 percent; the same study finds that the heaviest drinkers are least price sensitive  (Manning, 
Blumberg, & Moulton, 1995). In the cigarette market also, studies show that price sensitivity 
varies by intensity of use. A meta-analysis shows that while the mean price elasticity of demand 
for cigarettes is -0.5, estimates vary widely ranging from -3.1 to 1.4 (Gallet & List, 2003). 
Specifically, higher cigarette prices can lead to large decreases in the probability of initiation by 
non-smokers (Gilleskie & Strumpf, 2005). The literature also finds that excise taxes on cigarettes 
can significantly deter smoking among adolescents, who have had less time to become addicted 
to the good as compared to older adults (Chaloupka & Wechsler, 1997; Gruber, 2001; Gruber & 
Zinman, 2000; Lewit, Coate, & Grossman, 1981). This inverse relationship between intensity of 
use and price elasticity exists in the market illicit drugs also. In the cocaine market, for example, 
the price elasticity of demand is -1.0 for the general population, but only -0.3 for those who are 
current users (Chaloupka, Grossman, & Tauras, 1999). 
Proposition 3. Existing users may also respond to price changes of the addictive good if 
they behave as rational addicts. 
The Theory of Rational Addiction proposes that consumers are sophisticated and account 
for tolerance and reinforcement when deciding current consumption (Becker & Murphy, 1988). 
Reinforcement implies that consumption of the addictive good today will positively affect the 
individual’s marginal utility of consuming the addictive good tomorrow. This means that a price 
change in the addictive good may compel forward-looking addicts to change their consumption 
habits. 
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Proposition 4. If OTC and prescription painkillers are substitutes, the quantity demanded 
of OTC painkillers falls when the price of prescription painkillers falls. 
The individual in my model maximizes pain relief by choosing an optimal mix of 𝑂, 𝑁, 
and 𝐶. The optimal mix depends on their relative prices and their relative productivities. 
Previous medical studies suggest that prescription and OTC painkillers are therapeutic 
substitutes for certain medical conditions (Chang, Bijur, Esses, Barnaby, & Baer, 2017). If 
consumers view prescription and OTC painkillers as economic substitutes, we should expect to 
see a reduction in 𝐶 after Part D reduces the prices consumers face of 𝑂 and 𝑁. 
1.3 Data 
This study uses two main data sources: the household component of the Medical 
Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS, years 2000 to 2009) and the Nielsen Household Consumer 
Panel (NHCP, years 2004 to 2009).10 The MEPS is a nationally representative survey that
provides detailed information on individuals’ medical expenditures, pharmaceutical utilization, 
and health outcomes (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2017). The MEPS is 
conducted annually, and the survey follows a panel design, featuring five rounds of interviews 
covering two full years. The original sample size is approximately 35,000 individuals per year; 
my analytical sample consists of 50,579 individuals aged 55 to 74 across the years 2000 to 2009. 
My analysis uses the MEPS full-year Consolidated Data File, which contains respondents’ socio-
demographic and economic characteristics; the MEPS Prescribed Medicines file, which contains 
10 In selecting the appropriate time period for this analysis, I note that including additional years of post-
2006 data would increase the sample size but may also bias the results by introducing other notable events that 
should have differentially affected the elderly and near-elderly. For example, the Affordable Care Act of 2010 
increased overall health insurance access for the near-elderly group but not for the elderly group (Frean et al., 2017). 
The Oxycontin reformulation and removal of Darvocet (e.g. Propoxyphene) also occurred in 2010 and significantly 
changed the landscape of the opioids market. I therefore limit my period of analysis to pre-2010 years. 
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all the prescription drugs purchased by respondents;11 and the MEPS Medical Conditions File,
which describes all medical conditions and treatment attempts. 
The MEPS is uniquely suited for this study as it contains detailed information on 
prescription medication use in the years relevant for this study. Purchases of prescription drugs 
are reported by individual respondents and then verified by the prescribing pharmacy.12 The
MEPS provides comprehensive information on medication characteristics, including the drug 
name, form, strength, quantity purchased, and National Drug Code. Other datasets, such as the 
National Health Interview Survey and Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance System, have the 
advantage of larger samples but do not contain prescription data. The Part D claims data does not 
have information on individuals before 2006. The MEPS has been used in past studies to study 
the effects of Part D on drug utilization (Alpert, 2016; Engelhardt & Gruber, 2011; Powell, 
Pacula, & Taylor, 2017). However, the MEPS has limitations, such as relatively small sample 
sizes. Also, any individual panel only contains two years of observations, which limits the ability 
to estimate long term effects of the policy change. Table 1-1 provides descriptive statistics of the 
MEPS sample. 
Because the MEPS provides data only for prescription drugs and not for OTC drugs, I use 
the NHCP to obtain information on purchases of the latter (Nielsen, 2017). The NHCP contains 
detailed information on grocery and drugstore purchases of a panel of 40,000 to 60,000 
households. My analytical sample consists of 335,060 household-year observations across the 
years 2004 to 2009. Variables include household demographics, geographic identifiers (to the zip 
code level), and product characteristics (to the UPC code level). I use the NHCP to acquire data 
11 The Prescribed Medicines file consists of only outpatient prescription drug purchases and excludes 
prescription drug administered in hospitals, clinics, or physician’s offices. 
12 The data has been verified by the prescribing pharmacy only for those who consented to release their 
pharmacy records. For those who did not consent, expenditures are based on self-reported expenditures that have 
been adjusted for outliers and imputations from the pharmacy data. 
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on households’ OTC drug costs and utilization. Table 1-2 provides descriptive statistics of the 
NHCP sample. 
The two main outcomes of interest in this paper are quantity purchased of a drug class 
and OOP price. I first calculate the percent change in OOP prices caused by Part D and the 
percent change in quantity purchased of the drug class caused by Part D. Then using the 
following elasticity formula, I obtain the estimated price elasticity of demand for the drug class. 
𝜀 =  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
Equation 1-1 
In my main analysis, I measure quantity as the units of days supplied of the drug for each 
person-year observation; days supplied can range from 0 to 365. Although MEPS provides 
information on the quantity of drugs purchased, the unit varies depending on the type of drug. 
Painkiller prescriptions come in different forms, including immediate release tablets, extended 
release tablets, liquid solutions injections, and patches. The reported MEPS quantity may be in 
number of bottles, number of pills, number of ounces, number of patches, etc. To obtain a 
consistent unit, I convert all purchases to “number of days supplied” of the drug. For example, 
for a strong oxycodone, a 28-pill bottle might mean a 28-day supply, but for a mild NSAID, a 
28-pill bottle might mean only a 7-day supply. A similar days supplied measure has been used in 
previous Part D studies (Ketcham & Simon, 2008; Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Yin et al., 2008). 
MEPS provides information on days supplied from the years 2010 onward, so for earlier years, I 
impute the number of days supplied of each drug using post-2010 data of the same drug.13 I also
conduct sensitivity analyses in which the quantity is measured as number of prescriptions, rather 
than “number of days supplied.” 
13 See Appendix 1-C for additional details on the imputation process. 
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To measure price, I use the OOP price (adjusted by pharmaceutical PPI) as my key 
outcome variable since this is the price faced by the individual. MEPS provides information on 
the total price paid for each prescription, as well as the breakdown by source of payment. For the 
NHCP outcomes, I simply use the reported price as my outcome, since these drugs are all 
purchased over the counter so other payment sources do not exist. 
I first estimate elasticities for all painkillers combined. However, painkillers vary widely 
in terms of both strength and potential for abuse. I therefore categorize the drugs into two 
classes, based on their risk for addiction and dependence: 
1. Opioids: Pain relief drugs whose distribution is controlled by the US Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) because they have potential for abuse and can lead to physical or
psychological dependence. This class includes drugs such as codeine, fentanyl,
hydrocodone, oxycodone, tramadol, and opioid combinations such as hydrocodone and
acetaminophen.
2. Non-Opioid Painkillers: Pain relief drugs that must still be obtained via a prescription but
are not controlled by the DEA because they have no known potential for abuse. These are
mostly prescription-strength NSAIDs, such as Aspirin and Ibuprofen, and
Acetaminophen.14
Table 1-3 provides additional details about the composition of each class.15 In addition to
analyzing these three broad classes of painkillers (all painkillers, opioids, and non-opioid 
painkillers), I separately assess the opioids category by: 
1. High-dose vs. low-dose opioids: I define high-dose opioids as prescriptions that contain
greater than 90 morphine milligram equivalents (MME) per day. In the MEPS, the mean
(median) MME per day for an opioid prescription is 43 (30). I obtain information on
MME from the CDC website (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2017). I
also examine total MME consumption as a continuous outcome variable.
2. Extended-release vs immediate-release opioids. Extended-release formulations, such as
Oxycontin, are designed to release slowly into the bloodstream and have the advantage of
being taken at less frequent intervals than their immediate-release counterparts.
14 Although NSAIDs have no known potential for addiction, they are not without risk. Side-effects of 
prolonged NSAID use include liver damage and GI bleeding. Nevertheless, most studies find that opioids represent 
a substantially higher risk of death and adverse events than NSAIDs (Solomon, 2010). 
15 Table 1-3 provides an abridged version of the painkiller classification. See Appendix Table 1- 2 for the 
complete classification.  
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In supplementary analysis, I also analyze changes in the consumption of the most 
commonly used opioids by the elderly during 2000-09: hydrocodone, propoxyphene, oxycodone, 
tramadol, codeine, morphine, fentanyl, and methadone. Such analysis is useful because even 
within the opioids class, different drugs may pose different public health risks. For example, the 
drugs most often involved in prescription opioid overdose deaths are oxycodone, hydrocodone, 
and methadone. The most frequently diverted drugs are oxycodone and hydrocodone. 
1.4 Impact of Price Changes on Prescription Painkiller Utilization 
1.4.1 Empirical Methods 
The empirical objective of this study is to estimate the effect of OOP drug prices on 
utilization of prescription painkillers. A naïve approach to this question might examine the cross-
sectional relationship between observed drug prices and purchases. However, even with a rich 
set of control variables, this approach would not identify the causal effect of price on utilization 
because of the likely presence of latent confounds; it is not possible to calculate an unbiased 
estimate unless we know whether price changes are due to a supply shock or a demand shock. A 
reasonable alternative method may be to use prescription drug coverage as an instrument for 
price, as there is substantial empirical evidence to show that obtaining drug insurance lowers the 
OOP price of drugs. However, simply comparing drug uninsured with drug insured individuals 
would not yield an unbiased causal estimate because of selection: people who are in worse health 
are more likely to enroll in generous insurance plans as well as consume more drugs; this would 
bias the estimate upwards. 
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In order to overcome this endogeneity, I propose a difference-in-differences (DD) 
estimation strategy that exploits the introduction of Medicare Part D16 in January 2006 as an
exogenous change in OOP drug prices for a treatment group of Medicare enrollees.17 Part D
provided publicly subsidized prescription drug coverage to Medicare eligibles and reduced the 
fraction of drug-uninsured elderly from 26 percent to 8 percent in its first year (Appendix Figure 
1- 3). Thus, the policy represented a sharp decrease in OOP drug prices for many people over the 
age of 65 who previously lacked drug coverage, while it was less likely to affect prices for 
younger people who were ineligible for the policy.18 In contrast to insurance plans that
individuals select and fully pay for themselves, Part D plans were available at highly subsidized 
rates to all Medicare-eligible adults and are therefore less likely to correlate with other factors 
that affect the demand for drugs. Part D has been used extensively to study causal effects of 
prescription drug coverage (Basu, Yin, & Alexander, 2010; Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010, 
2011; Engelhardt & Gruber, 2011; Ketcham & Simon, 2008; Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Yin et 
al., 2008).19
I estimate difference-in-differences (DD) models, comparing utilization among a 
treatment group that was affected by Part D (those aged 65 to 74, N=22,265) with those who 
16 See Appendix 1-D for additional background on Medicare Part D. 
17 Other researchers have used the RAND Health Insurance Experiment (HIE) to estimate the price 
elasticity of demand for health care overall (Manning, Newhouse, Duan, Keeler, & Leibowitz, 1987). While the HIE 
is useful in identifying the effects of cost sharing for most medical services, plan design did not differ independently 
for drug coverage, making it difficult to isolate the impact of drug price changes. Moreover, the HIE data is from the 
1980s, whereas prescription painkillers became more popular in the late 1990s; consumer preferences for painkillers 
were likely very different in the 1980s than in more recent years. 
18 Although 74 percent of the elderly had prescription drug coverage even before 2006, this coverage was 
often less than adequate. We may expect drug utilization to increase even for those who had coverage before 2006 if 
Par D coverage was more generous than previous drug plans, e.g. offered lower cost-sharing, fewer restrictions such 
as prior authorization, or more medications covered in formularies.   
19 While Part D is an older policy, it is still a topic of discussion in the current literature because provides a 
valuable context for studying the causal effects of increased pharmaceutical access  (Bradford & Bradford, 2016; 
Buchmueller & Carey, 2018; Carey, 2017; Dunn & Shapiro, 2019; Huh & Reif, 2017; Kaplan & Zhang, 2017; 
Powell et al., 2017). The purpose of the current analysis is not to evaluate the impact of Part D as a policy, but rather 
to understand more generally how utilization of prescription painkillers responds to prices; Part D merely serves an 
identification strategy.  
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were not affected (those aged 55 to 64 and not on Medicare, N=28,314),20 before and after the
introduction of the policy in January 2006. The use of the near-elderly control group helps 
separate Part D’s effects from other secular factors that may have changed at the same time (e.g., 
drugs going off patent). Specifically, I treat the MEPS data as a series of repeated cross sections 
and estimate the following baseline model for each utilization outcome described in Section 1.3: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖  
Equation 1-2
where 𝑌𝑖  represents the number of days supplied of a drug for individual i, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 is 
an indicator equal to one if the individual belongs to the treatment group, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖  is an indicator 
equal to one for observations following January 2006, 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of demographic control 
variables (sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and 
region), 𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 is a vector of age-fixed effects, 𝜗𝑖 is an indicator variable for each year, and 𝜀𝑖   is 
an idiosyncratic error term. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors 
account for the complex design of the MEPS. The DD coefficient of interest 𝛽 represents the 
change in drug utilization for elderly individuals following the introduction of Part D, relative to 
the change for near-elderly individuals. 
I use Equation 1-2 to estimate the effect of Part D on utilization outcomes, but not on 
OOP price outcomes. This is because OOP prices in MEPS are observed only for individuals 
who actually buy the drugs, and changes in  observed OOP prices may be driven by three 
phenomena: 1) list prices of drugs decreased after Part D due to insurers’ increased bargaining 
power (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010); 2) expanded drug coverage reduced OOP price faced by 
consumers; and 3) consumers likely responded to increased drug coverage by substituting to 
20 While this classification of treatment and control groups works in the MEPS, the NHCP is a household-
level dataset, and households can consist of individuals of differing ages. Nevertheless, the NHCP provides detailed 
ages of each household member, so I define the treatment group as households with at least one member aged 65-74, 
and the control group as households with all members <65. 
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more expensive drugs which would seemingly increase the average OOP prices observed in the 
data. Equation 1-2 would capture both the static effect of declining list and OOP prices (holding 
constant the pre-Part D mix of drugs), as well as the dynamic effect of elderly individuals 
shifting consumption to more expensive drugs in response to increased drug coverage. However, 
the denominator of Equation 1-1 should ideally represent only the static effect. I isolate the static 
effect by identifying the pre-Part D “basket” of painkillers purchased by the elderly and the near-
elderly pre-Part D and using a different DD model to estimate Part D’s effect on changes in OOP 
price for this fixed basket of drugs. 
For this analysis, I create an NDC-treatment group-year dataset. I first calculate the 
number of days supplied of each NDC in the year 2003 separately for the treatment group and 
the control group (adjusting for MEPS survey weights).21 Appendix Table 1- 3 presents the
composition of the 2003 basket of pain relief drugs for each group. I then calculate the average 
OOP price per day supplied for each NDC-treatment group-year observation (adjusting for 
MEPS survey weights). Next, I estimate the following equation: 
𝑌𝑑𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜇(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔) + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑑𝑔𝑡 
Equation 1-3
where 𝑌𝑑𝑔𝑡 represents the out-of-pocket price per day supplied of NDC d purchased by 
treatment group g in the year t and other variables are defined as in Equation 1-2. Importantly, 
the regressions are weighted by the 2003 level of utilization. The DD coefficient of interest 𝛽 
represents the change in OOP price for elderly individuals following the introduction of Part D, 
compared to the change for near-elderly individuals. A similar approach was used for estimating 
drug elasticities in previous studies (Chandra, Gruber, & McKnight, 2010; Contoyannis, Hurley, 
Grootendorst, Jeon, & Tamblyn, 2005; Landsman, Yu, Liu, Teutsch, & Berger, 2005) 
21 Part D was signed into law at the end of 2003. The year 2003 is therefore unlikely to be biased by 
possible anticipation effects (Alpert, 2016). 
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1.4.2 Caveats 
There are four primary concerns with this identification strategy. First, Part D 
simultaneously changed seniors’ OOP prices for all drugs. To the extent that consumers consider 
opioids and non-opioid painkillers substitutes, my elasticity estimates may be biased downward. 
(If there were to be a reduction in the OOP price of opioids only and no change in the OOP price 
of non-opioid painkillers, we would expect a larger utilization response than in the case where 
OOP prices of both classes reduced simultaneously. My elasticity estimates can therefore be 
interpreted as a lower bound.) This is a common issue in existing studies that estimate drug-
specific elasticities, since policy-induced price variation is usually not drug-specific (Chandra et 
al., 2010; Einav et al., 2018; Goldman et al., 2004). 
Second, Medicare Part D was signed into law in late 2003 but not implemented until 
January 2006. Elderly individuals in 2004-05 may have delayed drug purchases in anticipation of 
gaining Part D coverage in 2006 (Alpert, 2016). Alternatively, in post-Part D years, those who 
are near the age of 65 may delay drug purchases until they gain Part D coverage after age 65. 
This possibility, if it exists, would bias my estimates downward and may increase the likelihood 
of Type II error. I account for this possibility by estimating a set of DD models in which I split 
the “post” period into two time periods: 2004-05 and 2006-09. I also estimate specifications of 
Equation 1-2 that omit the years 2004 and 2005 from analysis and omit 63- and 64-year-olds 
from the sample. 
Perhaps Part D influenced opioid purchases through non-price mechanisms, e.g. if the 
policy increased pharmaceutical advertising and detailing in a way that made elderly individuals 
more likely to seek out opioids and instigated physicians to prescribe more opioids. While this is 
theoretically plausible, empirical studies have found limited evidence that Part D influenced 
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advertising of opioids. An analysis of the effects of direct-to-consumer advertising found that 
although Part D increased pharmaceutical advertising, opioids are among the top 10 non-
advertised drug classes for older adults (Alpert, Lakdawalla, & Sood, 2015). Moreover, the 
authors find little evidence that Part D caused changes in physician detailing. 
Finally, my sample includes only those aged 55 to 74, so there may be concerns about 
extending my conclusions about price sensitivity to those outside this age group. In spite of these 
concerns about external validity, the elderly are an important group to study because they are the 
largest users of prescription opioids. The majority of prescription opioid growth over the past 15 
years came from those aged 65 and older (100 percent increase in prescription opioid utilization 
over this time period) and those aged 45 to 64 (71 percent increase in utilization). Conversely, 
adults aged 18 to 44 and children younger than 18 saw only marginal changes in their 
prescription opioid utilization (Panel B of Figure 1-1). Moreover, Medicare is the largest payer 
of opioid pain relievers, covering 20 to 30 percent of opioid spending since 2006 (Zhou, 
Florence, & Dowell, 2016), another indication that it is important for federal policymakers to 
understand how this population responds to price stimuli.  
1.4.3 Baseline Results 
Table 1-4 displays both pre-2006 means for the treatment group and DD estimates from 
Equation 1-2 and Equation 1-3 for the impact of Part D on painkiller utilization (Columns 1-3) 
and OOP price (Columns 4-6). Column 5 displays the implied elasticity estimate (calculated 
using the results from the first six columns). The first row of Table 1-4  shows that Part D led to 
a 4.3 increase in the number of days supplied of all prescription painkillers (p<0.10), which 
represents an 11 percent increase compared to pre-2006 levels. Part D also led to a $0.51 
decrease in the OOP price per day supplied of all prescription painkillers (p<0.01), which 
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represents a 38 percent decline from pre-2006. The implied elasticity is therefore -0.29 
(calculated by dividing 11 percent by -38 percent). This result suggests that the demand for 
prescription painkillers is downward sloping and slightly inelastic; a 10 percent decrease in price 
would lead to a 2.9 percent decrease in quantity demanded. 
However, when I stratify the painkillers into opioids and non-opioids, I find that the 
elasticities vary widely. While there is no detectable effect of OOP prices on the demand for 
non-opioid painkillers, the demand for opioids is more elastic (=-0.89). Subsequent panels of 
Table 1-4 show that the majority of the increase in opioids purchases came from low-dose 
opioids and extended-release opioids. It is also interesting to note that Part D led to a large 
increase of 74 percent in the total MMEs consumed. Most of the increase in opioid utilization 
came from hydrocodone and morphine (Appendix Table 1- 5). 
1.4.4 Parallel Trends Tests 
The key identifying assumption of the DD model is that in the absence of Part D, both 
groups would have trended similarly. One way to evaluate the plausibility of this assumption is 
to compare descriptive statistics from the two groups. Table 1-1 reports statistics for MEPS 
respondents in the treatment and control groups just prior to Part D’s implementation. 
Individuals in the treatment group are significantly less likely to be married (plausibly because 
people in the treatment group are older and more likely to be widowed), less educated, and have 
lower household income (likely because more people in the treatment group are retired) than 
those in the control group. However, the treatment and control group do not differ substantially 
in gender composition, race/ethnicity, and region of residence. 
More important than comparing descriptive statistics is to assess whether the two groups 
exhibit comparable pre-2006 trends in their OOP painkiller prices and utilization. Figure 1-4 
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presents the average OOP drug prices for each NDC over time, weighted by the 2003 level of 
utilization.  Figure 1-4 shows that prior to the introduction of Part D, OOP prices for the 
treatment and control group followed similar trends. After 2006, both groups experienced 
declines in OOP prices, but the decline for the treatment group was much larger in magnitude 
than the reduction experienced by the control group. The fact that prices for the two age groups 
trended similarly before 2006 increases our confidence that they would have trended similarly 
after 2006, were it not for the introduction of Part D. 
Similarly, Figure 1-5 presents the utilization for each class of painkillers over time, 
separately for the treatment and control group. Again, purchases of painkillers appear to trend 
fairly closely for the older and younger groups in the years before Part D. There was a sizeable 
reduction in non-opioid painkiller utilization for both groups in 2004-05; this decrease can be 
attributed to the removal of certain widely used Cox-II inhibitors (e.g. Vioxx, Bextra, etc) from 
the market in late 2004 and early 2005. After the implementation of Part D in 2006, there was a 
large increase for the treatment group, while the control group’s utilization remained constant or 
trended upward more gradually. 
To formalize the relationship illustrated in Figure 1-4 and Figure 1-5, I estimate a 
specification of Equation 1-2 that replaces the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖 term with a series of 
interaction terms between the treatment group indicator and an indicator for each year. I omit the 
year 2005 as the reference year. Specifically, I estimate the following equation: 
𝑌𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗 (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖) + 𝛾𝑋𝑖 + ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Equation 1-4
where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑖 represents the interaction between the treatment indicator 
and the year indicator for each year except 2005. All other variables are defined as in Equation 
1-2. Table 1-5 presents the coefficient estimates of the 𝛽𝑗 terms for the utilization and OOP price 
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outcomes for all painkillers, opioids, and non-opioid painkillers. For all the main outcomes 
presented in Table 1-5, the pre-2006 𝛽𝑗 terms are statistically indistinguishable from 0.  I also 
conduct an F test of whether the point estimates for all the pre-2006 𝛽𝑗 terms are jointly different 
from zero. For all outcomes, I cannot reject the null hypothesis at a p-value of 0.10. Appendix 
Table 1- 6 presents results for the remaining outcomes. Of the 10 outcomes presented in 
Appendix Table 1- 6, I reject the null hypothesis of parallel trends for only one outcome – 
utilization of extended-release opioids. Together, the evidence suggests that the near-elderly 
control group services as a reasonable comparison group for the utilization responses of the 
elderly treatment group. 
Table 1-5 also shows that the larger utilization effects came in 2007 and later. This 
finding is consistent with previous studies that find substantial impacts of Part D on utilization 
only after the second half of 2006 (Yin et al., 2008). This is likely because enrollment of seniors 
into Part D was gradual during the first half of 2006; earlier Part D enrollees were sicker and less 
likely to respond immediately to price changes. 
1.4.5 Heterogeneity Tests 
In Table 1-6, I use respondents’ reported conditions to assess the effects of Part D on 
prescription painkiller utilization for subpopulations that are of interest to policymakers. In the 
first panel, I stratify the sample into individuals who have cancer and those who do not. Opioids 
are widely accepted as legitimate pain treatment for cancer patients (Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention, 2016). I find that the OOP price reductions associated with Part D led to a 45 
percent increase in opioid utilization for people with cancer and 49 percent increase for those 
without cancer. Part D led to a 37 percent increase in opioid utilization for those with joint or 
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back pain and had no detectable effect for those without joint or back pain. Finally, I stratify the 
sample by whether respondents had medical or non-medical substance poisoning. I find that 
those who had a poisoning event did not experience any significant change in painkiller 
utilization after Part D, whereas those who did not have a poisoning event increased opioid 
utilization by 52 percent when OOP prices dropped. 
1.4.6 Sensitivity Analyses and Robustness Checks 
Despite the parallel trend test regarding the comparability of individuals in the elderly 
and near-elderly groups, there may be lingering concerns about the parallel trends assumption. 
To provide additional confidence in the causal interpretation of 𝛽, I conduct falsification tests 
which estimate a series of models similar to Equation 1-2, but define 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 as different 
10-year age groups whose eligibility for drug coverage was unaffected by Medicare Part D: non-
disabled individuals aged 45-54, 35-44, 25-34, and 18-24. I expect to find no effect of Part D on 
prices and utilization for these “false” treatment groups relative to the control group of those 
aged 55-64. If I do find significant effects, it would imply that the model is biased due to 
violations in the parallel trends assumption. Failure to find significant effects will provide 
additional confidence in the approach. Results for these falsification tests are presented in 
Appendix Table 1- 7. Of the 12 falsification tests, I reject the null hypothesis at a significance 
level of 0.10 for only one outcome – utilization of opioids for the false treatment group 
consisting of individuals aged 18-24. However, the coefficient is in the opposite direction as 
expected, i.e. utilization of opioids for those aged 18-24 decreased relative to the 55-64 group. 
Appendix Table 1- 8 displays results from a specification in which I split the post period 
into two periods to study potential anticipation effects from the announcement of Part D in late 
2003. For all painkillers, there was a marginally significant increase in utilization even during 
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2004-05 (p<0.10). However, this rise was smaller in magnitude than the 2006-09 increase. For 
opioid painkillers, the increased utilization happened only in 2006-09; for non-opioid painkillers, 
there was no detectable effect in either time period. Results in the second and third column of 
Appendix Table 1- 9 provide additional confidence in the finding that potential anticipatory 
effects do not bias my results. The second column displays results from a specification of 
Equation 1-2 that omits the years 2004 and 2005 from analysis, and the third column displays 
results from a specification that omits 63- and 64-year-olds from the sample. In both cases, the 
results are very similar to the baseline estimates. 
Next, I expose Equation 1-2 to a number of sensitivity analyses. Appendix Table 1- 9 
presents these results. In the first column of Panel A, I omit the demographic control variables 
from the right hand side. In column 2, I omit the years 2004-05 from analysis. Column 3 omits 
respondents aged 63-64 from the control group. In the fourth column, I use an alternative 
definition of “treatment” in which I omit younger Medicare recipients (rather than include them 
in the treatment group). In column 5, I include a vector of interaction terms for the treatment 
group indicator with an indicator for each year on the right hand side. The sixth column includes 
a right-hand side variable that controls for the respondent’s health status (measured by their total 
medical expenses in the year). In the seventh column, I include both treatment X year fixed 
effects and control for respondent’s health status; this is to account for the fact that older 
individuals are in worse health than younger ones. Panel B presents results in which I include 
additional years of MEPS data in the analysis. All of these sensitivity analyses yield results that 
are remarkably similar to those presented in the baseline model.   
In Appendix Table 1- 10, I conduct another sensitivity analysis in which I change the 
units of my outcome to “number of prescriptions” of the drug rather than “number of days 
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supplied.” I do this because my original outcome variables involved an imputation to convert 
prescriptions into days supplied. Although the magnitudes of the estimates are expectedly 
different because of the different unit used, qualitatively the outcomes are very similar to the 
original specification. 
My baseline analysis studies the aggregate effects of Part D on painkiller utilization. The 
DD estimate captures the direct effect experienced by those who were previously drug uninsured 
and gained prescription drug coverage through Part D, as well as substitution effects for those 
who switched from private drug insurance to Part D once the publicly subsidized option became 
available. While many studies in the Part D literature use this DD approach to study aggregate 
effects, it is important to note that 74 percent of the elderly had drug coverage even before the 
introduction of Part D. Thus, the DD estimate may underestimate the true effect of gaining new 
drug coverage. To provide suggestive evidence, I hone in on income groups that were 
particularly likely to gain new coverage to Part D and find that the largest effects on utilization 
came from middle-income individuals with household income between 125 and 400 percent of 
the poverty level (Appendix Table 1- 11). This is consistent with previous studies that find that 
middle-income individuals were more likely to gain drug coverage after 2006, since low-income 
elderly people likely had drug coverage through Medicare and high-income people likely had 
coverage through employer insurance (Levy & Weir, 2009). 
My sample includes people who are aged 55 to 74 (i.e. plus and minus 10 years from the 
age 65 cutoff). In Appendix Table 1- 12, I assess whether my results are sensitive to the selection 
of age groups included. I do this by first estimating Equation 1-2 for a sample with only people 
aged 50 to 79 (with people below 65 defined as the control group and people 65 and over defined 
as the treatment group). I then restrict my sample to people aged 51 to 78, then 52 to 77, and so 
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on until I reach people aged 60 to 69. For each sample, I obtain results that are remarkably 
similar to my original set of results that use people aged 55 to 74. This suggests that the results 
are not sensitive to the selection of age groups included in the sample. 
1.5 Elasticity Estimates for New vs. Existing Users 
The results discussed above provide evidence of a relationship between OOP prices and 
utilization of opioids. However, these multi-year estimates do not fully exploit the panel nature 
of the MEPS data. Panel 10 is the only panel of the MEPS that contains observations of the same 
individuals both before and after the introduction of Part D (years 2005 and 2006). These data 
allow for the use of individual fixed effects to control for time invariant differences across 
individuals that may influence their response to Part D. Moreover, this analysis using a single 
panel of the MEPS allows me to assess whether price-sensitivity differs for new versus existing 
users. I define new users as those who did not purchase any drug in the relevant category in the 
year 2005 prior to the implementation of Part D. I define existing users as those who purchased a 
drug in the relevant category at least one time in the year 2005. I estimate the following fixed 
effects equation first for Panel 10 pooled, then stratified by new and existing users: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
Equation 1-5
where 𝛾𝑖 is an individual-level fixed effects, 𝜗𝑡 is an indicator variable for each interview 
round (each respondent is interviewed a total of 5 times during the two-year period), and all 
other variables are defined as in Equation 1-2. Standard errors are clustered at the individual 
level. The coefficient of interest, 𝛽, is the estimated impact of Part D within each individual. 
This estimate is driven by the change in drug utilization for an elderly MEPS respondent 
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compared to the change for similar non-elderly respondents, before and after the implementation 
of Part D in 2006. 
There are two key differences with this analysis, compared to that presented in Section 
1.4. First, new users by definition are those that had a pre-2006 utilization of 0, so I cannot 
calculate percent changes or elasticities for the new users. Moreover, I cannot observe OOP 
prices for new users because the MEPS only provides prices for respondents who actually 
purchased the drug. To ensure that new and existing users both actually experienced OOP price 
declines after Part D, I estimate a specification of Equation 1-5 in which the outcome variable is 
the OOP price per prescription of all drugs (not just painkillers). The finding that new and 
existing users experienced similar OOP price declines for non-painkillers will increase 
confidence that they would have experienced similar OOP price declines for painkillers, had I 
been able to observe them. 
Table 1-7 provides estimates from Panel 10. To compare to the baseline results presented 
in Table 1-4, pre-2006 means and coefficients should be multiplied by 2.5 (i.e. the number of 
rounds per year). For comparison purposes, the first panel reports estimates of Equation 1-2 
using only Panel 10 data. The point estimates (multiplied by 2.5) are similar to earlier estimates 
in sign and magnitude. However, I find a large gap between new and existing users in their 
response to Part D. The second panel reports shows that new users experienced a 17 percent 
reduction in OOP prices and increased their utilization of opioids by 1.79 days supplied per year 
and non-opioid painkillers by 2.48 painkillers per year. The third panel shows results for existing 
users. While existing users experienced a statistically significant 21 percent decline in OOP 
prices, there was no detectable change in their opioid or non-opioid painkiller utilization. These 
results suggest that it was only the new users who were responsive to Part D’s price changes. 
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1.6 Cross-Price Elasticity Estimates for Over-the-Counter Painkillers with Respect to 
Prescriptions 
Part D presents a useful opportunity to study the degree of substitutability between 
prescription and OTC painkillers. I first estimate the impact of Part D on utilization of OTC 
painkillers using the NHCP data and DD models described in Equation 1-2.22 My outcome
variable of interest is the household’s total days supplied per year of OTC painkillers, such as 
Ibuprofen, Naproxen, and Aspirin. I also include household fixed effects on the right hand side to 
exploit the panel structure of the NHCP. To calculate cross-price elasticities of demand, I divide 
the estimated percent change of OTC quantity by the percent change of OOP prescription prices 
from Table 1-4. 
Table 1-8 displays the estimated effects of Part D on quantity of OTC painkillers 
purchased and resulting cross-price elasticities of OTC painkillers with respect to the price of 
prescription painkillers. I find that Part D led to a 4.3 percent decline in days supplied of OTC 
painkillers. This implies a positive and statistically significant cross-price elasticity (ε = 0.11), 
which suggests that consumers view prescriptions and OTC painkillers as substitutes.  
I estimate event study models (Appendix Table 1- 16) and sensitivity analyses similar to 
those described in Section 1.4. In Appendix Table 1- 17, I present results from sensitivity 
analyses in which I exclude the demographic control variables, estimate models without Nielsen 
survey weights, omit household fixed effects, and use as my outcome variable an indicator 
variable for “any OTC purchase.” The substantive results are mostly robust to these sensitivity 
analyses. 
22 I also confirm that Part D did not change prices of OTC drugs for elderly households relative to younger 
households. Because Part D plans do not cover OTC drugs, the estimated treatment effect of the policy on OTC drug 
price should theoretically be close to zero and statistically insignificant. Appendix Table 1- 15 confirms that Part D 
led to no detectable change on OTC prices. 
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1.7 Discussion 
My results help inform the designing of new opioid policies that act through price 
mechanisms. I find consistent evidence that opioid utilization responds to price stimuli, with a 
price elasticity of -0.9. Price changes affect the utilization of opioid-naïve individuals, but not of 
existing opioids users. Moreover, the results for cross-price effects provide evidence of 
substitution between prescription and OTC painkillers. These findings suggest that opioid-naïve 
people may be highly responsive to opioid prices and that they likely have substitutes that they 
are willing to use in place of opioids. Therefore, increasing the OOP price of opioids, through 
measures such as taxes and formulary design, may be effective in reducing the flow of new 
opioid use. For example, assuming a policy increases the OOP price of opioids by 10 percent, the 
per-person opioid consumption would decrease by 9 percent. (This could be understated if 
demand shifts to the left. Moreover, demand is typically more elastic at higher prices, so as 
policies increase OOP prices, elasticity may increase.23) However, price-based policies will not
significantly change utilization among existing users, and so alternative policies are needed to 
reduce the stock of existing addicts. 
In the context of the existing literature, my elasticity result for opioids appears relatively 
large. Other papers that exploit the introduction of Part D find elasticity estimates for 
prescription drugs overall ranging from -0.2 to -0.5 (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010; Ketcham & 
Simon, 2008; Liu et al., 2011; Yin et al., 2008). Papers that exploit discontinuities in the cost-
sharing structure of insurance plans as their empirical design, as opposed to the introduction of 
Part D, find elasticity estimates that are even more inelastic, ranging from -0.04 to -0.3 (Chandra 
23 Previous studies suggest that the form of the policy matters. Consumers underreact to price changes that are not 
salient (Chetty, Looney, & Kroft, 2009). 
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et al., 2010; Coulson & Stuart, 1995; Einav et al., 2018; Hillman et al., 1999; Joyce et al., 2002). 
However, this discrepancy is likely because my analysis estimates the elasticity of a specific 
class of drugs, whereas much of the earlier literature estimates the elasticity for prescription 
drugs overall. Studies show that the impact of prices on drug utilization depends on the 
therapeutic class of the drug (Goldman et al., 2004), so there is reason to believe that these 
earlier findings on prescription drugs overall may not apply to pain relief drugs. 
Among the few existing studies that identify elasticities separately by drug class, one uses 
Part D data to study the impact of entering the donut hole on utilization of 150 different types of 
drugs; for opioids, the authors estimate an elasticity of only -0.04 (Einav et al., 2018). My 
elasticity estimate for opioids (-0.89) is very different from that of Einav et al. However, this is 
likely because my paper uses a different identification strategy and answers a different question. 
Einav et al. exploits within-year price variation around the donut hole, so the sample by 
definition is limited to people who have spent up to the donut hole (i.e. those who are sicker and 
therefore have likely used prescription painkillers in the past).24 Behavioral responses are likely
to differ for consumers with different levels of annual drug spending. Moreover, Einav et al.’s 
aim is to estimate a short-run elasticity of demand with respect to an end-of-the-year increase in 
the spot price of a drug, and their elasticity estimates are local to the variation used. In the paper, 
the authors caution that the ordinal ranking of their 150 drug elasticities is more important than 
the cardinal value of these elasticities.  
Another explanation for the high elasticities I estimate is that people view prescription 
painkillers as substitutes for OTC drugs, at least to some extent. This would mean that people 
who were previously using more OTC drugs to treat their pain substitute to opioids and other 
24 Einav et al. reports that the average Medicare Part D enrollee spends $1,910 on drugs per year, but the 
spending level to enter the donut hole (i.e. the Einav et al. study sample) is $2,250 to $2,840, which is around the 
75th percentile of the expenditure distribution.  
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prescription painkillers, once their OOP prescription prices drop. Indeed, my analysis of the 
impact of Part D on OTC purchases shows that cross-price elasticity estimates between 
prescription and OTC painkillers are significantly positive (elasticity = 0.11). 
I acknowledge the limitations of this work. The estimates in this paper are picking up 
uncompensated responses that are a mix of the price effects, substitution effects, income effects, 
and information effects of Part D. It is not possible to disentangle these effects with a reduced 
form model. Nevertheless, my findings provide important evidence that prescription opioids are 
have a relatively high price elasticity compared to other drugs. This implies that people are 
sensitive to the price of opioids and that they likely have close substitutes that they are willing to 
trade off. As such, policies to increase the OOP price of opioids would likely reduce the flow of 
new opioid use, and the welfare losses associated with such restrictions would likely be small. 
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Figures 
Figure 1-1. Annual Utilization of Prescription Painkillers per Person 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2015. Sample is restricted to 
respondents with non-missing age (N=545,665). Figures display the mean number of painkiller prescriptions per 
person, adjusted by MEPS survey weights. 
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Figure 1-2. Annual Utilization of Over-the-Counter Painkillers per Household 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2016. Figure displays mean 
annual spending per household, adjusted by Nielsen survey weights. Spending outcomes has been adjusted for 
inflation.  
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Figure 1-3. Opioid Overdose Deaths 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. 
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Figure 1-4. Out-of-Pocket Prices of Prescription Painkillers over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Figures display the mean 
OOP spending per day supply of each NDC, weighted by 2003 utilization of the NDC. Prices are adjusted to 2009 
dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Pharmaceutical Producer Price Index.  
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Figure 1-5. Utilization of Prescription Painkillers over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74 (N=50,579). Figures display the mean annual number of days supplied per person, adjusted by 
MEPS survey weights.  
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Figure 1-6. Utilization of OTC Painkillers over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Figure displays the mean 
annual number of days supplied per household, adjusted by Nielsen survey weights.  
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Tables 
Table 1-1. Descriptive Statistics of the MEPS Sample 
Treatment Group 
(Ages 65-74) 
(1) 
Control Group 
(Ages 55-64) 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
Male 0.47 0.48 -0.01** 
Married 0.63 0.70 -0.07*** 
Household Income
Less than 100% FPL 0.10 0.08 0.02*** 
100 to 124% FPL 0.06 0.02 0.03*** 
125 to 199% FPL 0.17 0.09 0.08*** 
200 to 399% FPL 0.30 0.26 0.04*** 
Greater than 400% FPL 0.38 0.55 -0.17*** 
Educational Attainment
Less than high school 0.25 0.14 0.11*** 
High school 0.35 0.32 0.03*** 
Some college 0.18 0.22 -0.04*** 
College or more 0.22 0.32 -0.10*** 
Race/Ethnicity
White, Non-Hispanic 0.78 0.77 0.01 
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.10 0.09 0.01 
Other, Non-Hispanic 0.05 0.05 -0.01** 
Hispanic 0.07 0.08 -0.01** 
Region
Northeast 0.19 0.19 -0.00 
Midwest 0.22 0.23 -0.01 
South 0.39 0.36 0.03*** 
West 0.20 0.22 0.01** 
N 22,265 28,314 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Means are adjusted by MEPS survey weights. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 1-2. Descriptive Statistics of the Nielsen Sample 
Treatment Group 
(Ages 65+) 
(1) 
Control Group 
(Age <65) 
(2) 
Difference 
(3) 
Male Householder 0.61 0.74 -0.13*** 
Female Householder 0.80 0.81 -0.01*** 
Married 0.38 0.52 -0.14*** 
Household Income
Less than 100% FPL 0.05 0.07 -0.01*** 
100 to 124% FPL 0.04 0.03 0.01*** 
125 to 199% FPL 0.17 0.11 0.05*** 
200 to 399% FPL 0.41 0.30 0.10*** 
Greater than 400% FPL 0.33 0.48 -0.15*** 
Educational Attainment of Male 
Householder
No male householder 0.39 0.26 0.13*** 
Less than high school 0.08 0.05 0.03*** 
High school 0.24 0.24 0.00 
Some college 0.15 0.22 -0.07*** 
College or more 0.14 0.23 -0.10*** 
Educational Attainment of Female 
Householder
No female householder 0.20 0.19 -0.01*** 
Less than high school 0.07 0.03 0.04*** 
High school 0.39 0.26 0.12*** 
Some college 0.22 0.27 -0.04*** 
College or more 0.12 0.25 -0.13*** 
Race/Ethnicity
White, Non-Hispanic 0.82 0.72 0.10*** 
Black, Non-Hispanic 0.09 0.12 -0.03*** 
Other, Non-Hispanic 0.03 0.05 -0.02*** 
Hispanic 0.06 0.10 -0.05*** 
Region
Northeast 0.21 0.20 0.01** 
Midwest 0.24 0.25 -0.00 
South 0.33 0.32 0.01** 
West 0.22 0.23 -0.01*** 
N 97,276 237,784 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Means are adjusted by 
Nielsen survey weights. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1-3. Classification of Prescription Painkillers in MEPS 
Examples 
(1) 
Any 
Prescription 
(2) 
Prescriptions 
Per Year 
(3) 
Total Price Per 
Prescription 
(4) 
OOP Price Per 
Prescription 
(5) 
All Drugs 0.90 27.91 68.07 27.77 
All Painkillers 0.35 1.96 47.08 18.86 
Opioids 
All Opioids 0.19 0.87 32.36 13.23 
Hydrocodone Vicodin, Lortab, Lorcet 0.08 0.30 19.43 9.32 
Propoxyphene Darvocet, Darvon, Propacet 0.04 0.15 25.61 13.74 
Oxycodone Oxycontin, Percocet, Endocet 0.04 0.14 51.81 17.04 
Tramadol Ryzolt, Ultram, Ultracet 0.02 0.12 43.29 18.12 
Codeine Codeine & Tylenol 0.02 0.06 15.63 8.35 
Morphine MS Contin, Kadian, Avinza 0.01 0.03 71.08 19.36 
Fentanyl Duragesic, Actiq 0.00 0.03 249.83 75.58 
Methadone Methadose, Dolophine 0.00 0.02 27.17 11.33 
Other Opioids 
Hydromorphone, Meperidine, 
Pentazocine, Dihydrocodeine 
0.00 0.01 35.05 18.74 
Non-Opioid Painkillers
All Non-Opioid Painkillers 0.23 1.09 57.56 23.05 
Acetylsalicylic Acid Aspirin, Ecotrin 0.04 0.20 7.71 3.63 
Celecoxib Celebrex 0.05 0.20 122.18 45.38 
Rofecoxib Vioxx 0.03 0.09 82.17 40.69 
Diclofenac Arthrotec, Voltaren 0.02 0.09 64.05 25.25 
Ibuprofen Advil, Motrin 0.03 0.09 17.54 7.49 
Naproxen Aleven, Naprelan, Anaprox 0.03 0.09 42.38 15.80 
Meloxicam Mobic 0.02 0.07 78.31 32.15 
Acetaminophen Tylenol, Fioricet, Mapap 0.02 0.06 12.74 6.59 
Nabumetone Relafen 0.01 0.04 60.97 26.80 
Valdecoxib Bextra 0.01 0.03 103.45 61.56 
Indomethacin Indocin 0.01 0.03 31.39 11.66 
Etodolac Lodine 0.01 0.03 47.16 15.66 
Piroxicam Feldene 0.00 0.02 46.80 17.14 
Sulindac Clinoril, Disalcid 0.00 0.01 46.31 18.05 
Oxaprozin Daypro 0.00 0.01 54.21 17.00 
Other Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
Sumatriptan, Salsalate, 
Ketoprofen 
0.01 0.03 92.99 25.67 
 N 22,265 22,265 22,265 22,265 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. The data in the last four 
columns displays means for the treatment group (elderly individuals) across all years, adjusted by MEPS survey 
weights.  
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Table 1-4. DD Results and Own-Price Elasticity Estimates for Prescription Painkillers 
Utilization (Days Supplied) Price (OOP Price per Day Supplied)
Elasticity 
(7)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1)
DD 
Coefficient 
(2)
Percent 
Change 
(3)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(4)
DD 
Coefficient 
(5)
Percent 
Change 
(6)
Painkillers 
All Painkillers 39.57 
4.33* 
(2.29) 
10.9% 1.34 
-0.51*** 
(0.13) 
-38.1% -0.29 
Opioids 9.54 
4.81*** 
(1.23) 
50.4% 2.31 
-1.30** 
(0.56) 
-56.5% -0.89 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 31.50 
0.02 
(2.03) 
- 1.17 
-0.40*** 
(0.14) 
-34.2% - 
Opioids, by Dosage 
Total MME 540.10 
401.82** 
(162.18) 
74.4% 0.03 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-66.7% -1.12 
High Dose Opioids 1.58 
0.77* 
(0.47) 
48.7% 5.41 
-4.31 
(3.67) 
- - 
Low Dose Opioids 8.04 
4.72*** 
(1.16) 
58.7% 1.73 
-0.72** 
(0.31) 
-41.6% -1.41 
Opioids, by Release 
Extended Release 
Opioids 
2.04 
1.54** 
(0.72) 
75.5% 2.98 
-0.57 
(1.55) 
- - 
Immediate Release 
Opioids 
7.71 
4.03*** 
(1.00) 
52.2% 1.84 
-1.02** 
(0.51) 
-55.4% -0.95 
N 50,579 3,454 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Columns 1-3 are based on 
results from Equation 1-2. Sample is restricted to adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the 
treatment group. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-
2006 indicator. Regressions control for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, 
and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, 
and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, 
column 3 displays percent change from pre-2006 mean. 
Columns 4-6 based on results from Equation 1-3. Sample is restricted to painkiller NDCs for which at least one year 
of pre-2006 and one year of post-2006 data is available. Column 4 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment 
group. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 
indicator.  Regressions include a treatment group indicator and year fixed effects. Data are weighted by 2003 level 
of utilization of the NDC. For statistically significant point estimates, column 6 displays percent change from pre-
2006 mean.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1-5. Event Study Results for Prescription Painkillers 
Utilization (Days Supplied) Price (OOP Price per Day Supplied) 
All 
Painkillers 
(1) 
Opioids 
(2) 
Non-
Opioid 
Painkillers 
(3) 
All 
Painkillers 
(4) 
Opioids 
(5) 
Non-
Opioid 
Painkillers 
(6) 
Year 2000 X Treatment 
-1.47 
(3.62) 
-1.26 
(1.83) 
-0.55 
(3.38) 
0.30 
(0.27) 
0.40 
(0.45) 
0.26 
(0.30) 
Year 2001 X Treatment 
-3.98 
(3.42) 
-2.15 
(1.53) 
-1.96 
(3.02) 
0.33 
(0.33)
0.65 
(0.90)
0.25 
(0.31)
Year 2002 X Treatment 
-5.61* 
(3.29) 
-1.45 
(1.77) 
-4.24 
(2.95) 
0.32 
(0.22)
0.62 
(0.88)
0.33 
(0.24)
Year 2003 X Treatment 
-4.65 
(3.71) 
-2.82 
(1.79) 
-2.69 
(3.26) 
0.28 
(0.30)
0.83 
(0.88)
0.21 
(0.37)
Year 2004 X Treatment 
0.09 
(3.11) 
-0.62 
(1.57) 
0.05 
(2.97) 
0.23 
(0.21)
0.63 
(0.94)
0.17 
(0.26)
Year 2006 X Treatment 
-4.79 
(3.15) 
-0.70 
(1.68) 
-4.85* 
(2.69) 
-0.17 
(0.25)
-0.38 
(1.21)
-0.12 
(0.25)
Year 2007 X Treatment 
5.03 
(4.06) 
5.20** 
(2.11) 
-0.67 
(3.46) 
-0.25 
(0.26)
-0.22 
(1.03)
-0.23 
(0.27)
Year 2008 X Treatment 
1.55 
(4.35) 
4.50* 
(2.39) 
-2.10 
(3.69) 
-0.15 
(0.16)
-0.51 
(0.48)
-0.11 
(0.22)
Year 2009 X Treatment 
4.85 
(4.11) 
4.50** 
(2.19) 
1.27 
(3.50) 
-0.06 
(0.23)
-0.34 
(0.56)
-0.04 
(0.30)
p-value for test that all pre-
2006 terms jointly equal 0 
0.57 0.48 0.79 0.26 0.68 0.54 
N 50,579 50,579 50,579 3,454 1,664 1,790 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Table displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and each year indicator. The year 2005 is omitted as 
the base year.  Regressions in columns 1-3 control for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, 
race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS 
survey weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS. Regressions in columns 4-6 
include a treatment group indicator and year fixed effects. Data are weighted by 2003 level of utilization of the 
NDC.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1-6. Heterogeneous Effects for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller Utilization by 
Reported Condition 
Individuals with the condition Individuals without the condition 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(4) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(5) 
Percent 
Change 
(6) 
Cancer 
All Painkillers 43.31 
4.39 
(5.96) 
- 38.97 
3.84 
(2.45) 
- 
Opioids 14.13 
6.36** 
(3.23) 
45.0% 8.80 
4.31*** 
(1.33) 
49.0% 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
30.91 
-2.29 
(5.19) 
- 31.59 
0.13 
(2.15) 
- 
N 5,069 45,510 
Joint or Back Pain 
All Painkillers 76.66 
8.52* 
(4.61) 
11.1% 15.62 
-1.43 
(1.57) 
- 
Opioids 19.05 
7.05*** 
(2.72) 
37.0% 3.40 
0.44 
(0.71) 
- 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
61.04 
2.13 
(4.02) 
- 12.43 
-1.94 
(1.46) 
- 
N 18,813 31,766 
Poisoning by 
medical and non-
medical substances 
All Painkillers 62.24 
-3.63 
(21.89) 
- 39.15 
4.51** 
(2.27) 
11.5% 
Opioids 21.75 
6.33 
(14.04) 
- 9.32 
4.87*** 
(1.22) 
52.3% 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
45.42 
-18.55 
(19.99) 
- 31.24 
0.27 
(2.03) 
- 
N 663 49,916 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Columns 1 and 4 display the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Columns 2 and 5 display 
the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control 
for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, columns 3 and 6 displays percent change 
from pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1-7. Heterogeneous Effects for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller Utilization for 
New vs. Existing Users 
Utilization (Days Supplied) Price (OOP Price per Prescription) 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(4) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(5) 
Percent 
Change 
(6) 
Pooled Sample 
All Painkillers 13.83 
2.70** 
(1.22) 
19.5% 
Opioids 4.11 
1.46** 
(0.68) 
35.5% 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
9.92 
1.17 
(0.99) 
- 
All Drugs 31.92 
-5.99*** 
(1.24) 
-18.8% 
N 12,068 12,068 
New Users 
All Painkillers 0.00 
3.62*** 
(0.62) 
- 
Opioids 0.00 
1.79*** 
(0.39) 
- 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
0.00 
2.48*** 
(0.44) 
- 
All Drugs 33.59 
-5.86*** 
(1.38) 
-17.4% 
N 8,791 8,791 
Existing Users 
All Painkillers 48.66 
1.58 
(3.93) 
- 
Opioids 24.89 
1.52 
(3.88) 
- 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
57.49 
-3.16 
(5.46) 
- 
All Drugs 30.76 
-6.57*** 
(2.43) 
-21.4% 
N 3,277 3,277 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2005 to 2006. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Columns 1 and 4 display the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Columns 2 and 5 display 
the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control 
for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, columns 3 and 6 displays percent change 
from pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 1-8. DD Results and Cross-Price Elasticity Estimates for OTC Painkillers 
Utilization (Days Supplied) 
Cross-
Price 
Elasticity 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
OTC Painkillers 75.68 
-3.27*** 
(1.01) 
-4.3% 0.11 
N 335,060 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Column 1 displays the 
pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group 
indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for householder’s sex, marital status, household income, 
educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Data are adjusted by Nielsen survey weights, and standard errors are clustered on household.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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2 Increasing Pharmaceutical Access for the Elderly Improves Functional Outcomes: 
Implications for Caregivers 
Abstract 
 One in four elderly Americans faces some limitation in activities of daily living (ADL), 
such as bathing, eating, or walking across the room. People with such functional limitations also 
have substantially larger long-term care needs; they often rely on informal caregiving from 
spouses and family members, which may reduce caregivers’ labor force participation. This study 
assesses the impact of increased pharmaceutical access on elderly individuals’ functional 
outcomes by exploiting increased prescription drug availability brought on by the introduction of 
Medicare Part D in 2006. I use nationally representative individual-level survey data and find 
that Part D improved functional outcomes among elderly beneficiaries and reduced their reliance 
on informal caregiving. Further analysis with time use data shows that Part D reduced the 
amount of time that non-elderly spouses and children spend providing care to older individuals, 
freeing up their time to spend on other activities. My results suggest that increasing 
pharmaceutical access for the elderly not only improves their own functional outcomes, but also 
has positive spillover effects for non-elderly caregivers. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Functional outcomes – defined as the capacity to perform activities of daily living 
(ADLs) without significant difficulties – are important determinants of individuals’ ability to live 
independent, healthy, and productive lives. Functional outcomes typically include five ADLs – 
bathing, dressing, eating, walking across a room, and getting in and out of bed – and five 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs) – making phone calls, managing money, grocery 
shopping, taking medications, and preparing hot meals. The ability to perform these activities 
without difficulty diminishes as people age, due to arthritis, osteoporosis, joint/nerve pain, heart 
disease, diabetes, cognitive decline, chronic respiratory illness, renal/urinary tract illness, and 
other medical conditions associated with aging (Malhotra, Chan, Malhotra, & Ostbye, 2012). In 
the United States, nearly one in every four individuals over age 65 has at least some difficulty 
performing one or more of the ten ADLs/IADLs. Although functional limitations are most 
common among those above age 80, they are present even among younger seniors, with 16 
percent of those aged 65 to 69 facing at least one functional limitation (Table 2-1). Those who 
have less educational attainment, have lower income, are not married, are women, are Black or 
Hispanic, or are veterans are more likely to face poor functional outcomes. Conditional on 
having any limitation, the average elderly person faces three ADL/IADL limitations; dressing, 
bathing, grocery shopping, and managing money are the activities that most elderly adults have 
difficulty with. 
The high prevalence of functional limitations is concerning because poor functional 
outcomes can reduce individuals’ labor force participation, worsen their health outcomes, and 
increase their reliance on long-term care. Those with ADL limitations are more likely to need in-
home and nursing home care, and Medicaid is the largest payer for this care (Brown & 
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Finkelstein, 2011). Moreover, seniors with ADL limitations often rely on informal (unpaid) 
caregiving from spouses and relatives (Feldman et al., 2003), which has high social costs 
including reduced labor force participation and higher levels of stress and anxiety among 
caregivers (American Psychological Association, 2006; Lilly, Laporte, & Coyte, 2007). The 
aging American population will only intensify these problems in the future, as the proportion of 
elderly people requiring long-term care increases to working-age people increases. The old-age 
dependency ratio is expected to grow dramatically from 29 elderly people per 100 working-age 
people in 2020 to 40 per 100 by 2060 (US Census Bureau, 2018). 
 There are many prescription drugs available for osteoarthritis, back pain, and 
osteoporosis, all potential causes of decreased ADL. However, these drugs can be quite 
expensive for those who lack prescription drug insurance. For example, the average list prices for 
the most common drugs to treat arthritis are $11 per day supplied for Rheumatrex, $5 for 
Plaquenil, and $3 for generic Methotrexate; the list prices for the most common back pain drugs 
are $4 per day supplied for Celecoxib, $3 for Diclofenac, and $1 for Aspirin (www.drugs.com).  
It is plausible that policy efforts to reduce patients’ out-of-pocket (OOP) drug prices may 
increase drug utilization and therefore improve functional outcomes. 
In this study, I assess the extent to which prescription drug coverage affects seniors’ 
functional outcomes and dependence on informal caregiving. My empirical identification comes 
from the introduction of Medicare Part D in January 2006, a policy that provided publicly 
subsidized prescription drug coverage to Medicare eligibles (mostly those above the age of 65). 
Part D reduced the fraction of drug uninsured elderly from 24 percent to 7 percent in its first year 
and substantially reduced OOP drug prices for the elderly (Ketcham & Simon, 2008; Levy & 
Weir, 2009). The policy has been used extensively to study causal effects of prescription drug 
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coverage on health and labor market outcomes; Appendix Table 2- 1 provides a comprehensive 
review of the Part D literature. 
While a number of studies find that Part D improved pharmaceutical access and increased 
drug utilization, there has been surprisingly little research of the impacts of Part D on health 
outcomes. Studies on mortality find conflicting results: some find reductions in cardiovascular 
deaths (Dunn & Shapiro, 2019; Huh & Reif, 2017) and another finds no significant impact of the 
policy on mortality (Kaestner, Schiman, & Alexander, 2017). The few studies that do evaluate 
non-mortality health outcomes focus on clinical outcomes rather than functional outcomes. 
Research shows that Part D improved mental health (Ayyagari & Shane, 2015), reduced chronic 
pain (Ayyagari, 2016), increased measures of self-assessed health (Chen, Lin, & Seo, 2018) and 
reduced inpatient hospitalizations (Afendulis, He, Zaslavsky, & Chernew, 2011; Kaestner et al., 
2017; Zhang, Donohue, Lave, O’Donnell, & Newhouse, 2009). One study using data predating 
Part D finds that prescription drug insurance has no detectable effect on functional disability for 
the overall elderly population, but does improve functional outcomes for older seniors above age 
71, those with chronic illness, and those who obtained drug coverage through a Medicare HMO 
(Khan, Kaestner, & Lin, 2008). While Khan et al. provides suggestive evidence that Part D may 
have reduced ADL limitations, the results may be biased if before 2006, elderly individuals 
sought prescription drug coverage based on unobservable factors correlated with functional 
outcomes. 
There is only one study I am aware of that directly studies the impact of Part D on 
functional outcomes (Chen et al., 2018). Chen et al. use the Health and Retirement Study’s 
(HRS) Prescription Drug Study and find improvements in self-assessed health but no detectable 
effect on ADL limitations. My analysis builds on this study in several ways. First, Chen et al. use 
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a small sample of about 750 individuals so low statistical power may impair their ability to find 
significant results. In contrast, I use the entire HRS sample and have nearly 92,000 observations 
in my analysis. Second, Chen et al.’s empirical strategy relies on prescription drug enrollment 
(not eligibility);  respondents with a new and continuous enrollment of the Part D from 2006 to 
2008 comprise the treatment group, and people who were never enrolled in Part D during 2006–
2008 comprise the control group. This approach may bias coefficient estimates downward if 
those who chose to enroll in Part D were individuals who were in worse health. My empirical 
approach, on the other hand, exploits changes in eligibility generated by Part D. Finally, Chen et 
al. use only one wave of pre-2006 data and two waves of post-policy data, whereas I use data 
spanning 1996 to 2010, which allows me to assess potential dynamic long-term effects as well as 
parallel trends between the treatment and control group in the pre-policy period. 
By providing some of the first evidence of Part D’s effects on functional outcomes, this 
paper fills an important gap in the literature.  Though functional outcomes may not seem as 
immediately life-threatening as some clinical outcomes, they are key determinants of elderly 
individuals’ daily functioning, long-term health, and reliance on formal and informal long-term 
care. I provide suggestive evidence on how pharmaceutical access for the elderly affects their 
utilization of informal unpaid care by evaluating the impact of Part D on time spent caregiving 
among non-elderly household members. Though there are various sources of formal and 
informal long-term care,25 in this paper, I focus on informal (unpaid) caregiving because it is the 
most common type of care and comes with high social costs. Surveys show that 64 percent of 
25 There are four main sources of long-term care. Informal care is the unpaid care provided by family and 
friends, whereas formal care is paid and includes in-home health workers, assisted living facilities, and nursing 
homes. Informal care, in-home health workers, and assisted living facilities provide mostly custodial and basic 
medical care. These forms of long-term care are most often associated with adverse functional outcomes. Nursing 
home care is meant for individuals with complex health conditions, such as Alzheimer’s and dementia, who require 
round-the-clock monitoring or medical care.  
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elderly individuals rely exclusively on informal care, 28 percent rely on both formal and 
informal care, and only 8 percent rely solely on formal care (Georgetown Health Policy Institute, 
2005). Informal care is most often provided by female spouses and adult daughters. Over 14 
percent of nonelderly women and 11 percent of nonelderly men spend at least some time caring 
for other adults; on average, caregivers spend about 5 hours per week providing physical and 
medical care to adults (Appendix Figure 2- 2). 
Although informal care is “unpaid” by definition, it has several social costs that are of 
concern to policymakers. The largest is the opportunity cost of the time that could otherwise be 
spent on labor and leisure activities. Studies find that informal caregivers work 1.2 hours per 
week less and enjoy 4.0 hours less leisure time than non-caregivers (Kydland & Pretnar, 2019). 
The economic value of services provided by informal caregivers totals about $470 billion per 
year (Reinhard, Feinberg, Choula, & Houser, 2015). Moreover, caregivers report higher levels of 
stress, anxiety, and depression (American Psychological Association, 2006), and 10 percent of 
caregivers have competing childcare responsibilities (Georgetown Health Policy Institute, 2005). 
This paper provides some of the first evidence of the impact of expanded pharmaceutical 
access on informal caregiving. I find that Part D reduced the probability that a nonelderly adult 
spent time caregiving by nearly 20 percent. Much of this reduction can be attributed to improved 
functional outcomes among the elderly. I find that Part D reduced the number of ADL/IADL 
limitations by 13 percent and the probability of having any functional limitation by 10 percent. 
This research has important economic and public health implications. Seniors with fewer ADL 
limitations are more likely to engage in community activities such as labor and community 
service; to the extent that it increases their retirement income, this increased engagement may 
reduce the burden on government welfare programs. Healthier seniors also have the ability to 
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live independently, freeing up spouses and other informal caregivers to participate in the labor 
force or pursue leisure activities. 
My results are particularly relevant in light of recent policy changes that may affect 
prescription drug availability. First, a provision of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) enacted the 
Part D coverage gap phase out and closure by the year 2020. Elderly individuals will likely 
increase their prescription drug utilization in coming years as their out-of-pocket costs reduce, 
and it is important for policymakers to understand the health and economics implications of this 
increased utilization. Second, reducing drug prices is a top priority for the federal government; 
there is ongoing discussion about promoting use of generics, reference pricing, and potentially 
allowing CMS to negotiate directly with drug manufacturers. Even after Part D, many seniors, 
particularly those with multiple chronic conditions, report difficulty paying for their medications 
(Naci et al., 2014). To the extent that proposed price cuts increase drug utilization among 
seniors, they will not only improve functional outcomes among the elderly but may also help 
reduce the burden of informal care among the nonelderly. 
2.2 Conceptual Framework 
My analysis focuses on two groups of agents: elderly individuals and non-elderly 
individuals (potential caregivers). I assume that elderly people are trying to maximize their 
functional outcomes, which can be improved through increased consumption of prescription 
drugs and non-drug medical care. Several medical studies show that certain prescription drugs 
can reduce ADL/IADL limitations (Cañete et al., 2006; Feldman et al., 2003; Hamilton, 
Brydson, Fraser, & Grant, 2001). Seniors decide their optimal quantity of drug consumption 
based on their OOP prices of drugs and non-drug substitutes, income, information received from 
physicians, and other factors. Part D affected this choice by increasing the portion of income that 
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could be allocated to non-medical spending (Ayyagari & He, 2016; Engelhardt & Gruber, 2011) 
and lowering OOP prices of drugs used to treat arthritis, heart disease, diabetes, joint/nerve pain, 
and other potential causes of ADL limitations (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010; Liu et al., 2011). 
Both these phenomena increased drug consumption among the elderly (Ketcham & Simon, 
2008); in particular, antihypertensives, lipid regulators, diabetes drugs, and analgesics were 
among the top ten therapy classes of prescription drugs prescribed in Part D (Engelhardt & 
Gruber, 2011). Increased drug utilization should in turn improve functional outcomes. 
The second set of agents consists of non-elderly people who are potential caregivers. 
They divide their time between labor, leisure, and caregiving. The amount of time they spend on 
caregiving depends on the health of their elderly family members; better functional and clinical 
outcomes for the elderly implies less time spent on informal caregiving among the non-elderly. 
Non-elderly agents are subject to a time constraint, which means that any time spent caregiving 
takes away time that could be spent on labor and leisure. Part D affects the caregiver’s decision 
by improving elderly people’s clinical (Afendulis et al., 2011; Ayyagari & Shane, 2015; Chen et 
al., 2018; Kaestner et al., 2017; Zhang et al., 2009) and functional outcomes. This should 
theoretically reduce time spent caregiving.  
However, it is also important to consider the mortality effects of Part D. Studies have 
found that Part D reduced cardiovascular mortality (Dunn & Shapiro, 2019; Huh & Reif, 2017). 
This implies that pharmaceutical access increases the number of elderly people who are alive, 
which might increase total caregiving needs. Ultimately, the effect of prescription drug coverage 
on informal caregiving is an empirical question. 
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2.3 Data and Measures 
This study uses two main data sources: the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS). 
The HRS is a nationally representative panel of adults over age 50 and their spouses 
(Health and Retirement Study, 2014). It is conducted biennially from 1992 to 2016 and contains 
information on respondents’ prescription drug coverage and health outcomes. The sample size is 
about 18,000 to 20,000 individuals each year. The survey contains detailed information on 
individuals’ health outcomes, ADL and IADL limitations, and labor force status. For this 
analysis, I use data from the 1996 to 2012 waves of the Rand HRS file (“RAND HRS Fat File 
Version P,” 2014);26 earlier waves are missing data on certain functional limitations, and in later 
years, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), which expanded insurance coverage for the non-elderly 
in 2014, may confound results. My main analyses are further restricted to individuals aged 55-74 
with non-missing data for my outcomes and covariates of interest. The sample size is 103,755 
across all waves. Appendix Table 2- 2 contains demographic characteristics of the HRS study 
sample. 
I examine six key outcomes from the HRS: (1) Number of ADLs (bathing, dressing, 
eating, getting in and out of bed, and walking across the room) that the respondent has at least 
some difficulty with; (2) Number of IADLs (talking on the telephone, managing money, taking 
medications, shopping for groceries, and preparing meals) that the respondent has at least some 
difficulty with; (3) total number of ADLs and IADLs that the respondent has at least some 
difficulty with; (4) whether the respondent has any ADL limitations; (5) whether the respondent 
26 The HRS (Health and Retirement Study) is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging (grant number 
NIA U01AG009740) and is conducted by the University of Michigan. The RAND HRS Fat Files take almost all the 
raw variables from the HRS survey, and collapse them into a single respondent-level dataset for each wave. This file 
was developed at RAND with funding from the National Institute on Aging. 
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has any IADL limitations; (6) and whether the respondent has any ADL or IADL limitations. In 
supplementary analyses, I also examine the effect of Part D on other health and labor outcomes, 
such as gross motor limitations, self-assessed health, prescription drug utilization, doctor visits, 
and home health care utilization. 
My data source for the caregiving analysis is the ATUS, a survey that collects 
information on time spent on various activities each day. The ATUS is conducted by the US 
Census Bureau every year from 2003 to 2017 and consists of a nationally representative random 
sample of about 10,000 individuals per year. The sample is drawn from a set of households that 
complete their final interview for the Current Population Survey (CPS). Respondents 
sequentially report activities they perform between 4 am on the day before the interview until 4 
am on the day of the interview. Respondents are interviewed on both weekend days and 
weekdays. Sampling weights are calculated to provide representative full-week estimates of the 
non-institutionalized US population. I also merge in information on presence and age of other 
people in the respondent’s household from the CPS. For my main analysis, I restrict the sample 
to adults aged 27 to 64 who completed their ATUS interviews between 2003 and 2013. I limit 
my sample to those 27 and older because young adults below age 26 became eligible for the 
dependent coverage provision of the ACA during my sample period, which may have influenced 
their household formation decisions (Abramowitz, 2016). The sample size is 101,423 across all 
years. Appendix Table 2- 3 provides demographic characteristics of the ATUS study sample. 
The Census Bureau groups reported activities into 17 major categories and dozens of 
subcategories; my key outcome variable of interest is time spent “caring for and helping 
household adults.” This includes physical care for household adults, looking after household 
adults (as a primary activity), providing medical care to household adults, obtaining medical and 
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care services for household adults, helping household adults, organization and planning for 
household adults, and picking up or dropping off household adults. Although the ATUS does not 
specify whether the care was provided for an elderly adult or nonelderly adult, one study finds 
that the ATUS measure of “caring for and helping household adults” is nearly identical to 
“caring for and helping infirm elders in the household (Kydland & Pretnar, 2019). In 
supplementary analysis, I also study the effect of Part D on non-elderly adults’ labor force status 
and other daily activities, including housework, volunteer, and working.  
2.4 Methods 
My empirical objective is to estimate the effects of prescription drug coverage on 
functional outcomes and caregiving. The main obstacle to obtaining unbiased causal estimates is 
endogeneity; simply calculating the correlation between drug utilization and health outcomes 
does not inform the direction of causality. Moreover, there may be confounding factors that 
affect both drug utilization as well as health outcomes. A reasonable alternative method may be 
to use prescription drug coverage as an instrument for drug utilization, as there is substantial 
empirical evidence to show that obtaining drug insurance increases the use of prescription drugs. 
However, simply comparing drug uninsured with drug insured individuals would not yield causal 
estimates either because of selection: people who are in worse health are more likely to enroll in 
generous insurance plans as well as have worse health outcomes; this would bias the estimate 
downwards.  
In order to estimate the causal effects of drug coverage, I exploit a natural experiment 
that created an exogenous change in prescription drug insurance for a treatment group of elderly 
people – the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006. In contrast to insurance plans that 
individuals select and fully pay for themselves, Part D plans were available at highly subsidized 
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rates to all Medicare-eligible adults and are therefore less likely to be correlated with other 
factors that affect the demand for drugs. There is a large literature establishing the first stage of 
my analysis, that Part D increased utilization of prescription drugs (Ketcham & Simon, 2008; 
Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Yin et al., 2008). I estimate the downstream effects of this increased 
drug utilization on functional outcomes and caregiving using a difference-in-differences (DD) 
approach. 
2.4.1 Functional Outcomes 
I first use HRS data to estimate DD models that compare outcomes among people aged 
65-74 (the treatment group) with individuals aged 55-64 (the control group), before and after the 
implementation of Medicare Part D in 2006. The use of the near-elderly control group helps 
separate Part D’s effects from other secular factors that may have changed at the same time (e.g. 
drugs going off patent). My baseline model is: 
𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝑿𝑖𝑔𝑡 + 𝜂𝑔 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡   (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡 represents the outcome variable for individual i in age group g at time t, 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 
is an indicator equal to one if the individual belongs to the treatment group, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is an indicator 
equal to one if the time period is after January 2006, 𝑿𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a vector of demographic control 
variables (including sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, household income, 
and Census region), 𝜂𝑔 is a vector of age-fixed effects, and 𝜗𝑡 is a vector of year-fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the individual level, and all analyses include HRS survey 
weights. 
The coefficient 𝛽 represents the causal effect of prescription drug coverage provided that 
the control group is a good counterfactual for the treatment group, i.e. in the absence of Part D, 
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both groups would have trended similarly. In order to assess the plausibility of this assumption, I 
conduct tests for parallel trends using an event study approach. I estimate a model similar to 
Equation 1, but replace the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 interaction term with a vector of interactions for 
each year indicator and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔, excluding the year just prior to 2006 as the base year. I 
conduct an F-test to test whether all the pre-2006 interaction terms are jointly equal to 0. A p-
value greater than 0.10 means failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal trends between the 
treatment and control groups before 2006, which increases our confidence in interpreting 𝛽 as a 
causal effect. 
2.4.2 Caregiving Outcomes 
I use the ATUS data and a similar DD model to evaluate the impact of Part D on non-
elderly adults’ time spent caring for and helping household adults. For this set of outcomes, the 
sample is restricted to adults aged 27 to 64. The treatment group is defined as those who have at 
least one elderly person (age 65 or older) in their household, i.e. those whose household 
members are eligible for Part D coverage. The control group consists of those whose household 
members are all below age 65, i.e. those whose household members were not affected by the 
introduction of Part D.27 The baseline model is:
𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝜂𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 + 𝛾𝑿𝑖𝑔𝑡 + 𝜗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔𝑡   (2) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑔𝑡 represents the outcome variable for individual i in treatment group g at time t, 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑔 is an indicator equal to one if the individual belongs to the treatment group, 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡  is an indicator equal to one if the time period is after January 2006, 𝑿𝑖𝑔𝑡 is a vector of 
27 Ideally, I would also like to include in my treatment group individuals who have elderly parents or other 
relatives who do not live with them. However, the ATUS only provides ages of parents and other relatives if they 
live in the same household as the respondent. 
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demographic control variables (including age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital 
status, household size, Census region, and an indicator for whether the interview took place on a 
weekend or holiday), and 𝜗𝑡 is a vector of year-fixed effects. Standard errors are robust, and all 
analyses include ATUS survey weights. 
2.5 Results 
I first examine the impact of Part D on functional outcomes for elderly adults. These 
results are displayed in Table 2-2. I find that Part D reduced the probability of having any 
ADL/IADL limitations for adults aged 65-74 by 1.6 percentage points (a 9 percent decline from 
pre-2006 levels) and the number of ADL/IADL limitations by 0.06 limitations (a 12 percent 
reduction from baseline). Next, I examine ADLs and IADLs separately. Although there are 
significant improvements for both types, Part D is associated with larger declines in IADL 
limitations (14 percent decrease in the probability of any IADL limitations versus an 8 percent 
decline in the probability of ADL limitations). Table 2-2 also displays results that stratify the 
sample by marital status and sex. I find larger improvements in IADL outcomes for married 
individuals and for men.  
In Appendix Table 2- 4, I analyze changes in the 10 specific ADLs and IADLs. Part D 
coverage has the largest effect on reducing limitations in bathing/showering, eating, grocery 
shopping, managing money, using a telephone, and taking medications. Appendix Table 2- 5 
shows DD estimates for the impact of Part D on outcomes other than functional outcomes. I 
confirm earlier studies’ findings that Part D improves self-assessed health and increases regular 
use of prescription drugs. I also find that Part D increases the probability of having any doctor 
visit in the past two years, suggesting that doctor visits may be a potential mechanism for 
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increasing prescription drug utilization. However, there is no effect on gross and fine motor 
limitations, number of doctor visits, or home health care visits. 
Next, I present in Table 2-3 the effects of Part D on non-elderly adults’ time spent 
caregiving for household adults. I find that Part D reduces the probability of spending any time 
caregiving by 3.5 percentage points for women (a 22 percent decline from pre-2006 levels). 
However, there is no change in caregiver status among men. The overall effect of Part D on 
hours per week spent caregiving decrease by a statistically insignificant) 0.2 hours. Women’s 
caregiving hours reduce by 0.6 hours per week, but men’s caregiving hours actually increase by 
0.4 hours per week. This suggests that Part D may change distribution of caregiving 
responsibilities within families. 
Appendix Table 2- 8 shows that the reduction in caregiving for women were driven by 
activities related to providing physical care for household adults and providing medical care to 
household adults. Increases in male caregiving were driven by providing physical care for 
household adults and obtaining medical and care services for household adults. Appendix Table 
2- 9 presents interesting heterogeneity in caregiving outcomes. I find that the largest declines in 
caregiving occur for women who are in the labor force, do not have children, are aged 55 to 64, 
are White, have high school education, and are married. 
Finally, I explore whether this reduction in caregiving is accompanied by an increase in 
labor force participation. Table 2-4 presents DD estimates for the impact of Part D on labor 
market outcomes for non-elderly potential caregivers. In spite of its impact on caregiving, there 
is little evidence that Part D increases labor force participation or employment. In fact, Part D is 
associated with a small increase in the probability of being unemployed among non-elderly men 
with elderly members of their household. There are no detectable effects of the policy on other 
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employment outcomes, such as full-time versus part-time employment, self-employment, 
working without pay, or usual hours worked (Appendix Table 2- 10). I find similar results using 
data from the HRS (Appendix Table 2- 13) and the CPS (Appendix Table 2- 14). 
Since I find reductions in caregiving among older women, I explore possible activities 
that women substituted for caregiving after the implementation of Part D. In Appendix Table 2- 
12, I present estimates for the effect of the policy on older women’s time spent on a 
comprehensive set of activities reported in the ATUS. While Part D does not impact time spent 
on work and employment, there were substantial increases in time spent on housework and 
providing care for non-household children. These findings suggest that when the elderly become 
eligible for prescription drug coverage, caregivers spend less time caregiving and substitute this 
extra time with household production activities. 
2.5.1 Parallel Trends Tests and Sensitivity Analyses 
To assess pre-policy parallel trends between the treatment and control groups, a key 
identifying assumption of the DD model, I first visually examine trends for the treatment and 
control groups for functional outcomes (Figure 2-1), caregiving outcomes (Figure 2-2), and labor 
market outcomes (Figure 2-3). I provide further evidence that the treatment and control groups 
followed similar trends before 2006 by estimating event study models. Results are reported in 
Appendix Figure 2- 3, Appendix Figure 2- 4, and Appendix Figure 2- 5. For most outcomes, 
event study regressions show little evidence of significant differences in trends between the 
treatment and control groups before 2006. 
I conduct several checks to assess the robustness of my findings. For my baseline models 
of functional outcomes, I restrict my sample to individuals aged 55 to 74. Appendix Table 2- 6 
shows that results are not sensitive to this sample restriction; results are remarkably stable, even 
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if I reduce the age band by one year on each side. I also show DD estimates from a number of 
sensitivity analyses in Appendix Table 2- 7 and Appendix Table 2- 11: including a right-hand-
side variable that controls for region/state-level Medicare Advantage penetration rates, using 
robust standard errors rather than individual-clustered, excluding individuals aged 63-64, 
excluding the year 2004, excluding years 2010 and later, omitting demographic control variables 
from the right hand side, and including individual fixed effects. For the most part, the key results 
are remarkably similar to those from the baseline model. 
2.6 Discussion  
This study finds a statistically significant and economically meaningful decline in ADL 
and IADL limitations due to the introduction of Medicare Part D, suggesting that increased 
access to pharmaceuticals improves functional outcomes among older adults. I also find that Part 
D reduced time spent caregiving among non-elderly household members, particularly women. 
Thus, the findings of this study imply that the impact of policies that reduce drug prices and 
expand prescription drug insurance extend beyond improving health outcomes for their targeted 
elderly populations; they also have positive spillover effects for non-elderly potential caregivers. 
My DD estimates suggest that Part D decreased the probability of having any ADL and 
IADL limitations by 2 percentage points (or 9 percent compared to pre-2006 levels) and reduced 
the number of hours non-elderly women spend providing care to household adults by 0.6 hours 
per week (or 42 percent). Taken together, these effects imply that for every one elderly adult who 
no longer has functional limitations, there is a 30-hour per week reduction in the number of 
caregiving hours by a non-elderly female caregiver. 
This analysis has several limitations. First, since over two-thirds of elderly people had 
prescription drug coverage even before the implementation of Part D, there is general concern 
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that unobserved beneficiary characteristics may help explain estimated effects. If it were true that 
unhealthy individuals were more likely to seek prescription drug coverage before 2006, then my 
estimates of the effect of Part D on functional outcomes would be a lower bound of the true 
effect of prescription drug coverage on functional outcomes. Second, the ATUS data identifies 
ages of parents, spouses, and other relatives only if these individuals live in the same household 
as the respondent. This means that members of my control group (identified as those without any 
household members over age 65) may have in fact been affected by Part D if their non-household 
parents/relatives became eligible for the policy. Finally, enrollment in Medicare Advantage grew 
substantially from 2005 to 2013; it is possible that my DD estimates are in fact picking up the 
effect of Medicare Advantage growth. To alleviate this concern, I conduct a robustness check in 
which I include region/state-level Medicare Advantage penetration rates on the right-hand side. 
In spite of these caveats, this study makes several important contributions to the 
literature. First, to my knowledge, no other study has used methods of causal inference to 
evaluate the impact of Medicare Part D on activities of daily living. This paper thus adds to the 
scant evidence that prescription drug coverage improves health outcomes for elderly people. 
Moreover, we know little about how Part D affected the informal long-term care needs of elderly 
adults. I provide some of the first evidence that increasing pharmaceutical access for the elderly 
not only improves their own functional outcomes, but also has positive spillover effects for non-
elderly caregivers. 
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Figures 
Figure 2-1. Trends in ADL & IADL Limitations 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1996-2012 (N=103,755). Sample is restricted to adults age 55-64. 
Estimates include HRS sampling weights. 
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Figure 2-2. Trends in Non-Elderly Adults’ Time Spent Caregiving for Household Adults 
Panel A: Pooled 
Panel B: Men 
Panel C: Women 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13 (N=101,423). Sample is restricted to adults age 27-64. The 
treatment group comprises individuals who have at least one elderly adult in their household. The control group 
comprises individuals who have no elderly adults in their household. Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.  
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Figure 2-3. Trends in Non-Elderly Adults’ Labor Force Outcomes 
Panel A: Pooled 
Panel B: Men 
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Panel C: Women 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13 (N=101,423). Sample is restricted to adults age 27-64. The 
treatment group comprises individuals who have at least one elderly adult in their household. The control group 
comprises individuals who have no elderly adults in their household. Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.  
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Tables 
Table 2-1. Prevalence of ADL & IADL Limitations in the HRS 
ADL or IADL Limitations ADL Limitations IADL Limitations 
Any Number [0-10] Any Number [0-5] Any Number [0-5] 
Pooled (age 
50+) 
0.202 0.6 0.150 0.3 0.132 0.3 
By age 
50-54 0.135 0.3 0.099 0.2 0.087 0.2 
55-59 0.148 0.4 0.110 0.2 0.092 0.2 
60-64 0.159 0.4 0.122 0.2 0.097 0.2 
65-69 0.163 0.4 0.123 0.2 0.096 0.2 
70-74 0.194 0.5 0.145 0.3 0.119 0.2 
75-79 0.261 0.7 0.190 0.4 0.169 0.3 
80-84 0.352 1.0 0.253 0.5 0.247 0.5 
85+ 0.524 1.9 0.390 0.9 0.414 1.0 
By sex 
Male 0.183 0.5 0.131 0.2 0.113 0.2 
Female 0.218 0.6 0.166 0.3 0.148 0.3 
By 
household 
income 
Quartile 1 0.386 1.2 0.297 0.6 0.275 0.6 
Quartile 2 0.237 0.6 0.173 0.3 0.155 0.3 
Quartile 3 0.152 0.4 0.111 0.2 0.091 0.2 
Quartile 4 0.084 0.2 0.059 0.1 0.047 0.1 
By 
educational 
attainment 
Less than 
high school 
0.350 1.1 0.263 0.6 0.248 0.5 
High school 0.195 0.5 0.145 0.3 0.124 0.2 
Some 
college 
0.166 0.4 0.122 0.2 0.104 0.2 
College or 
more 
0.116 0.3 0.085 0.2 0.069 0.1 
By 
race/ethnicit
y 
White, non-
Hispanic 
0.185 0.5 0.135 0.3 0.119 0.2 
Black, non-
Hispanic 
0.291 0.9 0.225 0.5 0.202 0.4 
Other, non-
Hispanic 
0.227 0.6 0.166 0.3 0.155 0.3 
Hispanic 0.273 0.9 0.216 0.5 0.178 0.4 
By marital 
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status 
Married 0.157 0.4 0.114 0.2 0.098 0.2 
Unmarried 0.278 0.8 0.211 0.4 0.190 0.4 
By veteran 
status 
Veteran 0.186 0.5 0.134 0.3 0.113 0.2 
Non-veteran 0.207 0.6 0.155 0.3 0.138 0.3 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1996 to 2012 (N=103,755). Estimates include HRS sampling weights. 
ADL limitations are bathing, dressing, eating, getting in and out of bed, and walking across the room, and IADL 
limitations are talking on the telephone, managing money, taking medications, shopping for groceries, and preparing 
meals. 
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Table 2-2. DD Estimates for Impact of Part D on ADL & IADL Limitations for the Elderly 
Pooled Married Not married Men Women 
Any ADL/IADL 
limitations 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
-0.016 
(0.010) 
-0.016* 
(0.009) 
[μ=0.178] [μ=0.153] [μ=0.224] [μ=0.167] [μ=0.187] 
Number ADL/IADL 
limitations [0-10] 
-0.056** 
(0.023) 
-0.070*** 
(0.024) 
-0.026 
(0.048) 
-0.073** 
(0.032) 
-0.045 
(0.032) 
[μ=0.450] [μ=0.382] [μ=0.580] [μ=0.408] [μ=0.484] 
Any ADL Limitations 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.009 
(0.012) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
[μ=0.135] [μ=0.115] [μ=0.174] [μ=0.119] [μ=0.149] 
Number ADL 
limitations [0-5] 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.029** 
(0.014) 
-0.011 
(0.029) 
-0.036* 
(0.019) 
-0.014 
(0.020) 
[μ=0.253] [μ=0.214] [μ=0.329] [μ=0.222] [μ=0.280] 
Any IADL limitations 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
-0.013* 
(0.007) 
-0.018** 
(0.007) 
[μ=0.107] [μ=0.090] [μ=0.139] [μ=0.099] [μ=0.113] 
Number IADL 
limitations [0-5] 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.040*** 
(0.012) 
-0.015 
(0.023) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.031** 
(0.015) 
[μ=0.196] [μ=0.168] [μ=0.251] [μ=0.186] [μ=0.205] 
Observations 103,755 70,190 33,565 45,659 58,096 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. Individual-clustered standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2-3. DD Estimates for Impact of Household’s Part D Eligibility on Non-Elderly Adults’ 
Time Spent Caregiving  
Pooled Men Women 
Caregiving (any) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.035* 
(0.018) 
[μ=0.129] [μ=0.083] [μ=0.162] 
Caregiving (hours per week) 
-0.185 
(0.166) 
0.383** 
(0.165) 
-0.602** 
(0.261) 
[μ=0.963] [μ=0.311] [μ=1.444] 
Observations 101,423 45,193 56,230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment 
group [μ] is in brackets.     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 2-4. DD Estimates for Impact of Household’s Part D Eligibility on Non-Elderly Adults’ 
Labor Force Outcomes (ATUS) 
Pooled Men Women 
Employed 
-0.021* 
(0.011) 
-0.040** 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.013) 
[μ=0.950] [μ=0.946] [μ=0.953] 
Unemployed 
0.021* 
(0.011) 
0.040** 
(0.018) 
0.007 
(0.013) 
[μ=0.050] [μ=0.054] [μ=0.047] 
Observations 81,673 39,715 41,958 
Not in labor force 
0.003 
(0.016) 
0.016 
(0.024) 
-0.004 
(0.022) 
[μ=0.306] [μ=0.217] [μ=0.371] 
Observations 101,423 45,193 56,230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment 
group [μ] is in brackets.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3 Drugs and Diet: The Impact of Prescription Drug Coverage on Food Habits 
Abstract 
Incentivizing nutritious diet and other healthy behaviors is therefore a key public health 
policy in the United States, as poor diet is associated with chronic illness, including obesity, 
diabetes, and heart disease, which are costly for the health care system in the long. However 
policies that are intended to improve health outcomes, such as expansion of prescription drug 
coverage, may unintentionally worsen individuals’ diets by reducing their costs of eating poorly. 
In this study, I examine how elderly adults’ dietary habits respond to increased prescription drug 
coverage after the implementation of Medicare Part D in 2006. I use nationally-representative 
survey data to compare changes in diet among elderly versus near-elderly people after the 
implementation of the policy in 2006. I find strong and consistent evidence that Part D reduced 
healthy eating among seniors. These results are reflective of ex-ante moral hazard and suggest 
that poor eating habits may be an unintended spillover effect of increased prescription drug 
access. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Prescription drugs represent one of the most rapidly growing components of US health 
care spending, increasing from $354 billion in 2009 to $457 billion in 2015 (Assistant Secretary 
for Planning and Evaluation, 2016). Prescription medication utilization is particularly high 
among enrollees in public insurance programs; Medicare and Medicaid paid $219.3 billion or 
nearly half of the $457 billion spent on prescription drugs in 2015 (Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, 2016). While rapid innovation in pharmaceuticals has contributed to 
longevity and quality of life (Lichtenberg, 2007; Musini, Tejani, Bassett, & Wright, 2009) and 
reduced hospitalizations and non-drug medical spending (Afendulis et al., 2011; Kaestner et al., 
2017), improved access to drugs may have unintended negative spillover effects on individuals’ 
health behaviors. For example, if a person wants to lower their blood cholesterol levels, they can 
do so either by taking prescription statins or by modifying their diet, particularly reducing their 
intake of saturated fat and transfats (American Heart Association, 2017). If people view 
prescriptions and healthy diet as substitutes, then reducing prescription prices through 
expansions of prescription drug insurance may inadvertently lead to worse diets and higher 
utilization of prescription drugs. 
Poor diet is associated with a number of chronic illnesses, including obesity, diabetes, 
and heart disease. These diseases are costly for the health care system in the long run. Many of 
the costs associated with these diseases are not borne by the individual patient but rather by 
society at large in the form of payments from public health insurers, informal caregiving from 
friends and family members, and lost economic productivity. One study finds that the social cost 
of obesity alone exceeds $186 billion per year (Cawley & Meyerhoefer, 2012). Since individuals 
do not take into account these external costs when deciding to engage in risky behaviors, 
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government intervention may be needed to align the private costs of risky behaviors with the 
social costs. Incentivizing nutritious diet and other healthy behaviors is therefore a key public 
health policy in the United States (US Department of Health and Human Services, 2014a). 
Several existing state and federal policies attempt to modify individuals’ diets by 
increasing prices of unhealthy products (for example, soda taxes and candy taxes) and removing 
information asymmetries (for example, requiring labeling of nutrition facts). However, in some 
cases, government programs which are intended to improve health may unintentionally reduce 
individuals’ private costs of engaging in risky behaviors. One such example is the provision of 
publicly-subsidized prescription drug coverage for elderly people through the introduction of 
Medicare Part D in January 2006. Part D reduced the fraction of drug uninsured elderly from 24 
percent to 7 percent in its first year28 and substantially increased their drug utilization by between
6 and 13 percent  (Ketcham & Simon, 2008; Levy & Weir, 2009; Lichtenberg & Sun, 2007; Yin 
et al., 2008).29  Lipid regulators and non-insulin diabetes drugs were among the top five
therapeutic classes of drug prescribed under Part D in 2006-07 (Engelhardt & Gruber, 2011). 
While Part D played an important role in improving health and financial outcomes for the 
elderly (Ayyagari, 2016; Ayyagari & Shane, 2015; Chen et al., 2018), recent evidence points to 
unintentional harmful effects of the policy on health behaviors (Asfaw, 2019). Asfaw finds that 
the introduction of Part D reduced moderate exercise at the extensive and intensive margins and 
increased the probability of being overweight. However, we know little about how individuals 
substitute between prescription drug and diet. This paper examines the impact of prescription 
28 Even among those seniors who had drug coverage before 2006, most had less generous coverage with 
annual caps on spending (Gold, 2001). Past studies found that such spending caps were associated with reduced drug 
adherence among seniors (Hsu et al., 2006). 
29 Most of these studies measured “intent to treat” effects, and nearly two-thirds of the elderly had 
prescription drug insurance prior to Part D, so they imply much larger impacts for the sample who actually went 
from uninsured to insured. 
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drug coverage on elderly adults’ food habits, using the exogenous increase in prescription drug 
coverage for the over-65 population after the implementation of Part D. I use t nationally-
representative survey data to compare changes in diet among elderly versus near-elderly people 
after the implementation of the policy in 2006. 
I find strong and consistent evidence of substitution between prescription drugs and 
healthy diet. This is concerning because compared to diet, prescription drugs pose larger 
financial costs for public payers, can lead to adverse side-effects for patients (such as cerebral 
hemorrhage, renal failure, and rhabdomyolysis from statins) (Dimmitt, Stampfer, & Martin, 
2017), and have lower rates of efficacy than most people believe (Greger, 2018).30 The
consensus among most physicians and researchers is that diet and drugs are not mutually 
exclusive and that a healthy diet should accompany drug utilization. Thus, the finding that drug 
utilization is accompanied with poorer diet is a major public health concern. As policymakers 
discuss ways to make prescription drug more accessible to individuals, they should also 
implement supplemental policies to promote healthy eating to address potential negative 
spillover effects of increased drug utilization. 
3.1.1 Previous Literature on Ex-Ante Moral Hazard in Health Insurance 
This paper draws on the broader literature of ex-ante moral hazard in health insurance. 
Ex-ante moral hazard, which refers to low investments in self-protective activities in the 
presence of market insurance, was first modeled in Ehrlich and Becker (1972); this seminal 
paper discussed the tradeoffs between self-insurance, self-protection, and market insurance. In an 
30 For example, Greger (2018) reports that statins offer at most a 3 percent absolute risk reduction for 
subsequent heart attack or death over six years, whereas a heart-healthy diet may offer an absolute risk reduction of 
60 percent after fewer than four years. Nevertheless, survey results indicate that patients believe statins are about 
100 times more effective than they actually are in preventing heart attacks. 
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application of the Ehrlich and Becker model to health care, an agent can protect herself against 
risk by 1) purchasing health insurance, 2) self-insuring via intertemporal savings, or 3) investing 
in self-protective activities (such as preventive care and healthy behaviors) to reduce the 
probability of sickness. Without insurance, agents engage in an optimal combination of self-
insurance and protection, but if the agent purchases health insurance, then she no longer bears 
the full cost of falling sick. Thus, the marginal benefit of self-protection falls, and consequently 
the agent’s optimal level of self-protection decreases. 
Findings from the existing empirical literature on the existence of ex-ante moral hazard in 
health insurance are mixed. (Appendix 3-A provides a comprehensive review of this literature.) 
There is some evidence that Medicare decreases physical activity and increases smoking and 
drinking among elderly men, while it has no detectable effect on risky behaviors among women 
(D. Dave & Kaestner, 2009; de Preux, 2011). Others study younger populations and find that 
providing health insurance to young adults increases risky drinking (Barbaresco, Courtemanche, 
& Qi, 2015), though other studies using different data find no evidence of changes in smoking, 
drinking or drug utilization (Breslau et al., 2017; J. Lee, 2018). Results are also mixed for low-
income populations: some find that health insurance expansions for the poor increase risky 
drinking (C. Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2019) and smoking during 
pregnancy (D. M. Dave, Kaestner, & Wehby, 2019); others find no detectable effect on exercise, 
smoking, drinking, or BMI (Cawley, Soni, & Simon, 2018; C. Courtemanche, Marton, Ukert, 
Yelowitz, & Zapata, 2018; K. Simon, Soni, & Cawley, 2017); and still others actually find 
improvements in health behaviors for this population, such as reduced BMI and decreased 
consumption of cigarettes, alcohol, and soda (Cotti, Nesson, & Tefft, 2019; C. J. Courtemanche 
& Zapata, 2014; He, Lopez, & Boehm, 2018). Two randomized controlled trials find no impact 
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of health insurance on smoking and mixed results for body weight (Baicker et al., 2013; 
Bhattacharya, Bundorf, Pace, & Sood, 2011; Brook et al., 1983). Another study exploiting state 
laws that require plans to cover diabetes treatment find that more generous coverage does 
increase BMI (Klick & Stratmann, 2007). Researchers have also studied ex-ante moral hazard in 
non-US settings. There is evidence that insurance improves healthy behaviors in Britain 
(Courbage & de Coulon, 2004), but reduces the probability of engaging in healthy behaviors in 
China and Ghana (Qin & Lu, 2014; Yilma, Van Kempen, & De Hoop, 2012). 
One potential reason that previous studies find mixed results may be that health insurance 
provides incomplete protection against the costs of disease. While insurance may cover the 
monetary costs associated with illness, it does not cover the non-financial costs such as pain and 
suffering. Moreover, the medical procedures covered by non-drug insurance (such as surgery) 
may impose utility loss above and beyond the financial cost. One study finds that 88 percent of 
patients going for surgery experienced preoperative fear; the top three causes of their anxieties 
are fear of postoperative pain, intraoperative awareness, and postoperative drowsiness 
(Ruhaiyem et al., 2016). Fear and anxiety associated with medical procedures may be a reason 
why individuals resist changing their behaviors, even after gaining health insurance. 
Notably, the majority of these existing studies explore ex-ante moral hazard in the 
context of comprehensive insurance coverage. Prescription drugs are widely used and not 
associated with the same levels of fear and anxiety as invasive medical procedures. One would 
imagine, therefore, that there should be a larger behavioral response to prescription drug 
coverage than non-drug coverage. To my knowledge, only one paper looks at the impacts of 
prescription drug coverage isolated from other health insurance coverage. Asfaw (2019) studies 
the introduction of Part D and finds that the policy decreased vigorous physical activity and 
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increased the probability of being overweight. While he does not find an impact on smoking and 
other types of physical activities, his findings suggest that prescription drug coverage may indeed 
be associated with higher levels of ex-ante moral hazard. 
This paper makes two primary contributions to this literature. First, to my knowledge, 
this is the first paper to study the effect of prescription drug coverage on dietary outcomes. Part 
D is a promising context in which to study the effects of prescription drug coverage, given its 
substantial impact on out-of-pocket (OOP) drug prices and utilization. (See Appendix 2-A for a 
review of papers studying the impact of Part D on drug utilization.) Second, this paper is more 
generally informative about the presence of ex-ante moral hazard in the context of prescription 
drug insurance. Ex-ante moral hazard causes people to invest insufficiently in self-protection, 
and it is thus important for policymakers to be aware of this unintended side effect of expanding 
prescription drug coverage. 
3.1.2 Conceptual Framework: How Part D May Impact Diet 
Part D could theoretically affect elderly individuals’ diets in several ways. First, 
increased access to prescription drugs may cause ex-ante moral hazard; people have less 
incentive to undertake health-promoting behaviors because they no longer bear the full financial 
cost of their future illness. On the other hand, drug coverage leads to more physician visits to 
obtain prescriptions. During these visits, doctors may advise patients to improve their diets. 
Finally, Part D increased seniors’ disposable income, and they may have allocated these funds to 
improving their diets.31
31 Existing studies show that before Part D, prescription drugs produced high financial burdens for elderly 
people. In a 2003 survey of noninstitutionalized Medicare beneficiaries above age 65, 90% of respondents reported 
taking prescription drugs, predominantly pills, inhalers, creams, and eyedrops. However, only 75% of all 
respondents and 66% of low-income respondents had prescription drug coverage, and so out-of-pocket prescription 
costs were high. Nearly one-third of respondents spent more than $100 per month, and five percent reported buying 
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These three mechanisms work in opposing directions. For example, assume that there are 
two methods for someone to prevent a heart attack: 1) reduce consumption of unhealthy foods 
high in cholesterol and saturated fats, or 2) take a statin. If the patient derives utility from eating 
unhealthy foods, then “abstaining” is costly for her. When statins are subsidized through 
prescription drug insurance, she would be less likely to abstain and so we would expect an 
increase in cholesterol and fat consumption. On the other hand, when the patient goes to the 
doctor to obtain her statin prescription, the doctor may inform her of the negative effects 
unhealthy eating has on her condition; this information effect may convince the patient to 
improve her diet. Finally, unhealthy foods tend to be inferior goods, so when the patient’s 
disposable income increases through prescription drug insurance (due to less out of pocket 
spending on statins and other drugs), she would buy less unhealthy food. The net effect of 
prescription drug insurance on diet is thus ambiguous and ultimately an empirical question. 
3.2 An Economic Model of Ex-Ante Moral Hazard 
This section develops a model that predicts how Medicare Part D changes its 
beneficiaries’ incentives; the model is based on one developed in a seminal paper on ex-ante 
moral hazard (Ehrlich & Becker, 1972), but my model differs in the following ways. In the 
Ehrlich and Becker model, the main risk agents face is foregone wages, but the population I 
model is above the age of 65, so foregone income is less salient; instead, the main risk in my 
model is out-of-pocket medical spending. Also, Ehrlich and Becker include an endogenous 
prescriptions from Canada or Mexico. Twenty-five percent reported forgoing prescription drugs in the past year 
because of cost. Most respondents who had prescription drug coverage obtained coverage through employer plans or 
privately purchased plans. Those with privately purchased coverage had higher spending and cost-related 
nonadherence than those with employer-sponsored coverage and Medicaid (Safran et al., 2005). 
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variable to indicate the purchase of insurance, whereas in my model, the only endogenous 
variable is behavior. 
The agent in this model is a Medicare-eligible person who is above the age of 65. The 
agent chooses the amount of a healthy behavior to maximize expected utility. There are two 
states of the world depending on the agent’s health status: Sick and Healthy, and each state has 
an associated utility based on the agent’s net income in that state. I assume that labor supply is 
zero in both states as the agent is above age 65 and likely to be retired. The agent receives 
retirement income Y which is independent of health status and exogenous in this model. 
Health status depends on probabilities over which individuals have at least some level of 
control. Agents can undertake a healthy behavior, i.e. consume a nutritious diet, which would 
reduce their probability of getting sick (p). Healthy behavior is denoted as B and measured in 
time-units. Mathematically, p(B) is a decreasing convex function with 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵
< 0 and 
𝑑2𝑝
𝑑𝐵2
> 0  (See 
Figure 3-1). The reason for the convexity assumption is that presumably going from zero units of 
nutrition to one unit of nutrition would result in major health benefits; however, the marginal 
benefit of each additional unit of nutrition would naturally fall as the agent starts to eat more and 
more nutritiously.  
Undertaking the healthy behavior also imposes some cost on the agent, which I quantify 
as wB, where w represents the agent’s shadow price of time. In the event of sickness, agents face 
an exogenous financial loss L, which is equivalent to the medical cost of treating sickness. 
Agents are trying to maximize expected utility, which is calculated as the sum of utility 
when healthy and utility when sick, each weighted by their respective probability of occurring. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑈 (𝐵) =  𝑝(𝐵) ∙ 𝑢(𝑦𝑠) + [1 − 𝑝(𝐵)] ∙ 𝑢(𝑦ℎ)
Equation 3-1 
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where the income when sick is 𝑦𝑠 = 𝑌 –  𝐿 –  𝑤𝐵  and income when healthy is 𝑦ℎ =
𝑌 –  𝑤𝐵.32 I assume that u(y) and w are strictly positive, while B is greater than or equal to 0. The
only endogenous decision variable in the model is B. Taking the derivate of Equation 3-1 with 
respect to choice variable B results in the first order condition: 
 𝑝(𝐵∗) ∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑦𝑠
∙ (−𝑤) + 𝑢(𝑦𝑠) ∙
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵∗
+ [1 − 𝑝(𝐵∗)] ∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑦ℎ
∙ (−𝑤) + 𝑢(𝑦ℎ) ∙ (−
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵∗
) = 0
Equation 3-2 
This simplifies to: 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵∗
∙ [𝑢(𝑦𝑠) − 𝑢(𝑦ℎ)] = 𝑤 ∙ {𝑝(𝐵∗) ∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑦𝑠
+ [1 − 𝑝(𝐵∗)] ∙
𝑑𝑢
𝑑𝑦ℎ
}
Equation 3-3 
The term in {brackets} on the right-hand side represents the expected value of marginal 
utility and can be denoted as 
𝑑𝐸𝑈
𝑑𝑦
 and so the first-order condition further simplifies to:
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵∗
∙ [𝑢(𝑦𝑠) − 𝑢(𝑦ℎ)] = 𝑤 ∙
𝑑𝐸𝑈
𝑑𝑦
Equation 3-4 
The first term in Equation 3-4 (
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵∗
) represents the change in probability of getting sick
from a marginal increase in healthy behaviors. This will be a negative quantity since I assumed 
above that 
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵
< 0. The second term on the left-hand side 𝑢(𝑦𝑠) − 𝑢(𝑦ℎ) represents the
difference in utility between the two states of the world and is also negative because of the sign 
restrictions placed on the parameters. So the left-hand side amounts to the decreased probability 
32 For simplicity, I denote income in each state as ys and yh in equations 1-4. Note, however, that y is always 
a function of L, w, and B. 
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of suffering the utility difference and thus represents the marginal benefit from an incremental 
increase in healthy behaviors. 
The right-hand side amounts to the agent’s shadow price of time multiplied by the 
marginal utility of income. Income Y is decreasing in B and so the derivative term represents the 
decrease of utility associated with additional healthy behaviors in both states of the world. We 
can thus interpret the right-hand side of the equation as the marginal cost of healthy behaviors. 
Therefore, the first order condition specified in Equation 3-4 states that utility-maximizing 
agents will choose an optimal level of B* such that the marginal gain from healthy behaviors is 
equal to the marginal cost of healthy behaviors. B* is increasing in out-of-pocket cost L.
3.2.1 Impact of the Policy 
Next, I incorporate the Part D policy into this framework. Part D affects 𝑦𝑠 by reducing
the cost of being sick (L) and thus increasing the value of 𝑦𝑠. The policy reduces L by making
prescription drug insurance available to agents, which in turn reduces the agent’s out-of-pocket 
cost of medical care. The rise in 𝑦𝑠 narrows the utility gap between the healthy state and sick
state, which in turn reduces the marginal gain from healthy behaviors (i.e. the left-hand side of 
the equation). Since the left-hand side of the first-order condition is now less than the right-hand 
side of the equation, agents must respond by lowering their optimal choice of B*. (I assumed 
above that  
𝑑𝑝
𝑑𝐵
< 0 and 
𝑑2𝑝
𝑑𝐵2
> 0 .) Thus, the model predicts that a positive shock in healthcare 
access, such as the one associated with Part D, would undermine the agent’s incentive to engage 
in the healthy behavior.  Specifically, Part D lowers the price of prescription drugs for people 
who are Medicare eligible, so we would expect the Medicare eligible to use less of the healthy 
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diet substitute, whereas the policy does not change the price of drugs for younger adults who are 
ineligible for Medicare, so we should expect no change in diet for them. 
3.3 Data and Measures 
The National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NHANES) is a biennial survey 
conducted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The NHANES provides 
detailed dietary intake data that respondents consume during the 24-hour period prior to the 
interview. It is well-suited for my study because it contains detailed information on daily total 
nutrient intakes from foods and beverages for survey participants. The main outcomes I examine 
in this analysis are daily consumption of calories (kcal), carbohydrates (gm), total fat (gm), 
protein (gm), total saturated fatty acids (gm), cholesterol (mg), and sugar (gm). In the Appendix, 
I present estimates for additional outcomes, including consumption of calcium and other 
nutrients. The sample is nationally representative and consists of about 5,000 individuals each 
year. For my main analysis, I restrict the sample to the 2000-12 NHANES. Table 3-1 displays 
descriptive statistics of the NHANES study sample. 
I also present supplementary results using the 2001-09 Behavioral Risk Factors 
Surveillance System (BRFSS). The BRFSS contains individual-level data on eating habits and 
other health behaviors for 500,000 individuals per year. This dataset is widely used to study the 
effects of state and federal policies in individuals’ health behaviors (Barbaresco et al., 2015; K. 
Simon et al., 2017). It includes a number of questions related to consumption of fruits and 
vegetables. The main outcomes I examine in this analysis are: number of servings per month of 
fruit juice, fruit, green salad, potatoes, carrots, and other vegetables. For my primary analysis, I 
restrict the analytical sample to those aged 60 to 70; I also omit those aged 65 from the sample. 
Appendix Table 3- 2 provides demographic characteristics of the BRFSS sample.  
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3.4 Empirical Methods 
This section describes a model intended to estimate the causal impact of prescription drug 
coverage on health behaviors. Without employing causal inference methods, an ordinary least 
squares model regressing health behavior on prescription drug coverage may be biased if 
unobservable factors that influence an individual’s drug coverage are correlated with 
unobservable factors that determine the individual’s health behaviors. Without controlling for 
these unobservable factors, drug coverage would positively correlate with the error, and the 
estimated ex-ante moral hazard effect would be overstated. On the other hand, those who had 
insurance before 2006 could have been healthier (if insurance companies screened out high-risk 
individuals), in which case the moral hazard effect would be understated (healthier people are 
less likely to engage in ex-ante moral hazard). Therefore, conventional least squares regression 
will yield biased results. 
In order to obtain causal estimates, I exploit plausibly exogenous variation in prescription 
drug insurance enrollment generated by the introduction of Medicare Part D. I use a difference-
in-differences (DD) study design that compares outcomes among people aged 66-70 (the 
treatment group) to those aged 60-64 (the control group), before and after the 2006 policy 
change. My baseline model is: 
Yigst = α + β(Treatmentg*Postt)+ γXigst + ϕUnempst +ηAgei + δStates + ϑTimet + ε
Equation 3-5
where Yigst represents a diet-related outcome for individual i in age group g living in state 
s at time t, Treatmentg is an indicator equal to one if the individual is 66-70 and zero if the 
individual is 60 to 64, Postt is an indicator equal to one if the time period is after January 2006, 
Xigst is a vector of demographic control variables, Unempst is the state unemployment rate, Agei is 
a vector of age-fixed effects, States is a vector of state-fixed effects, and Timet is a vector of time-
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fixed effects. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-robust, and regressions include BRFSS 
survey weights. 
The coefficient β represents the causal effect of prescription drug coverage on Y provided 
that the control group is good counterfactual for the treatment group, i.e. in the absence of 
Medicare Part D, both groups would have trended similarly. In order to assess the plausibility of 
this assumption, I conduct parallel trends tests using an event study approach. I estimate a model 
similar to Equation 3-5, but I replace the Treatmentg*Postt interaction term with a vector of 
interactions for each year indicator and Treatmentg, excluding the year 2005 as the base year. I 
conduct an F-test to test whether all the pre-2006 interaction terms are jointly equal to 0. A p-
value greater than 0.10 means that I cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal trends between the 
treatment and control groups before 2006. This provides confidence that the control group is a 
good counterfactual for the treatment group. 
3.4.1 Additional Empirical Tests 
I also assess whether impacts were stronger among demographic and socioeconomic 
groups most impacted by Part D by estimating Equation 3-5 separately for subsamples stratified 
by income, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, and geographic region. Before Part D, drug 
coverage was concentrated among those with income over 200% FPL and those below the 
poverty line (Long, 1994). Another study found that those who gained most from Part D tend to 
be low educated, low income, black, and more likely to come from some regions (e.g., east and 
west South Central) (Kaestner & Khan, 2012). Assuming that it was indeed changes in 
prescription drug insurance that principally caused changes in health behaviors, we should 
expect changes between 2004 and 2007 to be greater for those with incomes between 100 and 
200% FPL and those with low education. By honing in on those who were more likely to have 
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gained drug coverage through Part D, I assess whether my estimates are stronger for these 
groups. 
3.5 Results 
I first assess visual trends in diet outcomes over time. Figure 3-3 and Figure 3-3 show 
annual means for each of the NHANES and BRFSS outcome variables separately for the 
treatment group and the control group. For nearly all outcomes, the elderly treatment group and 
non-elderly control groups appear to trends similarly over the pre-2006 period. There is visual 
evidence of a relative decline in consumption of certain fruits and vegetables after 2006. 
Table 3-2 presents DD results from the NHANES analysis. I find that Part D increased 
total calorie consumption by 76.9 calories per day (a 4.4 percent increase over pre-2006 levels), 
increased carbohydrate consumption by 12.6 grams per day (5.8 percent increase), increased 
total fat consumption by 2.9 grams per day (4.6 percent increase), increased total saturated fatty 
acid consumption by 1.5 grams per day (7.1 percent increase), and increased sugar consumption 
by 12.0 grams per day (12.1 percent increase). Most of these increases were concentrated among 
unmarried males. I examine additional outcomes, and results are displayed in Appendix Table 3- 
3. I find increases in total monounsaturated fatty acids, reductions in dietary fiber intake,
reductions in Vitamin B6, reductions in Vitamin K, reductions in Beta-carotene, and increases in 
caffeine consumption. Again, the majority of these changes came from unmarried men. 
Appendix Figure 3- 1 displays results from the event study tests for parallel trends for the 
NHANES outcomes. For most outcomes, there is no evidence of differential trends between the 
treatment and control groups in the pre-2006 years. This increases confidence that the DD 
assumptions are met and that the DD estimates can be interpreted as causal. 
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Table 3-3 displays the DD results from the BRFSS analysis. I find that Part D 
significantly reduced consumption of fruit by 1.2 servings per month (a 4.2 percent decline 
compared to pre-2006 levels), reduced green salad consumption by 0.6 services per month (3.5 
percent decline), and reduced the consumption of other vegetables by 1.2 servings per month 
(2.9 percent decrease). There was no significant change in consumption of fruit juice, potatoes, 
and carrots. Appendix Table 3- 4 presents results from the pre-trends analysis. I find no evidence 
that the treatment and control groups followed differential trends before 2006 for any of the six 
outcomes, which increases confidence in the causal interpretation of these results. 
3.6 Discussion  
This study provides some of the first evidence that expanded pharmaceutical access 
unintentionally worsens individuals’ diet habits. I exploit the introduction of Medicare Part D, 
and find significant increases in total saturated fat and sugar consumption and reductions in fruit 
and vegetable consumption; changes were concentrated among unmarried men. These findings 
are informative about the presence of ex-ante moral hazard as well as substitutability between 
prescription drugs and diet. These results also support previous studies which find no significant 
impact of Part D on cholesterol levels, in spite of increased use of statins and other antilipidemic 
drugs (Hanlon et al., 2013). 
Part D has numerous large benefits for health and financial outcomes for the elderly, and 
thus policymakers should not interpret these findings as rationale for cutting back on prescription 
drug coverage for older people. However, it is important that they are aware of potential negative 
spillover effects and supplement coverage accordingly. For example, Medicare does not 
currently cover services of nutritionists or dieticians. There is some empirical evidence that 
informational nudging can help people make healthier food choices (Nikolova & Inman, 2015; 
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Oster, 2018).  Policymakers may consider expanding Medicare’s coverage of nutrition services 
as a way to combat the unintended negative side-effects of Part D on health behaviors. 
This analysis is subject to several limitations. The control group might be contaminated 
because people close to age 65 know that they will get Part D in the future, and therefore there 
may be anticipatory effects. The Medicare Modernization Program also created the Medicare 
Discount Drug Card Program which took effect in early 2004 and helped Medicare recipients 
receive discounts on their Rx drugs during the two years prior to Part D implementation. I 
conduct robustness checks omitting the years 2003-04 and individuals aged 63-64, and find that 
the results persist even after accounting for potential anticipatory effects of the policy. 
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Figures 
Figure 3-1. Example Functional Form of p(B) 
p(B) 
B 
95 
Figure 3-2. Trends in NHANES Diet Outcomes 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on NHANES 2000-2012. The treatment group is adults aged 65 and older; the 
control group is adults aged 25 to 64. Data is adjusted by NHANES sample weights.  
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Figure 3-3. Trends in BRFSS Diet Outcomes 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from the sample. The treatment group is adults aged 60 to 64; the control group is adults 
aged 66 to 70. 
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Tables 
Table 3-1. Demographic Characteristics of the NHANES Sample 
Control 
Group 
Treatment 
Group 
Age 43.65 73.46 
Male 0.487 0.442 
Educational attainment 
Less than high school 0.164 0.278 
High school 0.232 0.276 
Some college 0.305 0.240 
College or more 0.299 0.206 
Race/ethnicity 
White, non-Hispanic 0.701 0.823 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.113 0.0784 
Other race, non-Hispanic 0.0572 0.0347 
Hispanic 0.129 0.0636 
Household income (thousands) 65.22 46.55 
Married 0.610 0.587 
Household size 3.101 2.026 
Observations 20,679 7,725 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHANES 2000-2012. The treatment group is adults aged 65 and older; the 
control group is adults aged 25 to 64. Data is adjusted by NHANES sample weights.  
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Table 3-2. DD Results for Impact of Medicare Part D on NHANES Diet Outcomes 
Pooled 
Unmarried 
Females 
Married Females 
Unmarried
Males 
Married Males 
Calories (kcal) 
76.936*** 
(27.023) 
61.601 
(47.862) 
59.452 
(45.373) 
310.927*** 
(78.981) 
29.826 
(51.068) 
[μ=1,727.8] [μ=1,506.9] [μ=1,563.8] [μ=1,824.3] [μ=2,023.4] 
Carbohydrates (gm) 
12.596*** 
(3.671) 
11.211* 
(6.441) 
7.610 
(6.396) 
48.993*** 
(10.587) 
4.341 
(6.960) 
[μ=216.8] [μ=192.3] [μ=200.9] [μ=216.3] [μ=249.6] 
Protein (gm) 
0.182 
(1.190) 
-2.072 
(2.062) 
1.438 
(2.050) 
7.836** 
(3.557) 
-1.044 
(2.261) 
[μ=67.5] [μ=59.8] [μ=59.1] [μ=70.6] [μ=79.9] 
Total fat (gm) 
2.888** 
(1.352) 
2.728 
(2.421) 
3.038 
(2.392) 
10.379*** 
(3.663) 
1.289 
(2.577) 
[μ=65.4] [μ=57.5] [μ=59.2] [μ=68.2] [μ=77.2] 
Cholesterol (mg) 
2.796 
(8.046) 
-13.879 
(13.150) 
6.495 
(16.594) 
4.038 
(23.034) 
13.627 
(14.903) 
[μ=241.4] [μ=211.7] [μ=213.6] [μ=289.4] [μ=277.1] 
Total saturated fatty 
acids (gm) 
1.477*** 
(0.482) 
1.321 
(0.865) 
2.035** 
(0.834) 
3.177** 
(1.385) 
0.693 
(0.919) 
[μ=20.8] [μ=18.1] [μ=18.3] [μ=22.9] [μ=24.6] 
Sugar (gm) 
11.958*** 
(2.635) 
6.962 
(4.470) 
7.792 
(4.779) 
35.385*** 
(7.193) 
7.561 
(5.113) 
[μ=98.8] [μ=90.0] [μ=95.8] [μ=97.6] [μ=110.1] 
Observations 28,404 7,009 7,554 5,024 8,817 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHANES 2000-2012. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the treatment group 
indicator, sex, age, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, household income, household size, and 
year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by NHANES sample weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Pre-
2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 3-3. DD Results for Impact of Medicare Part D on BRFSS Diet Outcomes 
Pooled 
Unmarried 
Females 
Married Females 
Unmarried
Males 
Married Males 
Fruit Juice 
-0.284 
(0.403) 
-0.750 
(0.721) 
0.251 
(0.540) 
-0.558 
(1.424) 
-0.210 
(0.756) 
[μ=17.52] 
Fruit 
-1.186*** 
(0.440) 
-1.305 
(0.921) 
0.080 
(0.814) 
-2.388* 
(1.223) 
-1.631** 
(0.692) 
[μ=27.76] 
Green Salad 
-0.590** 
(0.268) 
-0.007 
(0.564) 
-0.581 
(0.503) 
-1.689** 
(0.770) 
-0.521 
(0.421) 
[μ=16.99] 
Potatoes 
0.006 
(0.157) 
-0.171 
(0.281) 
-0.465* 
(0.259) 
0.185 
(0.555) 
0.360 
(0.272) 
[μ=8.21] 
Carrots 
-0.338 
(0.223) 
-0.019 
(0.422) 
-0.570 
(0.393) 
-0.285 
(0.476) 
-0.318 
(0.389) 
[μ=8.53] 
Other 
Vegetables 
-1.158*** 
(0.446) 
-0.103 
(0.856) 
-2.271*** 
(0.817) 
1.810 
(1.456) 
-1.660** 
(0.714) 
[μ=40.21] 
Observations 227,526 66,383 67,400 28,061 65,682 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from sample. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of 
treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, marital 
status, unemployment status, household income, household size, state unemployment rate, state-fixed effects, and 
quarter/year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. State-clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.   
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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4 Consumption Effects of Health Insurance Expansions for Young Adults: Evidence 
from Scanner Data 
Abstract 
Improving financial outcomes is a stated policy goal of health insurance expansions, but 
little is known about how health insurance impacts consumption patterns, particularly among 
young adults. I exploit a large increase in insurance coverage for young adults generated by the 
Affordable Care Act’s 2010 dependent coverage provision. Before this policy, young adults 
faced high uninsurance rates and large out-of-pocket medical expenses. I use detailed data on 
daily purchases by a panel of 60,000 households and apply quasi-experimental study designs to 
assess the dependent coverage provision’s impact on consumption among young adults. I 
measure both income effects of health insurance, by studying the expansions’ impacts on total 
consumer purchases, and substitution effects, by studying impacts on purchases of specific 
products. I find that expanded insurance eligibility increases total consumer spending by 8 
percent; this was driven by increases in purchases of food, alcohol, contraceptives, and over-the-
counter medications. This study provides important evidence of the role that health insurance 
expansions can play in improving consumption and financial outcomes among vulnerable 
populations. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Health insurance provides people with protection against potentially catastrophic medical 
expenses that may result from illness or injury. Health care costs are high in the United States, 
particularly for acute and emergent care. The uninsured therefore face considerable financial 
risk. Before the implementation of the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA’s) dependent coverage 
provision in 2010, uninsured young adults were particularly vulnerable. Uninsured young adults 
spent on average more than 50 percent of their total annual medical expenses, or $575 per year, 
out-of-pocket (OOP), whereas insured young adults spent only 15 percent of their annual 
medical expenses, or $384 per year, OOP.33 It is plausible that insuring young adults would
reduce this financial risk, free up their income and precautionary savings, and improve their 
financial outcomes. 
Improving financial outcomes is often a stated policy goal of insurance expansions. 
However, the causal effect of insurance expansions on financial outcomes can be challenging to 
measure because of the endogeneity between income and insurance eligibility. Income and assets 
are often determinants of eligibility for public health insurance, and so people may have 
incentives to distort or misreport income in order to maintain insurance eligibility. There may 
also be unobserved factors, such as risk aversion, that are correlated with both financial 
outcomes and insurance enrollment. Moreover, there could be reverse causality if financial 
distress itself causes poor health. To circumvent these issues, I use consumers’ purchasing power 
as a proxy measure for financial wellbeing. I measure how people’s monthly household 
purchases change in response to increased health insurance eligibility. My identification strategy 
33 Author’s calculations based on sample of 19-26 year olds from the 2006-08 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey. 
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exploits a recent health insurance expansion resulting from the ACA dependent coverage 
provision in 2010.  
4.1.1 The Dependent Coverage Provision 
The ACA significantly expanded health insurance coverage in the United States (Frean, 
Gruber, & Sommers, 2017) through various provisions. The one that I focus on is the 2010 
dependent coverage provision of the ACA, also known as the Young Adult Mandate. The 
Mandate was one of the first coverage provisions of the ACA; it required insurers to allow 
children to remain on their parents’ private insurance plans until age 26. Before the 
implementation of the provision in September 2010, in most states, children were no longer able 
to remain on their parents’ plans upon turning 19. Even in those states that had some sort of 
provision for continuing parental insurance coverage for young adults, coverage was typically 
dependent on being a student, being unmarried, or being financially dependent on parents.  
Consequently, young adults faced some of the highest uninsurance rates of all age groups 
in the country. In 2009, about 31 percent of adults aged 19-25 (or 9.2 million individuals) lacked 
insurance coverage (Busch, Golberstein, & Meara, 2014). Previous studies show that the 
dependent coverage provision led to substantial increases in insurance, reducing uninsurance 
rates among targeted individuals by about 10 percentage points (or 3 million young adults) by 
the end of 2011 (Akosa Antwi, Moriya, & Simon, 2013; Sommers, Buchmueller, Decker, Carey, 
& Kronick, 2013). Moreover, previous studies have found that the dependent coverage provision 
reduced large and uncertain out-of-pocket medical expenses for young adults (Ali, Chen, Mutter, 
Novak, & Mortensen, 2016; Busch et al., 2014). If young adults reallocated this income to 
consumption, we should expect to see increases in consumer purchases. 
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4.1.2 Literature on Health Insurance and Financial Wellbeing 
Previous studies have examined the relationship between health insurance and financial 
outcomes in different settings. Appendix 4-A provides a comprehensive review of this literature. 
Others have studied the impact of the ACA dependent coverage provision on financial outcomes 
other than consumption (Blascak & Mikhed, 2018; Han, 2016). Blascak & Mikhed (2018) use 
data on consumer credit scores and find that the provision decreased the number of delinquencies 
and the probability of filing for bankruptcy among young adults; effects were strongest for 
individuals living in counties with the highest pre-2010 uninsurance rates. Han (2016) studies 
student loan debt and finds that the provisions reduced the student loan default rate and increased 
repayment rates of student loans.  
There is a large literature which examines the effects of health insurance on financial 
outcomes for other populations. For example, studies find that Medicare decreased OOP medical 
expenditure risk (Finkelstein & McKnight, 2008), reduced contact with collection agencies 
(Barcellos & Jacobson, 2015), and increased investments in risky assets (Angrisani, Atella, & 
Brunetti, 2018; Christelis, Georgarakos, & Sanz-de-Galdeano, 2017) among elderly people. The 
Medicare Part D provision, in particular, reduced OOP medical expenditures (Engelhardt & 
Gruber, 2011) and increased investments in risky assets (Ayyagari & He, 2016) by expanding 
prescription drug coverage for the over-65 population. 
There are also a number of studies evaluating the financial impacts of Medicaid 
expansion for low-income people. These papers report strong and consistent increases in credit 
scores and retirement savings, and reductions in OOP medical expenditures, medical and non-
medical debt, payday loans, delinquencies, personal bankruptcy, and evictions (Allen, Swanson, 
Wang, & Gross, 2017; Brevoort, Grodzicki, & Hackmann, 2017; Caswell & Waidmann, 2017; 
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Dillender, 2017; E. Gallagher, Gopalan, Grinstein-Weiss, & Sabat, 2018; Gross & Notowidigdo, 
2011; Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, Miller, & Wong, 2018; Kino, Sato, & Kawachi, 2018; 
Leininger, Levy, & Schanzenbach, 2010; Miller, Hu, Kaestner, Mazumder, & Wong, 2018; 
Sommers & Oellerich, 2013). Another study exploits income eligibility thresholds to receive 
ACA marketplace subsidies and finds that subsidized coverage reduces the probability of being 
delinquent on home payments (E. A. Gallagher, Gopalan, & Grinstein-Weiss, 2017). 
Others have evaluates causal effects of health insurance on financial outcomes in the 
context of the Oregon health insurance experiment (Finkelstein et al., 2012), the Massachusetts 
health care reform (Mazumder & Miller, 2016), and the Tennessee Medicaid disenrollment 
(Argys, Friedson, Pitts, & Tello-Trillo, 2017). Nearly all these studies find strong evidence that 
health insurance increases credit scores, and reduces debt, delinquencies, and other measures of 
financial strain. 
While there is a large body of evidence showing that health insurance improves financial 
outcomes such as credit scores, debt, and bankruptcy, we know very little about the effects of 
expansion on consumption itself. There are a few exceptions. For example, Dillender (2017) 
applies an instrumental variables strategy to estimate the effect of an additional family member 
becoming eligible for Medicaid and finds that while insurance reduces medical spending, there is 
no detectable effect on non-health spending. Levy et al. (2019) exploits the ACA Medicaid 
expansion and draws similar conclusions, that Medicaid reduces health spending but does not 
change non-health consumption. Leininger et al. (2010), on the other hand, finds increases in 
overall expenditures (mostly transportation and retirement savings) resulting from expansions of 
the Children’s Health Insurance Program. All three of these studies use the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) and focus on low-income populations. 
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To my knowledge, this paper is the first to study the effect of health insurance on 
consumption for young adults below age 26. Adults aged 19-26 are usually in the early stages of 
their career or full-time students and therefore financially vulnerable. Financial outcomes during 
this stage of life can have important implications for later-life outcomes. I exploit the 
implementation of the ACA dependent coverage provision and use detailed data on household 
purchases from the Nielsen Household Consumer Panel (NHCP), a dataset that has powerful 
applications in public policy but is not yet widely used in the field. I find that expanded 
insurance eligibility increases total consumer spending, particularly in the categories of food, 
contraceptives, and over-the-counter medications. 
4.2 Data 
I use the Nielsen Household Consumer Panel (NHCP), a panel survey that reports all the 
household products purchased daily by a panel of 60,000 US households. Variables include 
household demographics (including household income, race/ethnicity, household size, and age 
and educational attainment of all members in the household), geographic identifiers (to the zip 
code level), and product characteristics (to the UPC code level). After each shopping trip, 
households report their purchases using handheld barcode scanners and keypads provided by 
Nielsen. Participating households are asked to scan all their purchases, including groceries, 
drugs, small appliances, and mass merchandise products. About 80 percent of households are 
retained from year to year, and there are around 60,000 active households (that meet Nielsen’s 
reporting requirements) in any given year.  
The Nielsen has several advantages over the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), the 
main dataset used in previous studies of health insurance and consumption (Dillender, 2017; 
Leininger et al., 2010; Levy, Buchmueller, & Nikpay, 2019). First, the use of scanners and 
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receipts in real time increases the accuracy of reported expenditures. Second, there is a large 
amount of detail available on products; approximately 3.4 million UPC codes have been 
purchased at some point by households in the NHCP. Thus, I am able to differentiate between 
branded and generic products. Third, the NHCP provides detailed geographic identifiers down to 
the zip code level, which allows me to estimate triple differences models exploiting variation in 
pre-2010 uninsurance rates across counties. However, unlike the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
the Nielsen data does not include information on expenditures for goods and services used 
outside the home, including purchases at bars and restaurants. 
4.3 Methods 
To assess the impact of the ACA dependent coverage provision on consumer purchases, I 
exploit the fact that only those below the age of 26 were eligible for the provision. I compare 
consumption outcomes for households impacted by the policy with those unaffected because 
they were too old, before and after the implementation of the policy in 2010. The treatment 
group is defined as households in which all members are aged 25 and younger, and the control 
group consists of households in which all members are aged 27 to 31; households with members 
of other ages are omitted from analysis. Households in which at least one member is below 25 
and at least one other member is 27 to 31 are also omitted from analysis. A similar difference-in-
differences (DD) empirical approach has been used in the past literature to evaluate the ACA 
dependent coverage provision (Akosa Antwi, Ma, Simon, & Carroll, 2016; Akosa Antwi et al., 
2013; Barbaresco et al., 2015; Depew, 2015). My specific DD model is: 
Yigst = α + β (Treatmentg X Postt) + δTreatmentg+ γXigst + ηHouseholdi + ϕTimet + ε    (1) 
where Yigst represents an insurance outcome for individual i in age group g living in state 
s in year t. Treatment is a binary variable equal to 1 if the household is in the treatment group 
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defined above and equal to 0 if the household is not in the control group. Post is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the time period is after the policy implementation (i.e. 2010 to 2013) and equals 0 if 
the time period is before the policy implementation (i.e. 2004 to 2009). X is a vector of 
demographic control variables, including age of householder, educational attainment of 
householder, race/ethnicity, and marital status. Household is a vector of household state fixed 
effects, and Time is a vector of month-year fixed effects. I estimate linear probability models 
because they typically give reliable estimates of average effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
Standard errors are clustered at the household level to allow for common unobserved shocks to 
occur to the same household over time. 
I estimate Equation (1) for households’ monthly spending on food and all household 
products reported in Nielsen, adjusted for inflation. I also classify purchases based on department 
and estimate models for inflation-adjusted monthly spending on 1) health and beauty, 2) alcohol, 
3) non-food grocery, 4) general merchandise, 5) all food, 6) frozen food, 7) dairy, 8) deli, 9)
packaged meat, and 10) fresh produce. 
A key assumption of the DD model is that in the absence of treatment, outcomes among 
the treatment group would have followed the same trend as those among the control group. If 
this assumption holds, then the DD coefficient β in equation (1) identifies the causal effect of the 
policy change on the outcome. I assess the validity of this assumption by comparing pre-2010 
trends in outcomes in the treatment and control groups. I do this by first visually assessing 
graphs of the trends and then estimating regressions that interact the Treatment indicator with 
year indicator variables for all years except 2009, which is the base year. If the treatment and 
control groups indeed followed similar trends before 2010, then the coefficient on the pre-2010 
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interaction terms should be jointly equal to 0. I test the null hypothesis that all pre-2010 
interaction terms equal 0 using a joint F-test. 
4.4 Results 
Table 4-1 presents demographic characteristics of the treatment and control groups. There 
are 11,277 households in the treatment group and 56,138 households in the control group. The 
treatment group tends to be less wealthy and more likely to have a head of household who is not 
working and who is not college educated. 
Table 4-2 displays the pre-2010 means and DD coefficient estimates for all outcomes 
described in the Methods section above. The dependent coverage provision led to a $26.79 
increase in the total monthly purchases of households with eligible young adults (p<0.10). 
Before 2010, these households spent an average of $331 per month on food and household 
purchases, so this represents an 8.1 percent increase over pre-2010 levels. This change was 
largely driven by increases in monthly purchases of alcohol ($2.66 increase in monthly 
purchases, p<0.05), frozen foods ($2.51 increase, p<0.10), and dairy ($1.54 increase, p<0.10). 
There was no significant change in purchases in other departments, including health & beauty, 
non-food grocery, general merchandise, all food, deli, and packaged meat. In subsequent 
analyses (available on request), I study finer categories of products and find increases in 
purchases of over-the-counter medications and contraceptives. 
In Table 4-3, I expose my model to a number of sensitivity analyses. Column (1) 
replicates the results of the baseline model in Table 2 for comparison purposes. In Column (2), I 
include a vector of state fixed effects on the right hand side. In Column (3), I measure the time 
fixed effects as two separate vectors of year fixed effects and calendar month fixed effects. In 
Column (4), I include a vector of age fixed effects for each householder on the right hand side. 
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For the most part, these adjustments do not substantially change the magnitude or direction of the 
coefficients from the baseline model. 
Table 4-4 displays results from the event study models. Each column is a separate 
regression, and the column header lists the outcome variable of the regression. I find that for total 
spending, none of the pre-2010 interaction terms are significant, suggesting that the treatment 
and control groups trended similarly before the enactment of the dependent coverage provision. 
This gives confidence that the control group serves as a good counterfactual to the treatment 
group. For most of the remaining outcomes also, I am unable to reject the null hypothesis that all 
pre-2010 interaction terms equal 0. The only exceptions are general merchandise and frozen 
foods, but for both these outcomes the pre-2010 interaction terms are negative, suggesting that 
the bias is in the opposite direction. 
4.5 Discussion 
The ACA dependent coverage provision increased total spending among young adults, 
particularly in the categories of food (dairy and frozen foods), alcohol, contraceptives, and over-
the-counter medications. These results provide evidence that expanding health insurance for 
young adults increases their consumption power. This increased purchasing power is of 
particular importance to young adults, who often face high debt burdens from education-related 
debt and low wages due to limited work experience. Thus, expanding insurance coverage to this 
vulnerable group may be a way to improve their financial outcomes, which was one of the stated 
goals of the Affordable Care Act. 
111 
Tables 
Table 4-1. Demographic Characteristics of Treatment and Control Groups 
Control Group 
(All members 
aged 27-31) 
Treatment Group 
(All members below 
age 26) 
Income (thousands) 
58.43 36.36 
Percent of Federal Poverty 
Line 
493.1 284.0 
Household size 
1.478 1.942 
Married 
0.375 0.366 
Have children? 
0 0.241 
Female householder? 
0.819 0.858 
Female householder age 
28.67 23.60 
Female householder not 
working 
0.124 0.306 
Female householder at least 
high school educated 
0.993 0.965 
Female householder at least 
college educated 
0.751 0.445 
Male householder? 
0.617 0.635 
Male householder age 
29.04 23.75 
Male householder not 
working 
0.0682 0.123 
Male householder at least 
high school educated 
0.987 0.923 
Male householder at least 
college educated 
0.645 0.363 
White 
0.788 0.802 
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Black 
0.0908 0.0704 
Asian 
0.0539 0.0525 
Other race 
0.0678 0.0748 
Hispanic 
0.0697 0.105 
Observations 56,138 11,277 
Notes: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen 2004-2013. Treatment group is defined as householders in which all 
members are below age 26. Control group is defined as households in which all members are aged 27 to 31.  
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Table 4-2. DD Estimates for Impact of ACA Dependent Coverage Provision on Households’ 
Monthly Spending 
Pre-2010 Mean DD Estimate Percent Change 
Total Spending 
331.4 26.790* 
(15.411) 
8.1% 
Health & Beauty 
19.96 1.733 
(1.514) 
- 
Alcohol 
5.341 2.657** 
(1.164) 
49.7% 
Non-Food Grocery 
26.63 0.990 
(1.270) 
- 
General Merchandise 
14.50 1.985 
(2.982) 
- 
All Food 
264.9 19.425 
(12.855) 
- 
Frozen Foods 
21.06 2.505* 
(1.516) 
11.9% 
Dairy 
19.13 1.535* 
(0.802) 
8.0% 
Deli 
4.684 1.092 
(1.111) 
- 
Packaged Meat 
6.408 0.088 
(0.412) 
- 
Observations 67,196 
Notes: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen 2004-2013. Treatment group is defined as householders in which all 
members are below age 26. Control group is defined as households in which all members are aged 27 to 31. All 
outcomes are measured in dollars spent per month, adjusted for inflation. Pre-2010 mean column displays pre-2010 
mean for the treatment group. DD estimate column displays coefficient on interaction of Post-2010 and treatment 
indicators. All regressions also control for treatment indicator, race/ethnicity, marital status, age and educational 
attainment of each householder, month-year fixed effects, and household fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the household level.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 4-3. Sensitivity Analyses 
Baseline 
(1) 
State FE 
(2) 
Separate Year and 
Month FE (3) 
Age FE (4) 
Total Spending 
26.790* 
(15.411) 
22.577 
(14.780) 
25.314* 
(15.327) 
25.177* 
(14.088) 
Health & Beauty 
1.733 
(1.514) 
1.689 
(1.569) 
1.647 
(1.522) 
2.320 
(1.498) 
Alcohol 
2.657** 
(1.164) 
2.549** 
(1.163) 
2.758** 
(1.163) 
2.011* 
(1.158) 
Non-Food Grocery 
0.990 
(1.270) 
1.008 
(1.241) 
0.765 
(1.264) 
1.801 
(1.251) 
General Merchandise 
1.985 
(2.982) 
0.556 
(2.022) 
1.769 
(2.956) 
1.100 
(2.301) 
All Food 
19.425 
(12.855) 
16.775 
(12.710) 
18.375 
(12.787) 
17.946 
(11.848) 
Frozen Foods 
2.505* 
(1.516) 
2.389 
(1.528) 
2.439 
(1.515) 
2.986** 
(1.497) 
Dairy 
1.535* 
(0.802) 
1.549* 
(0.811) 
1.517* 
(0.799) 
1.623** 
(0.803) 
Deli 
1.092 
(1.111) 
1.045 
(1.109) 
1.204 
(1.101) 
0.692 
(1.123) 
Packaged Meat 
0.088 
(0.412) 
-0.035 
(0.410) 
0.135 
(0.409) 
0.084 
(0.414) 
Observations 67,197 67,197 67,197 67,197 
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5 Health Insurance Expansions and Racial Disparities in Cancer Outcomes34
Abstract 
Cancer is a leading cause of death among non-elderly Americans, and there exist large racial and 
ethnic disparities in cancer detection and mortality. This study assessed the extent to which 
insurance expansions facilitated by the Affordable Care Act reduced racial/ethnic disparities in 
cancer screening and detection. We used nationally-representative survey data on preventive care 
and cancer registry data on diagnoses to study changes in states that did and did not expand 
Medicaid, before and after the implementation of the expansion. We found that the Medicaid 
expansion had no detectable effect on cancer screenings for the overall population or for any 
specific race. Our results also suggest that the incidence of early stage diagnoses increased by a 
statistically significant 4 percent for Whites (p<0.05) and by 22 percent for Hispanics (p<0.10); 
there was no detectable change for Blacks or other non-Hispanic races. 
34 This work is joint with Lindsay Sabik (University of Pittsburgh) and Kosali Simon (Indiana University 
and National Bureau of Economic Research). I am grateful to the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy for their 
support of this research. 
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5.1 Introduction 
Cancer is responsible for 22 percent of all deaths in the United States, making it the 
second leading cause of death in the country, behind only heart disease. There exist large 
disparities in cancer detection, treatment, and mortality by race and ethnicity: Black and 
Hispanic cancer patients are on average diagnosed at later stages than White patients, and 
mortality rates are higher for non-Whites. One reason for these disparities may be lack of health 
insurance. Non-White people are less likely to be insured, and uninsurance is a major financial 
barrier to cancer screening, early diagnosis, and treatment.  
One of the goals of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was to reduce racial/ethnic disparities 
in cancer outcomes by expanding health insurance. Under the ACA, states have the option to 
extend Medicaid coverage to low-income people below 138 percent of the federal poverty level 
(FPL). To date, 31 states and DC have opted to expand Medicaid. We exploited this variation in 
Medicaid expansion across states and over time to estimate the causal effect of Medicaid on 
racial/ethnic disparities in cancer diagnosis.  
Previous studies have shown that the Medicaid expansion significantly reduced 
racial/ethnic disparities in insurance coverage (Buchmueller et al., 2016). There is high interest 
in understanding the extent to which this new coverage impacts health outcomes for people with 
cancer. Our key findings were that the Medicaid expansion had no detectable effect on cancer 
screenings for the overall population or for any specific race. We found that the incidence of 
early stage diagnoses increased by a statistically significant 4 percent for Whites (p<0.05) and by 
22 percent for Hispanics (p<0.10); there was no detectable change for Blacks or other non-
Hispanic races. Our analysis informs policymakers of the extent to which public health insurance 
expansions can reduce racial/ethnic disparities in cancer screening and detection. 
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5.2 Conceptual Model 
It has been well-established that the Medicaid expansions facilitated by the ACA led to 
large increases in insurance coverage among the low-income, non-elderly population (C. 
Courtemanche et al., 2018; Frean et al., 2017). There are multiple ways in which this increased 
insurance coverage may affect cancer outcomes. One scenario is that newly-insured people now 
have increased access to care and are more likely to go to the doctor for recommended 
screenings. This may help catch cancer in its early stages. This group of people may have 
eventually been diagnosed with cancer even if they had remained uninsured, but likely it would 
have been caught in later stages.  
Another potential scenario is abetted by adverse selection. A person who feels some 
symptoms or has been recently diagnosed with cancer can now procure insurance without any 
barriers due to pre-existing conditions. Under this scenario, it would be those who are more 
likely to have cancer who seek insurance. If this scenario is true, there would be an even larger 
number of people who receive care under the ACA than what would be yielded by simply 
multiplying the number of uninsured people by the probability that someone has cancer.  
5.3 Data 
Our primary data sources were the 2010 to 2016 Behavioral Risk Factors Surveillance 
System (BRFSS) and the National Cancer Institute’s 2010 to 2015 Surveillance, Epidemiology, 
and End Results (SEER) program.  
The BRFSS is an annual telephone survey conducted by the Centers of Disease Control 
and Prevention (CDC) in collaboration with state governments. The survey is nationally 
representative and collects information on individuals’ health behaviors, including preventive 
119 
care utilization and cancer screenings. We used BRFSS data to assess the effect of the Medicaid 
expansions on the probability of receiving recommended cancer screenings. This dataset has 
been used in past studies to assess the effect of insurance expansions on cancer screening 
(Barbaresco et al., 2015; Bitler & Carpenter, 2016; Sabik & Bradley, 2016; K. Simon et al., 
2017). 
Although the BRFSS has a full sample size of nearly 500,000 each year, we restricted our 
sample to  respondents that were aged 19 to 64, had no children below the age of 18, and had 
household incomes below 100% of the FPL; i.e. the group most targeted by the Medicaid 
expansion. The exact sample size differed for each outcome because certain cancer screenings 
are relevant only for specific genders and age groups. Our outcomes of interest for the BRFSS 
analysis included: whether the respondent received a clinical breast exam in the past year 
(restricted to women over age 21), whether the respondent received a Pap test in the past year 
(restricted to women over age 21), whether the respondent received a mammogram in the past 
year (restricted to women over age 50), and whether the respondent received a colonoscopy in 
the past year (restricted to men over age 50).  
We used the SEER data to assess the effect of the Medicaid expansions on county-level 
cancer diagnosis rates. The SEER reports information on all patients with cancer in participating 
areas in the United States, including patient demographics, county of residence, type of cancer, 
stage of diagnosis, and type of treatment. Although only 13 states participate in SEER (9 
expansion states and 4 non-expansion states), the data covers 28% of the US population. The 
SEER has been used in past studies to study the effect of insurance expansions on cancer 
detection (Soni, Simon, Cawley, & Sabik, 2018). This study found that ACA Medicaid 
expansions led to a 3 percent increase in the incidence of total cancer diagnoses in the non-
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elderly population and a 6 percent increase in early-stage diagnoses. However, this study did not 
study potential heterogeneous effects by race/ethnicity.   
We augmented the SEER data with county-level uninsurance rates and demographic 
information from the Census Bureau and county-level cancer mortality rates from the National 
Vital Statistics System. 
The original number of diagnoses reported in SEER from 2010 to 2015 was about 2.8 
million. We limited the sample to first-time diagnoses for people aged 19 to 64; we further 
eliminated those whose county of residence or race/ethnicity information was missing. After 
making these restrictions, the dataset consisted of about 1.1 million diagnoses. For each 
race/ethnicity category in each county and in each year, we divided the number of diagnoses in 
the county by the population to construct county-level diagnosis rates for each race/ethnicity 
category. So our final analytical sample size was N=14,688 race-county-year observations (6 
years X 612 counties X 4 race/ethnicity categories).35  
The outcomes of interest for the SEER analysis included: county-level cancer diagnosis 
rate (number of diagnoses that year per 100,000 population of the county) for all diagnoses, 
early-stage diagnoses, late-stage diagnoses, and unknown stage diagnoses. We defined early-
stage diagnoses as those that were in situ, local, or regional by direct extension only. Late-stage 
diagnoses were those that were regional with only lymph nodes involved, regional with lymph 
nodes involved and by direct extension, regional not otherwise specified, and distant. Diagnoses 
35 As noted in the tables, the exact sample size is slightly smaller than 14,688 because some counties 
reported 0 population for certain race/ethnicity categories in certain years. Specifically, in Harding County, New 
Mexico, there were 0 non-Hispanic others in the years 2012 through 2015. In Piute County, Utah, there were 0 non-
Hispanic Blacks in the year 2010. In Alaska, only the American Indian/Alaska Native populations are covered by 
SEER, so the non-Hispanic White and non-Hispanic Black populations are both 0 in the years 2010-15. The 
outcome variable was undefined for these observations with missing populations and so they were automatically 
dropped from analysis.  
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for which the stage was missing, unknown, or specified as unstaged were included in the 
unknown stage category.   
For all of our analyses, we first assessed the impact of the Medicaid expansion for the 
entire sample and then separately for each racial/ethnic group to assess whether the Medicaid 
expansion closed disparities. We stratified our sample into four racial/ethnic groups: non-
Hispanic Whites, non-Hispanic Blacks, non-Hispanic other race, and Hispanics. 
5.4 Methods 
We estimated difference-in-differences (DD) models, comparing changes among people 
in Medicaid expansion states versus non-expansion states, before and after the implementation of 
the expansion. Our first set of analyses used BRFSS data to examine the expansion’s impact on 
the probability of receiving the four recommend cancer screenings described in the Data section 
above. Each outcome was coded as a binary variable: 1 if the respondent received the screening 
in the past year and 0 if they did not. For each outcome, we estimated the following model:  
𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝑿𝑖𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀 
Equation 1 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents a cancer screening outcome for individual i living in state s at time 
t, expressed as a quarter/year combination; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the 
respondent lives in an expansion state; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 if the time period is 
after the policy implementation (i.e. 2014 or later for most states); 𝑿𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of individual 
control variables that include age, sex, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, 
household size, whether the household was part of the cell phone sample; 𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑡 
measures the state unemployment rate in a given time period; 𝜃𝑠 represents state fixed effects; 
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and 𝜏𝑡 represents quarter/year fixed effects. Standard errors were clustered by state, and all 
regressions accounted for BRFSS sampling weights. Although the outcomes were binary, we 
estimated linear probability models because they generally give reliable estimates of average 
effects (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). The 𝛽 term is our key coefficient of interest. It captures the 
treatment effect of Medicaid expansion on the outcome of interest.  
Our second set of analyses used the 2010-15 SEER data to examine the expansion’s 
impact on county-level cancer diagnosis rates. The data was at the county level, not the 
individual level. We estimated the following equation for each outcome variable:  
𝑌𝑐𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡) + 𝛾𝑿𝑐𝑠𝑡 + 𝜃𝑠 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀 
Equation 2 
where 𝑌𝑐𝑠𝑡 represents a cancer diagnosis rate for county c in state s at year t; 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 
is a binary variable equal to 1 if the county is in an expansion state; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 is a binary variable 
equal to 1 if the time period is after the policy implementation (i.e. 2014 or later for most states); 
𝑿𝑐𝑠𝑡 is a vector of county-level control variables that include county unemployment rate, 
whether the county is rural, percent of county that is female, percent over age 65, and percent in 
poverty; 𝜃𝑠 represents state fixed effects; and 𝜏𝑡 represents year fixed effects. 𝛽 represents the 
causal effect of Medicaid expansion on the outcome of interest, so long as the DD assumptions 
are satisfied.  
5.4.1 Parallel Trends Tests 
The key identifying assumption of the DD model is that in the absence of treatment, the 
expansion states and non-expansion states would have trended similarly. We tested the validity 
of this assumption by first visually analyzing trends in expansion and non-expansion states 
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before 2014 and evaluating the extent to which they trended similarly in pre-expansion time 
period. We then formalized the parallel trends tests by estimating models similar to those 
described in Equations 1 and 2, but we replaced the 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 term with a vector of 
interactions between 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 and an indicator for each year, excluding 2013 as the base 
year. If we were to find coefficients that are insignificant and close to zero for the pre-2014 
interaction terms, it would increase our confidence that expansion and non-expansion states 
trended similarly before the expansion.  
5.4.2 Sensitivity Analyses 
We conducted a set of analyses with county-level demographic control variables (percent 
of county that is female, percent of county that is above 65, rurality of the county). However, 
some of these variables were missing for Alaska (county 900). We therefore estimated a set of 
models that did not include these demographic control variables in order to include the Alaskan 
counties in our analysis.  
In constructing county-level cancer diagnosis rates, we realized that not all race/ethnicity 
categories were represented in all counties in all years. If, for example, the original SEER 
database did not report a single diagnosis by a Hispanic person in Jones County, Iowa in 2013, 
then we assumed that 0 Hispanic persons in Jones County had cancer that year; therefore, the 
outcome variable for the Hispanic-Jones County, IA-2013 observation was imputed as 0. We 
estimated a set of models in which we excluded these imputed zeros. Our sample size for this 
non-imputed analysis was 9,942 county-year-race/ethnicity observations. 
Another potential concern may be potential non-random shifts in racial/ethnic 
composition of counties over time. To address this concern, we estimated another set of models 
in which we used a fixed base population as the denominator for the outcome variables.  
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5.5 Results 
Figure 5-1 displays trends in each outcome over time, separately for expansion states and 
non-expansion states.  
Table 5-1 shows the DD for the effect of Medicaid expansion on each cancer screening 
outcome for the overall sample, as well as stratified by race/ethnicity. We found that Medicaid 
expansion did not significantly change the probability of receiving breast exams, Pap tests, 
mammograms, or colonoscopies for the overall population. Even when we stratified the sample 
by race/ethnicity, we found that with the exception of the Hispanic population, there were no 
detectable impacts of the expansions on cancer screenings. The probability of receiving a clinical 
breast exam increased for Hispanic women by 0.11 percentage points (p<0.10). This represented 
a 17 percent increase compared to pre-expansion levels.  
Table 5-2 displays the DD estimates for each cancer diagnosis rate outcome for the 
overall sample, as well as stratified by race/ethnicity. We found that early stage diagnoses 
increased by a statistically significant 10.1 diagnoses per 100,000 population for Whites (p<0.05) 
and by 17.9 per 100,000 population for Hispanics (p<0.10). Relative to pre-expansion levels, this 
represented a 3.9 percent increase for Whites and a 22 percent increase for Hispanics. There was 
no detectable change for Blacks or other non-Hispanic races. There was no significant impact of 
Medicaid expansion on late stage diagnoses or unstaged diagnoses for the overall population or 
any particularly racial/ethnic group.  
Results for the parallel trends test are displayed in Appendix Table 5- 1. 
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5.6 Discussion 
These results fill a critical void in our understanding of Medicaid’s role in reducing 
racial/ethnic disparities in cancer screening and diagnosis. We found that the Medicaid 
expansion had no detectable effect on cancer screenings for the overall population or for any 
specific race. However, the incidence of early stage diagnoses increased by a statistically 
significant 4 percent for Whites (p<0.05) and by 22 percent for Hispanics (p<0.10); there was no 
detectable change on Blacks or other non-Hispanic races. The large impact that we find for 
Hispanics is in line with other work showing that insurance expansions have particularly 
benefited Hispanics with cancer (Sabik, Tarazi, Hochhalter, Dahman, & Bradley, 2018). Sabik et 
al. (2018) found increases in cervical screening after pre-ACA expansions to non-elderly adults 
for Hispanics.  
There are several possible explanations for the null finding on cancer screenings. First, 
we have only three years of post-expansion data and it may take more time for impacts to 
manifest (as with mammography in Massachusetts). Second, our data may be underpowered to 
detect effects in small racial/ethnic groups. Third, in spite of the new coverage, there may other 
barriers to accessing preventive care. For example, if there is general lack of awareness about the 
importance of cancer screenings in this population, or if there is a short supply of providers who 
accept Medicaid insurance.  
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Figures 
Figure 5-1. Trends Graphs for Each Race 
Panel A: All Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
White, non-Hispanic  Black, non-Hispanic 
Other, non-Hispanic Hispanic 
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Panel B: Early Stage Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
White, non-Hispanic Black, non-Hispanic 
Other, non-Hispanic Hispanic 
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Panel C: Late Stage Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
White, non-Hispanic  Black, non-Hispanic 
Other, non-Hispanic Hispanic 
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Panel D: Unstaged Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
White, non-Hispanic  Black, non-Hispanic 
Other, non-Hispanic Hispanic 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEER 2010 to 2015. 
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Tables 
Table 5-1. Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Cancer Screening Rates by Race/Ethnicity – 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
All Races 
White, non-
Hispanic 
Black, non-
Hispanic 
Other race, 
non-Hispanic 
Hispanic 
Clinical breast 
exam 
-0.005 
(0.025) 
-0.020 
(0.040) 
-0.040 
(0.075) 
-0.170 
(0.123) 
0.112* 
(0.059) 
μ=0.56 μ=0.51 μ=0.61 μ=0.51 μ=0.65 
N=17,046 N=10,537 N=3,197 N=1,273 N=1,600 
Pap test 
-0.007 
(0.026) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
0.019 
(0.060) 
-0.132 
(0.102) 
-0.022 
(0.053) 
μ=0.44 μ=0.38 μ=0.53 μ=0.38 μ=0.53 
N=23,254 N=14,359 N=4,300 N=1,564 N=2,268 
Mammogram 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.040 
(0.040) 
-0.106 
(0.067) 
-0.014 
(0.118) 
-0.004 
(0.107) 
μ=0.55 μ=0.49 μ=0.61 μ=0.48 μ=0.63 
N=15,752 N=9,588 N=2,943 N=1,014 N=1,636 
Colonoscopy 
0.020 
(0.023) 
0.011 
(0.042) 
0.008 
(0.054) 
0.122 
(0.109) 
-0.066 
(0.063) 
μ=0.41 μ=0.43 μ=0.41 μ=0.30 μ=0.35 
N=11,691 N=7,475 N=1,775 N=877 N=965 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BRFSS 2010 to 2016. Sample was restricted to include non-elderly childless 
adults with household income below 100% FPL. State-clustered standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions 
also control for age, sex, educational attainment, marital status, employment status, household size, whether the 
household was part of the cell phone sample, state unemployment rate, state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. 
Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. Pre-expansion means for expansion states (μ) are displayed below each 
DD estimate. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 5-2. Impact of Medicaid Expansion on Cancer Diagnosis Rates by Race/Ethnicity – 
Difference-in-Differences Estimates 
All Races 
White, non-
Hispanic 
Black, non-
Hispanic 
Other race, 
non-
Hispanic 
Hispanic 
Total Diagnoses per 100,000 
Population  
-10.58 
(13.99) 
9.53 
(6.76) 
-37.48 
(33.13) 
-24.68 
(38.78) 
10.39 
(14.24) 
μ=272.6 μ=434.8 μ=285.2 μ=228.9 μ=141.3 
Early-Stage Diagnoses per 
100,000 Population 
-0.57 
(10.55) 
10.13** 
(5.12) 
-5.01 
(23.72) 
-25.23 
(31.39) 
17.90* 
(10.45) 
μ=158.4 μ=258.9 μ=160.9 μ=131.5 μ=82.3 
Late-Stage Diagnoses per 
100,000 Population 
-9.81 
(8.61) 
0.26 
(4.01) 
-33.70 
(22.97) 
3.59 
(23.03) 
-9.37 
(8.68) 
μ=104.4 μ=159.1 μ=115.2 μ=90.3 μ=52.8 
Unknown-Stage Diagnoses 
per 100,000 Population 
-0.20 
(1.62) 
-0.86 
(1.21) 
1.23 
(4.05) 
-3.04 
(3.57) 
1.87 
(3.35) 
μ=9.8 μ=16.8 μ=9.0 μ=7.0 μ=6.2 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEER 2010 to 2015. Sample was restricted to first-time cancer diagnoses for 
adults aged 19 to 64. N=14,652 county-year observations. All regressions also control for county unemployment 
rate, whether the county is rural, percent of county that is female, percent that is over age 65, percent in poverty, 
state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Pre-expansion means for expansion 
states (μ ) are displayed below each DD estimate. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Appendices for Chapter 1 
1-A. Background on Opioids and Other Pain Relief Drugs 
Pain relief drugs—which include opioids (also known as narcotics), non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs, such as Ibuprofen), and Acetaminophen (such as Tylenol)—are 
among the most frequently prescribed therapeutic classes in the United States. These drugs are 
also known as analgesics, meaning that they produce a reduction in the perception of pain. In 
2015, pain relief drugs accounted for nearly 8% of total prescriptions taken by adults in the 
United States, and 24% of adults used a prescription analgesic at least once during the year. Over 
the past 15 years, there has been a shift in the type of painkillers prescribed: opioids accounted 
for only 38 percent of total painkiller prescriptions in 2000 but 51 percent of prescriptions by 
2015 (author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey). This is a worrisome 
trend because opioids are not only the strongest pain medications but also pose the highest risk 
for addiction.  
Spending on prescription opioids has grown rapidly over the past 15 years (Appendix 
Figure 1- 1). Panel A shows that average annual opioid spending was $9 per person in 2000 and 
more than tripled to $32 per person in 2015. Over the same time period, the share of spending 
attributable to public sources more than doubled from 24 percent in 2000 to 51 percent in 2015. 
148 
Panel B of Appendix Figure 1- 1 shows that this increase was even more pronounced for the 
elderly population. Among people over age 65, average annual opioid spending increased from 
$17 per person in 2000 to $63 per person in 2015. Meanwhile, the share of spending attributable 
to public sources nearly tripled from 24 percent in 2000 to 66 percent in 2015.  
How Pain Relief Drugs Work 
This section briefly describes the biochemistry of pain and pain relief drugs (Carroll, 
2016; Purves et al., 2004). The human brain and nervous system consist of nerve cells called 
neurons. Neurons communicate with each other by firing electrical signals to release chemical 
messengers, called neurotransmitters, across the tiny spaces between cells; this process is called 
neurotransmission. Nerve receptors are located all over the human body and send signals to the 
brain when they are exposed to certain stimuli, such as temperature. Nociceptors are specialized 
nerve receptors that only fire when something is causing damage to the body (e.g. if the skin is 
cut, a muscle is pulled, etc.). Nociceptors are located in skin, organ walls, and within body 
tissues such as muscles and joints. When the body encounters a noxious stimulus, nociceptors 
transmit electrical signals to the spinal cord, where neurotransmitters are released to send the 
signal up to the brain, where it is interpreted as pain. These pain signals are transmitted in a 
fraction of a second; their purpose is to alert the body to potential harm.  
Opioids are effective painkillers because they inhibit the pain signal at multiple steps in 
the pathway from the nociceptors to the brain. In the brain, opioids cause sedation and alter 
moods that decrease the emotional response to pain. At the nociceptor level, opioids block the 
signaling from the nociceptors to secondary neurons. Along the spinal cord, opioids chemically 
bind to specific opioid receptors on neurons, which decreases the release of neurotransmitters 
that are trying to communicate the pain signal. This results in less pain experienced by the brain. 
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The reason human spinal cords have opioid receptors is because the body has a built-in analgesic 
system that regulates pain signals. The human body produces endogenous opioids, known as 
endorphins, which bind to neurons and produce pain relief. Opioid drugs bind to opioid receptors 
in a similar way that endorphins produced by the body do, but with more powerful side effects, 
such as intense euphoria, severe respiratory depression, sedation, urinary retention, nausea, 
dizziness, and constipation.  
Moreover, opioid medications are associated with tolerance (with time, higher doses are 
required to get the same level of pain relief) and severe withdrawal symptoms if one stops the 
drug. This can lead to physical and psychological dependence on the drug. An opioid overdose 
refers to toxicity due to excessive opioids; an overdose can lead to insufficient breathing, loss of 
consciousness, and death. Because of the drug’s dangerous potential for addiction, opioid sales 
are controlled by the US Drug Enforcement Authority (DEA).  
Since 1970, the DEA has classified certain drugs and other substances, called controlled 
substances, into five schedules based on risk of abuse or harm. Schedule I drugs, such as heroin, 
have high risk and no counterbalancing benefit and are banned from medical use. Schedule II 
drugs have high potential for abuse and can lead to severe psychological or physical dependence; 
examples include hydromorphone, methadone, meperidine, oxycodone, fentanyl, morphine, 
opium, and codeine. Schedule III drugs have less potential for abuse but can still lead to 
moderate/low physical dependence or high psychological dependence. Schedule III opioids 
include combination products containing less than 16 mg of hydrocodone per dose and less than 
90 mg of codeine per dose (for example, Tylenol with Codeine). Schedule IV drugs have low 
potential for abuse (for example, Tramadol), and Schedule V drugs have even lower potential for 
abuse (for example, Robitussin AC). 
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NSAIDs – which include Ibuprofen, Aspirin, and COX-2 inhibitors – work differently 
from opioids. When cells and tissues are damaged, they prompt the body’s COX-1 and COX-2 
enzymes to produce chemicals known as prostaglandins. Prostaglandins lower the threshold 
required for nearby nociceptors to fire (i.e. reduce the body’s pain threshold); this results in more 
pain signals being transmitted to the brain. NSAIDs work by competitively inhibiting production 
of prostaglandins from the COX enzymes; the drug competes for the binding sites on the COX 
enzymes. Reduced production of prostaglandins diminishes the intensity of pain signals being 
sent to the brain, and as a result, the body experiences pain relief. Side effects of long-term 
NSAID use can include heartburn and stomach ulcers.  
Acetaminophen – which includes Tylenol – is another class of commonly-used pain relief 
drugs, but researchers have not yet determined exactly how the drug works. The physician’s 
directions that come with Acetaminophen prescriptions usually include the note, “Although the 
analgesic effect of Acetaminophen is well established, the site and mode of action have not been 
clearly elucidated.” Side effects of long-term use of Acetaminophen can include liver damage 
and trouble passing urine.  
The side effects associated with NSAIDs and Acetaminophen are substantially less 
severe than those of opioids. Moreover, neither NSAIDs nor Acetaminophen share the addictive 
properties associated with opioids. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
therefore recommends NSAIDs and Acetaminophen as first-line therapies for chronic pain 
outside of cancer treatment and end-of-life care (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 
2016). Neither NSAIDs nor Acetaminophen are controlled by the DEA, unless combined with 
opioids.  
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Causes of Opioid Growth 
Researchers have proposed several possible explanations for the rapid growth of opioids 
since the late 1990s. One school of thought focuses on the increased demand for opioids. 
Economic studies point out that certain population cohorts in the United States (particularly 
middle-aged White men) have experienced relative declines in permanent income in recent 
decades; this phenomenon may push the struggling cohorts to opioid addiction, suicide, and 
other “deaths of despair” (Case & Deaton, 2015). Ignorance about the addiction potential of 
opioids and increased prevalence of physical pain are other potential reasons for growth in the 
demand for opioids.  
Another set of explanations faults the increased supply of opioids. During the 1990s, new 
attitudes in medicine promoted the treatment of pain as the fifth vital sign and destigmatized the 
prescription of opioids for non-cancer pain. Meanwhile, drug manufacturers initiated aggressive 
marketing campaigns for opioids, often funding continuing medical education seminars for 
physicians and offering other in-kind perks to doctors. When asked about the addictive potential 
of opioids, sales representatives often pointed to a 1980 study which found that less than 1 
percent of patients taking narcotics developed addiction to them (Porter & Jick, 1980); however, 
that one-paragraph publication was based on a study of hospitalized patients, not those going 
home with opioid prescriptions. In particular, Purdue Pharmaceutical aggressively marketed its 
time-release formula of oxycodone – Oxycontin – as a virtually non-addictive pain relief drug. In 
2005, Purdue pled guilty to false branding and paid a $634 million fine. Moreover, there was 
little regulation of pain management clinics (“pill mills”), making prescription opioids even 
easier to access. On the illicit side, heroin became cheaper and more pure in quality, fueled by 
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the rampant growth of the black tar heroin from the Xalisco region of Mexico. This eased the 
transition from prescription to illicit opioids for those who became addicted.  
Consequences of Opioid Misuse 
One of the most devastating consequences of opioid misuse is the elevated rate of 
overdose deaths in the United States. By the year 2010, drug overdoses – driven by opioids – 
became the leading cause of death from injury, surpassing motor vehicle accidents. Panel A of 
Appendix Figure 1- 2 shows that the number of opioid overdose deaths increased from 8,400 per 
year in 2000 to 42,200 per year in 2016. Opioid overdoses may be from licit prescription opioids 
as well as illicit opioids such as heroin and illegally produced fentanyl. According to Panel A, 
prescription opioids have played an increasingly larger role in overdose deaths over time: 
prescription opioids were responsible for 52 percent of overdose deaths in 2000 and 77 percent 
by 2016. However, the underlying mortality data cannot distinguish deaths from pharmaceutical 
fentanyl and those from illegally produced fentanyl. Therefore, the prescription opioids bar may 
contain deaths from both prescription and illicit fentanyl.  
Panel B of Appendix Figure 1- 2 provides an alternative way to describe the split 
between prescription and illicit opioid deaths.36 The “semisynthetic and natural opioids” and the 
“heroin” bars refer unambiguously to prescription and illicit opioids, respectively. The “synthetic 
opioids” bar consists of deaths from both prescription and illicit fentanyl. In the year 2016, 
semisynthetic and natural (prescription) opioids accounted for 34 percent, synthetic (prescription 
and illicit) accounted for 37 percent, and (illicit) heroin accounted for 29 percent of total opioid 
36 The aggregate numbers in Panel B are slightly higher than those in Panel A because the three categories 
presented in Panel B are not mutually exclusive; deaths that involve more than one type of opioid are included in 
every applicable category. 
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overdose deaths. The most common drugs involved in prescription opioid deaths include 
methadone, oxycodone, and hydrocodone. 
There are several other health and economic consequences of opioid misuse, in addition 
to deaths from overdose (Quinones, 2015; Temple, 2015). Shared needles increase the incidence 
of HIV and Hepatitis C. Opioid use by women during pregnancy can lead to neonatal abstinence 
syndrome: babies develop addiction in the womb and experience withdrawal after birth, leading 
to conditions such as seizures, breathing problems, and diarrhea. Prescription opioid abuse has 
also been linked to increased drug diversion, crime, emergency department utilization, and 
demand for illicit opioids (Council of Economic Advisers, 2017; Jones, 2013; Powell et al., 
2017). 
Policy Responses to the Opioid Crisis 
Reducing prescription opioid misuse is a top public health priority for policymakers at all 
levels of government, as well as leaders of the private sector. At the federal level, the White 
House declared the opioid crisis “a national public health emergency under federal law” (White 
House, 2018). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has issued new guidelines 
urging providers to reduce opioid prescribing and substitute toward other non-opioid therapies 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2016). At the state level, 46 state governors have 
signed a compact promising to take steps to reduce inappropriate opioid prescribing (National 
Governors Association, 2013); already several states have strengthened prescription drug 
monitoring programs (PDMPs) and expanded Naloxone access as ways to reduce opioid 
overdose deaths. Recently, insurance companies have also taken steps: in 2017, 16 major health 
insurance companies representing 245 million covered lives adopted eight National Principles of 
Care and pledged to increase access to treatment for substance use disorder (Pellitt, 2017). 
154 
Policy responses to the opioid crisis can be classified into two categories. The first set of 
policies intends to mitigate harm for existing users by increasing access to treatment for opioid 
use disorder. Pharmacotherapy programs to treat opioid use disorder typically use one of three 
drugs. (1) Naltrexone is an opioid antagonist; it prevents the effects of opioids (euphoria, pain 
relief, etc) and decreases the desire to take opioids. (2) Methadone is a synthetic opioid agonist, 
meaning that it acts as other opioid drugs by binding to opioid receptors. However, unlike other 
opioids, Methadone stays in the system for up to 59 hours (compared to six hours for normal-
release opioids) and does not demand increasing doses every few hours. Methadone can relieve 
withdrawal symptoms and cravings for other opioids, and is often used as a replacement drug in 
treatment for opioid addiction. (3) Buprenorphine is a partial opioid agonist that works by 
occupying opioid receptors but without stimulating a strong euphoric effect associated with other 
opioids; it can also reduce cravings and withdrawal symptoms. In addition to these three 
pharmacotherapy programs, another drug can effectively act as an overdose antidote: Naloxone 
is an opioid antagonist, meaning that it blocks opioid receptors by binding to the receptors in 
place of opioid drugs, and can reverse an overdose. Recent policies attempt to increase access to 
these drugs by making Naloxone available over the counters, increasing waivers for physicians 
to prescribe Buprenorphine, and expanding access to addiction cessation therapy through 
insurance expansions.  
The second category of policies focuses on preventing future misuse by restricting access 
to prescription opioids. In recent years, many states have strengthened their prescription drug 
monitoring programs (PDMPs), databases in which retail pharmacists enter information about 
controlled substance prescriptions. Providers can access PDMP databases before providing a 
patient with a prescription to ensure that the patient is not doctor shopping. Some studies have 
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found that mandatory access PDMP laws reduce opioid prescribing (Bao et al., 2016; 
Buchmueller & Carey, 2018; Grecu, Dave, & Saffer, 2019; Patrick, Fry, Jones, & Buntin, 2016; 
Radakrishnan, 2014). Other policies include the increased regulation of pain management clinics, 
the promotion of abuse-deterrent opioid formulations, tougher prescriber guidelines from the 
CDC, and 7-day limits on initial opioid prescriptions for opioid-naïve patients prescribed the 
drugs to treat acute pain.  
1-B. Review of Literature on Price Elasticities of Demand for Prescription Drugs 
Appendix Table 1- 1 summarizes methods, data sources, and results of 31 studies that 
estimate price elasticities of demand for prescription drugs. The empirical methods used in these 
studies exploit exogenous changes in out-of-pocket (OOP) drug prices, such as those caused by 
the introduction of Medicare Part D in 2006, entering the Part D coverage gap (donut hole), 
changes in benefit design of private insurance, the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, and the 
introduction of drug copayments in the United Kindgom’s National Health Service. Within each 
category, studies are sorted by year of publication. It should be noted that the studies listed in 
Appendix Table 1- 1 include only those that provide estimates for the policy’s impact on OOP 
costs as well as drug utilization and are thus able to calculate implied elasticities.  
There exist a large number of studies that assess the impact of prescription drug coverage 
or other policy changes on utilization alone; these are not included in Appendix Table 1- 1. 
Notable papers in this category include a study that uses panel data from the Health and 
Retirement Study Prescription Drug Study and finds that gaining prescription drug coverage 
through Part D leads to a 15 percent increase in the number of prescription drugs taken 
(Engelhardt, 2011). Another paper uses an instrumental variables approach to assess the impact 
of prescription drug coverage on drug utilization; the authors use data from the Medicare Current 
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Beneficiary Survey and find that drug coverage through Part D increases drug utilization by 30 
percent (Kaestner & Khan, 2012). Neither of these studies calculates implied elasticities of 
prescription drugs. 
Appendix Table 1- 1. Studies that Estimate Price Elasticities of Demand for Prescription Drugs 
Paper Methods Results 
Studies Based on the Introduction of Medicare Part D
Lichtenberg & Sun. (2007). 
“The Impact of Medicare 
Part D on Prescription Drug 
Use by the Elderly.” Health
Affairs. 
The authors use a sample of the 2004-06 
Walgreens pharmacy data (N=585 
million prescriptions) and estimate DD 
models to compare drug use (measured 
in units of days of therapy) and OOP 
costs (per days of therapy) among those 
aged 65 and older to those under 65. 
Part D reduced OOP costs by 18.4 
percent and increased quantity by 12.8 
percent. The elasticity of demand for 
prescription drugs is -0.70.  
Yin et al. (2008). “The 
Effect of the Medicare Part 
D Prescription Benefit on 
Drug Utilization and 
Expenditures.” Annals of
Internal Medicine. 
DD models and a sample of pharmacy 
data from Walgreens for the years 2004-
07 are used to compare prescription 
utilization (measured in pill-days) and 
out-of-pocket expenditures for those 
aged 66 to 79 with a control group aged 
60 to 63 (N=177,311 individuals), 
before and after January 2006. 
From January to May 2006, Part D 
increased use of medications by 1.1 
percent and decreased OOP costs by 
8.8 percent (implied elasticity of -0.13). 
From June 2006 to April 2007, 
utilization increased 5.9 percent and 
OOP costs decreased 13.1 percent 
(implied elasticity of -0.45). The effect 
over the earlier period represents the 
effect of increasing enrollment and the 
selection effect of early enrollees (who 
were unhealthier on average) than late 
enrollees. The effect over the later 
period represents the steady-state effect 
of Part D. 
Ketcham & Simon. (2008). 
“Medicare Part D’s Effect 
on Elderly Drug Cost and 
Utilization.” American
Journal of Managed Care. 
The authors use 2005-07 pharmacy 
records from Wolters Kluwer Health 
(N=1.4 billion prescription records filled 
by 34 million patients aged 58 and 
older) and estimate DD models 
comparing individuals 66 and older vs 
those aged 58-64, before and after 
January 2006. Outcomes include OOP 
cost per day’s supply of a medication, 
the days of medication supplied per 
capita, and the number of individuals 
filling prescriptions.  
Part D reduced OOP cost per day’s 
supplied of medication by 21.7 percent 
and increased use of prescription drugs 
by 4.7%, implying a price elasticity of 
demand of -0.22.  
*Schneeweiss et al. (2009).  Using 2005-06 pharmacy claims data,
the authors assess changes in drug 
utilization (measured by daily doses of 
medication) before and after 2006 
among a group of previously drug 
Utilization increased by between 3 and 
37 percent, and OOP spending 
decreased by between 37 and 58 
percent, depending on the drug class. 
The demand elasticities are -0.35 for 
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uninsured elderly individuals 
(N=114,766). The authors impute 
insurance status based on medication 
costs and patients’ OOP spending. 
However, this study only examines 
utilization of four essential drug classes. 
warfarin, -0.44 for statins and 
clopidogrel, and -0.76 for PPIs. 
Duggan & Scott-Morton. 
(2010). “The Effect of 
Medicare Part D on 
Pharmaceutical Prices and 
Utilization.” American
Economic Review. 
This study investigates the effect of Part 
D on price and utilization of branded 
drugs. The empirical strategy exploits 
variation across drugs in their pre-2006 
Medicare market shares and compares 
growth in drug prices for drugs that are 
more reliant on Medicare customers 
with drugs that are less reliant on 
Medicare customers. The authors use 
MEPS data to calculate Medicare 
market shares and 2001 to 2006 IMS 
Health data to obtain data on price and 
utilization outcomes.  
In addition to reducing the share of the 
drug price paid by the patient, Part D 
also reduced gross prices of 
prescription drugs about 20 percent 
lower than they otherwise would have 
been. Prices of brand-name drugs with 
close substitutes decreased because 
insurers could structure their 
formularies to drive demand toward 
generics and thus had substantial 
bargaining power with pharmaceutical 
companies. The study estimates a price 
elasticity of -0.38 for prescription 
drugs.   
Liu et al. (2011). “The 
Impact of Medicare Part D 
on Out-of-Pocket Costs for 
Prescription Drugs, 
Medication Utilization, 
Health Resource Utilization, 
and Preference-Based 
Health Utility.” Health
Services Research. 
The authors use DD models and the 
MEPS 2005-06 panel data to estimate 
price and utilization outcomes 
(measured in units of prescriptions) for 
those aged 65 and older with those aged 
55 to 63 (N=1,105), before and after 
January 2006. The study sample 
excludes those with Tricare, VA, 
Medicaid, other state and government 
subsidies, those with income <125% 
FPL, and those with cognitive 
limitations.  
OOP costs for prescription drugs 
increased by $180 (or 21.1 percent 
from 2005 levels) and utilization 
increased by 2.05 prescriptions (or 9.3 
percent) per patient year. The implied 
elasticity is -0.44. 
Studies that Exploit the Medicare Part D Coverage Gap (Donut Hole) 
Einav, Finkelstein, & 
Schrimpf. (2015). “The 
Response of Drug 
Expenditure to Nonlinear 
Contract Design: Evidence 
from Medicare Part D.” 
Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 
The authors use administrative data of 
2007-09 Part D formularies and Part D 
claims (N=3.9 million beneficiary years) 
to study the response of drug use to the 
future out-of-pocket price. They exploit 
variation in beneficiaries’ birth months, 
which generates variation in contract 
duration in their first year of eligibility, 
which in turn predicts their probability 
of reaching the Part D coverage gap.  
The implied elasticity of drug spending 
with respect to price ranges from -0.75
to -0.5, depending on the magnitude of 
the price change. 
Aron-Dine et al. (2015). 
“Moral Hazard in Health 
Insurance: Do Dynamic 
Incentives Matter?” Review
of Economics and Statistics. 
Part D claims data for the years 2007-09 
(N=138,000 individuals) are used to 
analyze how individuals’ initial drug 
utilization responds to future OOP 
prices. The authors take advantage of 
the fact that enrollees can enroll in 
Medicare at age 65 but their plan resets 
on January 1 regardless of the month in 
which they enroll. They exploit variation 
in birth month, which predicts enrollees’ 
The implied elasticity of initial 
prescription drug claims with respect to 
the future price is -0.25.
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probability of reaching the coverage 
gap.   
Kaplan & Zhang. (2016). 
“Anticipatory Behavior in 
Response to Medicare Part 
D’s Coverage Gap.” Health
Economics. 
The authors examine whether 
individuals anticipate copayment 
changes in their Part D plans and adjust 
consumption in advance. They exploit 
variation in beneficiaries’ birth months, 
which generates variation in contract 
duration in their first year of eligibility, 
which in turn predicts their probability 
of reaching the Part D coverage gap. 
They also use DD models to compare 
their main study group with those who 
receive low-income subsidies and do not 
face the coverage gap.  
The implied elasticity of drug 
utilization (measured as number of 
prescriptions) with respect to future 
price ranges from -0.2 to -05.
*Einav, Finkelstein, &
Polyakova. (2018). “Private 
Provision of Social 
Insurance: Drug-Specific 
Price Elasticities and Cost 
Sharing in Medicare Part 
D.” AEJ: Economic Policy.
This study exploits sharp increases in 
OOP prices created by the Part D 
coverage gap to estimate price 
elasticities of demand across more than 
150 drugs and more than 100 therapeutic 
classes. The authors use administrative 
data of Part D formularies and Part D 
claims from 2007 to 2011 (N=6.5 
million beneficiary-years).  
There is considerable heterogeneity in 
the price elasticity of demand across 
products; the average elasticity of the 
probability of any December purchase 
with respect to OOP price is  -0.24 and 
standard deviation is 0.49. The 
elasticity of opiate agonists is -0.04. 
For NSAIDs, the elasticity is -0.33 for 
non-maintenance NSAIDs, +0.07 for 
maintenance NSAIDs, and -0.15 for 
other NSAIDs. 
Studies that Exploit Cost-Sharing Changes in non-Medicare Part D Settings 
Harris, Stergachis, & Ried. 
(1990). “The Effect of Drug 
Copayments on Utilization 
and Cost of Pharmaceuticals 
in a Health Maintenance 
Organization.” Medical
Care. 
Exploiting the 1983 implementation of a 
cost-sharing prescription drug plan in 
Washington, the authors analyze the 
effect of copay increases on the number 
of prescriptions utilized. 
A $1.50 copay led to a 10.7 percent 
decrease in the number of 
prescriptions. Increasing the copay 
from $1.50 to $5 led to an additional 
10.6 percent decrease. The price 
elasticity of demand for drugs is -0.05
to -0.08.    
Smith. (1993). “The Effects 
of Copayments and Generic 
Substitution on the Use and 
Costs of Prescription 
Drugs.” Inquiry.  
This study assesses the effect of 
increases in drug copayments from $2 to 
$5 for a set of employer groups covered 
by a national managed care company.  
The price elasticity of demand is -0.10. 
Physicians compensated for the 
increased price to consumers by 
prescribing larger amounts per 
prescription.  
Coulson & Stuart. (1995). 
“Insurance Choice and the 
Demand for Prescription 
Drugs.” Southern Economic
Journal.  
The authors use panel data based on a 
survey of 4,066 elderly Pennsylvanians 
enrolled in Medicare. They study the 
effect of Pennsylvania’s PACE program, 
which provides subsidized drug 
coverage for elderly Medicare 
beneficiaries and imposes a $4 
copayment per prescription.  
The average subsidy was 82.2 percent, 
and the quantity of prescriptions 
purchased increased 27.6 percent. The 
own-price elasticity of drugs is thus -
0.34. 
*Ellison et al. (1997).
“Characteristics of Demand 
for Pharmaceutical 
Products: An Examination 
of Four 
The authors model demand for four 
cephalosporins using a multistage 
budgeting approach. Three of the drugs 
lost patent protection during this period, 
which enables the study of generic 
Own-price elasticities of the generic 
versions of the drugs are relatively 
larger and range from -1.07 to -4.34. 
Own-price elasticities of demand for 
the branded version of the drugs are 
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Cephalosporins.” RAND
Journal of Economics. 
substitution. smaller and range from -0.39 to -2.97. 
Cross-price elasticities between 
branded and generic versions of each 
drug are positive. 
Johnson et al. (1997). “The 
Effect of Increased 
Prescription Drug Cost-
Sharing on Medical Care 
Utilization and Expenses of 
Elderly Health Maintenance 
Organization Members.” 
Medical Care. 
The authors assess the effects of a 
copayment change among enrollees of 
the Kaiser-Permanente Northwest 
division in the 1980 to 1990 time period. 
They used administrative data from the 
insurer on benefit design and medical 
and drug claims and estimated changes 
in drug utilization after the copayment 
change. 
A $2 (66 percent) increase in 
copayment resulted in an 8 percent 
decrease in prescription use. The 
implied price elasticity of demand is -
0.12. 
Hillman et al. (1999). 
“Financial Incentives and 
Drug Spending in Managed 
Care.” Health Affairs.
A large sample of members enrolled in 
nine different United HealthCare 
Corporation’s insurance plans 
(N=134,937) is used to study the effect 
of higher copayments on drug 
utilization. The authors assess effects 
separately for physicians who are 
compensated under independent practice 
association (IPA) models and network-
model HMOs. Analyses include plan 
fixed effects to control for potential 
selection that may bias results. 
For individuals in IPA plans, a 50 
percent increase in drug copayments 
led to a 12.3 percent decrease in drug 
spending (implied elasticity is -0.25). 
For individuals in network plans, a 50 
percent increase in drug copayments 
led to only a 3.4 percent (statistically 
insignificant) reduction in drug 
spending (implied elasticity is -0.07). 
Joyce et al. (2002). 
“Employer Drug Benefit 
Plans and Spending on 
Prescription Drugs.” JAMA.
The authors study the effect of 
copayment changes on total drug 
spending, using 1997-99 data on non-
elderly beneficiaries who worked at 
large firms with insurance benefits 
(N=420,786 beneficiaries). In the 
sample, only two of the 25 firms gave 
employees a choice of drug plans, which 
minimizes potential selection bias.   
The price elasticity of drug 
expenditures was -0.22 for single-tier 
plans and -0.33 for two-tier plans. 
*Goldman et al. (2004).
“Pharmacy Benefits and the 
Use of Drugs by the 
Chronically Ill.” JAMA.
The authors estimate how changes in 
cost sharing affect drug utilization 
(measured in drug days) of the most 
commonly used drug classes among the 
privately insured and chronically ill. 
They use 1997 to 2000 pharmacy claims 
data linked with health plan benefit 
designs from 30 employers (N=528,969 
non-elderly beneficiaries). 
For all 8 therapeutic classes analyzed, 
doubling copayments is associated with 
reductions in utilization. The largest 
decreases were for NSAIDs (elasticity 
estimate was -0.45) and antihistamines 
(elasticity was -0.44). Patients with at 
least one chronic illness were less 
responsive to price changes. Patients 
with arthritis, for example, had a price 
elasticity of demand for NSAIDs of -
0.27. 
*Landsman et al. (2005).
“Impact of 3-Tier Pharmacy 
Benefit Design and 
Increased Consumer Cost-
Sharing on Drug Utilization. 
American Journal of 
Managed Care.  
The authors estimate price 
responsiveness of prescription demand 
for nine therapeutic classes using 1999 
to 2001 data on three managed care 
populations whose pharmacy benefits 
changed from a 2-tier to a 3-tier design, 
compared with a managed care 
population that had no change in benefit 
design. Utilization was measured as the 
The study found lower elasticities for 
drugs used in asymptomatic conditions 
(-0.10 to -0.16 for statins, ACE 
inhibitors, CCBs, and ARBs) and 
higher elasticities for drugs used in 
symptomatic conditions (-0.24 to -1.15
for triptans, SSRIs, Cox-e inhibitors, 
NSAIDs, and TCAs). The elasticity for 
NSAIDs was -0.60.  
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average monthly number of 
prescriptions.   
Gibson, McLaughlin, & 
Smith. (2005). “A 
Copayment Increase for 
Prescription Drugs: The 
Long-Term and Short-Term 
Effects on Use and 
Expenditures.” Inquiry.
The study exploits a natural experiment 
in which a large firm increases drug 
copayments. The authors use a panel 
dataset that provides information on 
medical and drug claims for the firm 
that changed copayments and a control 
firm that did not change copayments for 
the years 1995 to 1998 (N=263,000 
employee quarters).  
The overall elasticity of demand for 
drugs is -0.04. The own-price elasticity 
of demand for multisource brand-name 
drugs is -0.27, more elastic than that of 
single-source brand name drugs 
(elasticity is -0.03). The study does not 
find evidence that brand-name and 
generic drugs are substitutes.  
Gaynor, Li, & Vogt. (2007). 
“Substitution, Spending 
Offsets, and Prescription 
Drug Benefit Design.” 
Forum for Health 
Economics & Policy. 
The authors use the 1997 to 2003 
MarketScan panel dataset of insurance 
claims and benefit design (N=1.7 
million person years) to assess the 
effects of changes in employer-provided 
drug benefits on drug spending. During 
this time, a number of employers 
reduced generosity of drug coverage. 
The model includes individual fixed 
effects approach to control for potential 
selection bias.  
The short-run price elasticity of 
demand for drug spending with respect 
to price is -0.6 and long-run elasticity is 
-0.8.  
Shea et al. (2007). 
“Estimating the Effects of 
Prescription Drug Coverage 
for Medicare Beneficiaries.” 
Health Services Research. 
The authors use the 1999 Medicare 
Current Beneficiary Survey (N=5,270 
beneficiaries) to identify the effect of 
insurance coverage on prescription 
utilization by Medicare beneficiaries. 
The authors use a multistage residual 
inclusion method using instrumental 
variables to control for selection bias.  
Prescription drug insurance increased 
the number of prescriptions filled by 50 
percent. The estimated price elasticity 
of demand for prescription drugs for 
Medicare beneficiaries is -0.54.
Chernew et al. (2008). 
“Effects of Increased Patient 
Cost Sharing on 
Socioeconomic Disparities 
in Health Care.” Journal of
General Internal Medicine. 
This study explores whether the impact 
of increased drug copayments for 
diabetes and heart disease drugs differs 
between high- and low-income areas. 
The authors use MarketScan claims data 
which provide information on insurance 
coverage and claims for people covered 
by large employer plans (N=43,000 
individuals with diabetes or heart 
disease).  
The elasticity of demand on drug 
adherence ranges from -0.03 to -0.05. 
Those with lower income were more 
price-sensitive.  
Gilman & Kautter. (2008). 
“Impact of Multitiered 
Copayments on the Use and 
Cost of Prescription Drugs 
Among Medicare 
Beneficiaries.” Health
Services Research.  
This paper studies the impact of multi-
tiered copayments on the cost and use of 
prescription drugs among Medicare 
beneficiaries. The authors use 2002 
Marketscan data to link plan enrollment 
and benefits with medical and drug 
claims for 352,760 Medicare 
beneficiaries. They use cross-sectional 
variation in copayment structures among 
firms that offer employer-sponsored 
retiree health plans. To reduce potential 
selection bias, the authors ensure that 
each firm in their sample offers only one 
prescription drug plan, either a one-
Beneficiaries in three-tiered plans had 
lower drug utilization and higher OOP 
costs than individuals in lower-tiered 
plans. The price elasticity of demand 
for prescription drug expenditures is -
0.23. 
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tiered plan or a three-tiered plan. 
Chandra, Gruber, & 
McKnight. (2010). “Patient 
Cost-Sharing and 
Hospitalization Offsets in 
the Elderly. American
Economic Review.  
The authors exploit a policy change that 
raised cost sharing for patients covered 
by insurance plans for retired public 
employees in California. They use 
administrative data that provides 
information on medical utilization 
(N=70,912 continuously-enrolled 
individuals), and estimate DD models to 
identify the impact of increased 
copayments on drug utilization.  
For PPO enrollees, the arc-elasticity of 
drug utilization (measured by number 
of prescriptions) with respect to patient 
cost is -0.08, and for HMO enrollees, 
the arc-elasticity is -0.15.  
*Gatwood et al. (2014).
“Price Elasticity and 
Medication Use: Cost-
Sharing Across Multiple 
Clinical Conditions.” 
Journal of Managed Care & 
Specialty Pharmacy. 
The study sample consists of about 11.5 
million privately insured enrollees aged 
18 to 64 in the 2005-09 MarketScan 
claims database. The authors estimate 
negative binomial fixed effects models 
with patient cost sharing as the key 
independent variable and prescription 
fills as the outcome variable, separately 
for eight categories of drugs. Models 
include plan fixed effects, and thus 
focused on longitudinal changes in cost-
sharing over time.  
Elasticities range from -0.02 to -0.16, 
with the largest (in magnitude) price 
elasticity for smoking deterrents and 
the smallest for NSAIDs/opioids. 
Demand for antiplatelet agent was not 
responsive to price.   
Yeung et al. (2016). “Price 
Elasticities of 
Pharmaceuticals in a Value-
Based-Formulary Setting.” 
NBER Working Paper. 
The authors exploit a natural experiment 
that involved a large nonprofit insurance 
company transitioning its cost-based 
formulary to a value-based formulary, 
which tries to incentivize patients to use 
drugs that are likely to produce better 
value. This led to exogenous increases 
in cost-sharing for some drugs and 
decreases for others. 
The overall price elasticity of demand 
for drugs is -0.16, but there is 
substantial variation across the 
formulary tiers, ranging from -0.09 to -
0.87. Patients were more price-
sensitive to drug placed in higher cost-
sharing tiers.  
Studies Based on the RAND Health Insurance Experiment
Newhouse & the Insurance 
Experiment Group. (1993). 
Free For All? Lessons from 
the Health Insurance 
Experiment.  
The Health Insurance Experiment 
randomly assign 5,800 non-elderly 
individuals to insurance plans with four 
different levels of coinsurance (ranging 
from 0 to 95 percent) and three different 
levels of maximum OOP expenditures. 
Individuals in the free care plan spent 
nearly twice as much on prescription 
drugs as individuals in the 95 percent 
coinsurance plan ($82 and $46, 
respectively). However, the increase 
was attributable to a larger number of 
physician visits for individuals in the 
generous plan.37 The overall elasticity 
estimate for prescription drugs is -0.17, 
similar to the elasticity of demand for 
health care in general. 
Studies Based on Natural Experiments in non-US Settings
O’Brien. (1989). “The 
Effect of Patient Charges on 
The United Kingdom’s National Health 
Service implemented copayments for 
The price elasticity of demand for 
drugs was -0.23 for the initial period 
37 The insurance plans in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment did not vary cost-sharing for prescription 
drugs independently of other medical services. Since prescription drugs may serve as substitutes or complements to 
other services, it is difficult to isolate the effect of drug prices on drug utilization using the RAND data. 
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the Utilization of 
Prescription Medicines.” 
Journal of Health 
Economics. 
prescription drugs in 1968. This study 
exploits the natural experiment to study 
the effect of OOP price increases on the 
number of prescriptions.  
(1969-1977) and later rose to -0.64
(1978-1986). The study also found a 
positive cross-price elasticity of 0.22 
between prescription and OTC drugs. 
Hughes & McGuire. (1995). 
“Patient Changes and the 
Utilization of NHS 
Prescription Medicines.” 
Health Economics. 
The authors exploit the 1968 
implementation of copayments for 
prescription drugs in the United 
Kingdom’s National Health Service. 
They use cointegration models to 
estimate price elasticities of demand for 
prescription drugs.  
The price elasticity of demand for 
drugs is -0.35.
Contoyannis et al. (2005). 
“Estimating the Price 
Elasticity of Expenditure for 
Prescription Drugs in the 
Presence of Non-Linear 
Price Schedules: An 
Illustration from Quebec, 
Canada. Health Economics. 
This study uses an exogenous change in 
cost-sharing within the Quebec public 
prescription drug insurance program to 
estimate price elasticity of expenditure 
for drugs using an instrumental variables 
approach. The instrument is based on 
the price an individual would face under 
the new policy if their consumption 
remained at the pre-policy level. The 
authors use administrative data on the 
Quebec program (N=120,000 elderly 
beneficiaries). Those without a 
prescription in the pre-policy period are 
not included in the analysis. 
Expenditure elasticities range from -
0.12 to -0.16. 
*Studies that estimate elasticities for specific drug classes.
1-C. Additional Details about the MEPS Data 
Construction of the MEPS Analytical Dataset 
This section describes how I edited the original MEPS Prescribed Medicines files for the 
analysis in this paper. Step 1 describes how I merged the MEPS and CDC files. Steps 2 to 9 
outline how I identified the opioid and non-opioid painkillers in MEPS. I could not simply use 
the Multum Lexicon codes provided by MEPS because the classification scheme changed over 
time (Hill, Roemer, & Stagnitti, 2014). I also could not use the NDCs because they were missing 
for 8 percent of the observations. I instead used the drug names provided by MEPS to identify 
opioids and non-opioid painkillers. Appendix Table 1- 2 displays a comprehensive list of each of 
the generic drug names in the opioid and non-opioid painkillers categories. Steps 10-15 explain 
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how I imputed missing information on opioids’ MME, DEA schedule, etc. for the observations 
that were missing this information.  
 Step 1: The original MEPS Prescribed Medicines files contained 5,652,749 observations
for the years 1996 to 2015, where each observation represented the purchase or refill of a
prescription medicine. Using the NDCs, I merged in additional information on MME,
DEA schedule, extended vs immediate release, etc. for the opioid observations using the
CDC Oral MME Equivalents file (https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/data-
files/CDC_Oral_Morphine_Milligram_Equivalents_Sept_2017.xlsx). The CDC file
successfully matched with 89 percent of the opioid observations in the MEPS file (where
opioid observations were defined as those in the Multum classes “Narcotic Analgesics”
and “Narcotic Analgesic Combinations”).
 Step 2: I browsed through the 486,003 observations that were classified as “Analgesics”
by the Multum Lexicon codes and identified 510 observations that were misclassified as
analgesics. These were primarily birth control pills, antibiotics, statins, vitamins,
eyedrops, and antihistamines. I reclassified them in their correct categories. The sample
now consisted of 485,493 analgesic observations.
 Step 3: Of the 485,493 analgesic observations, 3,661 were missing both NDCs and drug
names. For these observations, I renamed the drug names to “Unknown Opioids” and
“Unknown Non-Opioid Painkillers” according to their Multum codes.
 Step 4: There were 726 analgesic observations for which the drug names were missing
but the NDCs were not. For these observations, I used the FDA’s NDC database
(https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ndc/) to look up the drug names.
 Step 5: For the remaining 481,106 analgesic observations, I streamlined the product
names to correct misspellings, abbreviations, and other inconsistencies in the original
MEPS drug names. For example, the drug “Acetaminophen” was spelled almost 70
different ways in the MEPS files (“ACEMINOPHEN”, “ACETAMIN 120MG”,
“ACETAMINOPHEN DROP”, “ACETAMI”, etc). I created a variable called
Product_Name that was spelled “Acetaminophen” for all such observations. I repeated
this for all 481,106 analgesic observations and ended up with 663 distinct product names.
 Step 6: For each of the 485,493 analgesic observations, I created a variable to identify the
generic drug names by looking up the drugs on the FDA’s NDC database
(https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ndc/). I ended up with 132 distinct generic
drug names.
 Step 7: I browsed through all 5,652,749 observations and identified 1,071 observations
that were actually analgesics based on their drug names but had been misclassified as
non-analgesics by the MEPS Multum Lexicon codes. For example, in some cases, drugs
like Aspirin and Vicodin were classified as muscle relaxants rather than analgesics. For
these observations, I reclassified them as analgesics and streamlined their product names
and generic drug names as described in Steps 5-6. I also browsed through the analgesic
observations and reclassified treatment drugs for opioid use disorder (Buprenorphine,
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Naloxone) as non-analgesics. I had now identified a total of 486,392 analgesic 
observations in the MEPS (485,493 correctly classified analgesics + 1,071 analgesics that 
had previously been misclassified – 172 opioid treatment drugs).  
 Step 8: I used the generic drug names (a variable which I had manually created) to
categorize all 5,652,749 observations into three categories: opioid painkillers (229,921
observations), non-opioid painkillers (256,471 observations), and other drugs (5,166,357
observations). I did not use the Multum Lexicon codes to distinguish opioid vs non-
opioid painkillers because the Multum Lexicon codes were not consistent over time. For
example, the drugs “Tramadol” and “Tramadol & Acetaminophen” were classified as
“Miscellaneous Analgesics” from 1996 through 2011 but as “Narcotic Analgesics” from
2012 onwards.
 Step 9: I used the generic drug names (which had 132 distinct values) to create a binary
variable that identified each individual drug. (For example, the variable “presc_tapen”
was equal to 1 for all observations of Tapentadol prescriptions.)
 Step 10: Of the 229,921 opioid observations that I had identified in the MEPS, 89 percent
had successfully matched with the CDC file (from Step 1). For the remaining 11 percent
of opioid observations, I identified whether they were immediate release or extended
release drugs through an imputation process. If an observation was missing immediate vs
extended release information, I first used information provided in the MEPS drug name.
(For example, I coded “MORPHINE IR” and “OXYCODONE 15MG IMM REL
TABLETS” as immediate release formulations.)
o For those that were still missing, I searched for drugs with the same name, form,
and strength level in the CDC file. (For example, in the CDC file, all Fentanyl
tablets were immediate release and all Fentanyl patches were extended release, so
I identified missing Fentanyl tablets as immediate release and missing Fentanyl
patches as extended release formulations.
o For those that were still missing, I looked up the NDCs on the FDA website
(https://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/InformationbyDrugClass/ucm251735.ht
m) and the Bioportal website (http://bioportal.bioontology.org/ontologies).
Finally, for the 3,000 opioid observations that were missing both drug names and
NDCs (“Unknown Opioids”), I identified them as “immediate release” because
these were more prevalent in the data. I ended up with 185,748 “immediate
release” opioids and 44,173 “extended release” opioids.
 Step 11: I identified DEA schedules of the 229,921 opioid observations. For 89 percent
of the observations, this information was already available from the CDC file (from Step
1). For the remaining 11 percent of opioid observations, I imputed this information using
steps similar to those described in Step 10. I ended up with 153,516 Schedule II opioid
observations, 21,065 Schedule III, 53,904 Schedule IV, and 1,436 Schedule V.
 Step 12: I identified the drug form, strength per unit, and unit of measurement for the
229,921 opioid observations. If needed, I converted strength per unit from the given units
to a consistent unit for all observations (MG for tablets, MG/ML for solutions, and
MG/patch for patches). For 89 percent of the observations, this information was already
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available from the CDC file (from Step 1). For the remaining 11 percent of opioid 
observations, I imputed this information. I first used the rxstreng and rxstrunt variables 
provided by MEPS to fill in missing information for strength per unit. (For example, if 
observations with an rxname of “Codeine” and rxstreng of “30 MG” did not match with 
the CDC file, I filled in “30” for the strength per unit and “MG” for the unit of 
measurement. This process allowed me to identify the drug form and strength per unit of 
76 percent of the missing data.  
o For observations that had missing values for rxstreng and rxstrunt, I searched for
drugs with the same name and form in the CDC file and used the modal values. 
(For example, the drug “Stadol” in its tablet form always had a strength per unit 
of 10 and unit of measurement of 10 MG/ML in the CDC file. So for Stadol 
observations with missing rxstreng values, I filled in “10” for the strength per unit 
and “MG/ML” for the unit of measurement.)  
o Finally, for the 3,000 opioid observations that were missing both drug names and
NDCs (“Unknown Opioids”), 28 percent of them did have nonmissing 
information for rxstreng. For the remaining 72 percent, I identified the missing 
information using the modal values of all the opioid observations (i.e. “tablet” 
drug form, 5 for strength per unit, and MG for unit).  
o Through this process, I was also able to identify drug names for 26 percent of the
3,000 opioid observations that were missing both drug names and NDCs (for 
example, if the drug form was weekly patch and the category was narcotic 
analgesic, I knew the drug must be fentanyl). I now had only 2,210 opioid 
observations that were missing both drug names and NDCs (“Unknown 
Opioids”).  
o I discovered that some of the “Unknown Opioids” were actually treatment drugs
such as Buprenorphine or Naloxone. I reclassified these observations as non-
analgesics. I now had 229,280 opioid observations.  
 Step 13: For each of the opioid observations, I identified the active opioid ingredient (e.g.
morphine, hydrocodone, fentanyl, tramadol, etc) using the generic drug names. For the
2,210 opioid observations that were missing both drug names and NDCs (“Unknown
Opioids”), I listed the active opioid ingredient as “Unknown.”
 Step 14: For each of the opioid observations, I identified the MME conversion factor. I
had obtained this data from the CDC file for 89 percent of the opioid observations (see
Step 1). For the remaining 11 percent, I used the active opioid ingredients and obtained
this information from the CMS website (https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-
Drug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Opioid-Morphine-EQ-
Conversion-Factors-Aug-2017.pdf). For the 2,210 opioid observations that were missing
both drug names and NDCs (“Unknown Opioids”), I identified the MME conversion
factor as the modal MME (1).
 Step 15: MEPS provided the total amount spent on each prescription, as well as the
breakdown by source of payment (amount paid by self, private insurance, other private
sources, workers’ compensation, Medicare, VA, Champus, Tricare, other federal sources,
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Medicaid, other state/local sources, other public sources, and other sources). These 
variables were all nonmissing in the original data because they had already been imputed 
by MEPS for missing cases. I used these variables to calculate amount paid by all public 
sources (sum of workers’ compensation, Medicare, VA, Champus, Tricare, other federal 
sources, Medicaid, other state/local sources, and other public sources) and amount paid 
by all private sources and self (sum of private insurance, other private sources, self, and 
other).  
 Step 16: I imputed quantities and days supplied for the opioid and non-opioid painkillers,
ensuring that the units matched the unit of measurement from Step 12. Of the 485,751
painkiller observations, the MEPS quantity variable (rxquanty) was nonmissing for 99.9
percent of observations. For those 561 observations that were missing quantities, I
imputed the quantity by using the modal quantity of the same NDC in other cases.
o The days supplied variable was only provided for the years 2010 onwards. Of the
485,751 painkiller observations, I had days supplied information for only 23
percent. Before any imputations, the mean (median) days supplied per
prescription was 18 (16) for opioids and 31 (30) for non-opioid painkillers.
o For observations that were missing days supplied, I imputed using the modal
quantity per day supplied of the same NDC in cases for which I did have days
supplied. (For example, for NDC 00054024425 (Codeine 30 mg tablets), the
mode number of tablets patients were prescribed per day in the post-2010 period
was 6. Therefore, for NDC 00054024425 in the pre-2010 period, I coded the days
supplied variable as the quantity of tablets in the prescription divided by 6.) After
this imputation, I had days supplied information for 61 percent of the painkiller
observations.
o For cases where the NDC was not observed again in the post-2010 period, I
imputed using the modal quantity per day supplied for observations that had the
same product name, drug form, and strength level. After this imputation, I had
days supplied information for 90 percent of the painkiller observations.
o For cases where days supplied was still missing, I imputed using the modal
quantity per day supplied for observations that had the same generic drug name,
drug form, and strength level. After this imputation, I had days supplied
information for 95 percent of the painkiller observations.
o For cases where days supplied was still missing, I imputed using the modal
quantity per day supplied for observations that had the same generic drug name
and drug form. After this imputation, I had days supplied information for 100
percent of the painkiller observations.
o After all the imputations, the mean (median) days supplied per prescription was
16.5 (10) for opioids and 28.2 (30) for non-opioid painkillers.
 Step 17: For each opioid observation, I multiplied the Quantity variable (from MEPS)
with the Strength Per Unit variable and the MME conversion factor (from the CDC file)
to obtain the total MMEs in each prescription. Prior to calculating the product, I ensured
that all three variables were measured in the same units.
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o Based on the total MME per day supplied, I identified high-dose opioid
prescriptions as those that had more than 90 MMEs per day supplied and low-
dose prescriptions as those that had 90 or fewer MMEs per day supplied.
 Step 18: Before collapsing the data, I created additional spending variables that described
the amount spent (in that transaction) by each payment source on each of the generic
drugs, extended release opioids, immediate release opioids, high-dose opioids, and low-
dose opioids.
 Step 19: I collapsed the data at the prescription level to obtain a person-year level dataset
that provided the number of prescriptions and amount of money spent for each drug type.
I then calculated the amount spent per prescription for each drug type.
 Step 20: I collapsed the data at the days supplied level to obtain a person-year level
dataset that provided the number of days supplied and amount of money spent for each
drug type. I then calculated the amount spent per day supplied for each drug type.
MEPS Limitations 
This subsection describes how I handle limitations of the MEPS data in my analysis. The 
text in italics comes from the MEPS codebook and methodology report (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2017; Hill et al., 2014), and subsequent paragraphs explain the extent to 
which the methodological issue does or does not threaten the validity of my results. 
1. “Users should carefully review the data when conducting trend analyses or pooling years or
panels because Multum’s therapeutic classification has changed across the years of the
MEPS…Analysts should use caution when using the Cerner Multum therapeutic class
variables for analysis and should always check for accuracy.”
I do not use the Multum therapeutic variable to classify drugs, since the Multum codes 
change over the time period of my analysis. Rather, I carefully identify opioid and non-opioid 
painkillers by using the original drug names provided by MEPS.  
2. “…beginning with the 2007 data, the rules MEPS uses to identify outlier prices for
prescription medications became much less stringent than in prior years. Starting with the
2007 Prescribed Medicines file, there was: less editing of prices and quantities reported by
pharmacies, more variation in prices for generics, lower mean prices for generics, higher
mean prices for brand name drugs, greater differences in prices between generic and brand
name drugs, and a somewhat lower proportion of spending on drugs by families, as opposed
to third-party payers.”
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The DD model estimates the treatment effect as the difference between the treatment 
group (individuals aged 65-74) and the control group (individuals aged 55-64) after 2006, 
relative to the difference between the two groups before 2006. Presumably, the 2007 MEPS 
methodological changes were applied to all respondents without age-based discrimination. As 
long as the rules were not applied differentially to my treatment group and control group after 
2007, the DD results should not be affected.   
3. “Starting with the 2008 Prescribed Medicines file, improvements in the data editing
changed the distribution of payments by source: (1) more spending on Medicare
beneficiaries is by private insurance, rather than Medicare, and (2) less out-of-pocket
payments and more Medicaid payments among Medicaid enrollees.”
My interest is in OOP drug prices, so the shift from Medicare to private insurance among 
Medicare beneficiaries is not relevant for my analysis. I estimate a sensitivity analysis in which I 
omit Medicaid enrollees from analysis, and I find that the substantive results are similar (results 
available on request).   
4. “Starting with the 2009 data, additional improvements increased public program amounts
and reduced out-of-pocket payments and, for Medicare beneficiaries with both Part D and
Medicaid, decreased Medicare payments and increased Medicaid and other state and local
government payments.”
Regarding the reductions in OOP payments, so long as the methodology for calculating 
OOP payments did not change differentially for the treatment and control groups in 2009, my 
DD model should still capture the causal effect of Part D. I am primarily interested in the OOP 
gap between the treatment and control groups, not the raw levels of OOP payments. Regarding 
the second issue (decreased Medicare payments and increased Medicaid payments), my interest 
is in OOP prices, so the shift from Medicare to Medicaid among dual eligibles is not relevant for 
my analysis.   
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Other methodological changes were made beginning with the 2010 data, such as 
improvements to account for price discounts in the Part D donut hole and improvements in the 
price imputation methodology. However, since my period of analysis covers only through 2009, 
these later changes do not affect my results. 
1-D. Background on Medicare Part D 
Established in 1966, Medicare provides health insurance for individuals over age 65. For 
the first 40 years of its existence, however, the Medicare program did not provide prescription 
drug coverage, with the exception of drugs administered in institutional settings such as hospitals 
and physicians’ offices. Before 2006, the elderly had limited access to drug coverage: some low-
income “dual-eligible” Medicare beneficiaries received coverage through Medicaid or state-
sponsored drug programs; others received coverage through their employers or purchased 
coverage themselves through Medigap policies offered by private firms. However, these plans 
were often expensive and had caps on drug spending; one study found that before 2006, nearly 
one-third of elderly enrollees with drug coverage faced annual caps of $500 or less (Gold, 2001). 
Because of all these challenges, nearly one-third of Medicare beneficiaries lacked drug coverage 
before 2006 (Kaestner & Khan, 2012). Without insurance, these adults faced considerable cost 
barriers in accessing drugs and were more likely to engage in cost-related nonadherence 
(Duggan, Healy, & Scott Morton, 2008). 
Motivated by the high proportion of elderly adults without drug coverage, high out-of-
pocket spending burdens for the uninsured, and growing clinical importance of drugs in 
preventing and treating disease, the federal government established a prescription drug benefit 
for the elderly as part of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA). As of January 1, 
2006, Medicare beneficiaries gained access to drug coverage through Medicare Part D 
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(henceforth referred to as “Part D”). Insurance was delivered through private Part D plans and 
subsidized by the federal government. The MMA also provided a means-tested subsidy to help 
cover premiums and cost sharing for low-income individuals with limited assets.  
How Part D Works 
The enactment of Part D affected Medicare beneficiaries differently depending on their 
prior drug coverage (Levy & Weir, 2009):  
1. Those who already had creditable drug coverage (e.g. through their current or
former employers) were instructed to keep that coverage, and employers received
subsidies from the government to continue offering it. (This was intended to
reduce the likelihood that Part D would crowd out existing sources of drug
coverage.)
2. Those on Medicaid (dual eligibles) were automatically enrolled in Part D and the
subsidy.
3. Eighty-six percent of those on Medicare Advantage plans already had drug
coverage before Part D. After 2006, nearly all Medicare Advantage plans
included Part D plans as part of their benefit.
4. Those without coverage or with privately purchased drug coverage (including
Medigap plans) could decide whether to enroll in Part D and whether to apply for
the subsidy.
Part D beneficiaries could choose from three types of drug plans: 1) stand-alone plans 
that offered only drug coverage, 2) Medicare Advantage plans that provided all Medicare 
benefits including prescription drugs, or 3) creditable employer-sponsored coverage (for which 
the government would subsidize the employer). Enrollment in Part D plans was voluntary, but 
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recipients were subject to a financial penalty for each month that they delay enrollment after 
reaching the eligible age (to lessen adverse selection).  
For a typical Part D plan in 2006, the enrollee was responsible for paying 100 percent of 
their drug spending until reaching a $250 annual deductible. For the next $2,250 of spending, the 
plan covered 75 percent and the enrollee paid the remainder out of pocket. For the next $3,600 of 
spending, the plan paid 0 percent and the enrollee paid 100 percent (this part was known as the 
“coverage gap” or “doughnut hole”). After spending reached $5,100, the plan paid 95 percent 
and the enrollee paid only 5 percent out of pocket (Engelhardt & Gruber, 2011). Insurers had 
substantial flexibility in plan design, so long as the plan was actuarially equivalent to the one 
described above and covered certain therapeutic classes of drugs.  
Relevance of Part D for Researchers 
The introduction of Part D represented the most significant expansion to Medicare since 
the program’s inception. Appendix Figure 1- 3 shows that the prescription drug coverage rate for 
the elderly jumped from 74 percent before 2006 up to 92 percent in the years following Part D. 
Coverage for a control group of near-elderly individuals, on the other hand, increased only 
marginally from 81 percent to 84 percent over the same time period.  Part D currently serves 41 
million Medicare beneficiaries and spends $94 billion ($2,300 per beneficiary) each year (Kaiser 
Family Foundation, 2016). The policy has had large-scale impacts on prescription drug 
utilization, out-of-pocket spending, drug prices, and inpatient hospitalizations among elderly 
individuals.  
The implementation of Part D is of particular interest to researchers because it generated 
substantial variation in drug coverage rates across age groups and over time. Those above age 65 
received a positive shock in their out-of-pocket price of prescription drugs after 2006, whereas 
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those below 65 did not. Appendix Figure 1- 4 shows that after 2006, the share of elderly 
individuals’ prescription spending attributable to Medicare increased substantially from 9 percent 
before 2006 to 49 percent after the implementation of Part D; meanwhile, the share of total 
spending spent out of pocket fell from 49 percent before Part D to 25 percent after. Spending 
shares for the control group of near-elderly individuals, on the other hand, remained largely 
constant before and after 2006. This suggests that Part D led to a large change in out-of-pocket 
drug spending for Medicare eligibles.   
Prior research has exploited the implementation of Part D as a natural experiment for 
understanding the causal effects of prescription drugs on various health, financial, and social 
outcomes. Although Part D is an older policy, it continues to be used as a setting for studying 
prescription drug coverage even in recent studies (Bradford & Bradford, 2016; Buchmueller & 
Carey, 2018; Carey, 2017; Dunn & Shapiro, 2019; Huh & Reif, 2017; Kaplan & Zhang, 2017; 
Powell et al., 2017).  
1-E. Additional MEPS Analysis 
Appendix Figure 1- 5 displays trends in OOP prices of prescription painkillers over time 
for the outcomes not presented in Figure 1-4 in the main paper: price per MME and price per day 
supplied of high dose opioids, low dose opioids, extended release opioids and immediate release 
opioids. For the majority of outcomes, OOP prices appeared to follow similar trends for the 
treatment and control groups before 2006 and declined substantially for the treatment group after 
2006. Appendix Figure 1- 6 displays similar trends for the utilization outcomes (comparable to 
Figure 1-5 in the main paper). Although levels of utilization are always higher for elderly 
individuals, the trends are largely similar for the treatment and control groups before 2006, 
followed with a large uptick in utilization for the treatment group after 2006. 
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In Appendix Table 1- 4, I use my baseline DD model to model the effect of Part D on 
utilization of all prescription drugs (not just painkillers). I find that Part D led to an increase in 
2.95 prescriptions utilized per year (p<0.01), which represents an 11 percent increase over pre-
2006 levels. The policy also reduced OOP prices by $7.61 per prescription, which represents a 
24 percent decline from pre-2006. This implies a price elasticity of demand of -0.45, which 
aligns with findings from previous studies (Duggan & Scott Morton, 2010; Ketcham & Simon, 
2008; Liu et al., 2011; Yin et al., 2008). 
Appendix Table 1- 5 displays regression results for the impact of Part D on prescription 
opioid utilization by drug (to be compared with Table 1-4 in the main paper). The increased 
opioids utilization can be traced to large increases in hydrocodone (2.94 increase in days 
supplied or 134 percent increase from pre-2006) and morphine (1.00 increase in days supplied of 
417 percent increase from pre-2006).  
In Appendix Table 1- 6 through Appendix Table 1- 12, I present results from numerous 
parallel trends tests, falsification tests, and sensitivity analyses that provide confidence in the 
causal interpretation of my results. I discuss these results in detail in the main paper.  
Appendix Table 1- 13 shows results from a specification in which the outcome variable is 
measured as an indicator for whether the respondent made any purchase of the prescription that 
year. The estimated treatment effects are close to zero and not statistically significant, suggesting 
that there was no impact of Part D on the extensive margin of painkiller utilization. This may be 
because painkiller utilization was already relatively among elderly individuals even before 2006. 
Thirty-five percent of elderly individuals used prescription painkillers, even before the 
introduction of Part D.  
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In Appendix Table 1- 14, I use my DD model to assess the effects of Part D on the 
number of prescriptions individuals receive as “free” samples. Providers or manufacturers may 
offer free samples as a way to market their drugs, and so if I were to find increases in the number 
of opioids offered as free samples, it may raise concerns about the possibility of non-price 
mechanisms influencing the purchase of painkillers after Part D. However, I find that there was 
no significant impact of Part D on the number of free samples of opioids. Moreover, while there 
was an impact for non-opioid painkillers, it was in the opposite direction as expected. Part D led 
to a 25 percent decline in the number of free samples of non-opioid painkillers, suggesting that 
advertising through this avenue actually fell.  
1-F. Additional Nielsen Analysis 
Before 2006, the average price per day supplied of an OTC painkiller was $0.37. 
Appendix Table 1- 15 shows that there was no detectable effect of Part D on the prices of OTC 
painkillers for older households relative to younger households. The DD coefficient is close to 
zero and statistically insignificant.  
Appendix Table 1- 16 displays results from an event study specification that assesses 
differential trends in OTC utilization between the treatment and control group in each year, 
relative to the base year 2005. Older households purchase more painkillers than younger 
households. In the years 2004 and 2006, the gap between older and younger households 
increased, whereas during 2007-09, this gap shrunk substantially.  
I expose the baseline DD model to a number of sensitivity analyses, and results are 
displayed in Appendix Table 1- 17. The baseline DD model presented in the main paper yields a 
treatment effect of -3.27 (p<0.01). Column 1 displays results from a specification that omits 
demographic control variables from the right hand side; in this specification, the treatment effect 
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is -3.46 (p<0.01). Column 2 shows that if Nielsen survey weights are omitted, the treatment 
effect is -3.46 (p<0.01). Both these results are remarkably similar to that presented in the original 
baseline model. However, when I omit household fixed effects from the right hand side, the DD 
coefficient is 0.18 and imprecisely measured. This suggests that the results are sensitive to the 
inclusion of household fixed effects. In Column 4, I show that Part D led to a 0.01 percentage 
point or 1.3 percent decline in the probability of purchasing any OTC painkillers in a given year. 
Finally, I explore heterogeneous effects of the policy by income. Appendix Table 1- 18 
shows that the decline in OTC painkillers was concentrated among high-income households with 
income greater than 400 percent of the poverty level and middle-income households with 
incomes between 125 and 400 percent of the poverty level. As expected there was no detectable 
effect of Part D on OTC painkiller utilization of low-income households because these 
individuals were more likely to have drug coverage through Medicaid even before Part D. 
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1-G. Appendix 1 Figures 
Appendix Figure 1- 1. Prescription Opioid Spending per Person 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2015. Panel A includes all 
respondents (N=549,801), and Panel B includes respondents over age 65 (N=60,798). Figures display the mean 
number of painkiller prescriptions per person, adjusted by MEPS survey weights. 
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Appendix Figure 1- 2. Opioid Overdose Deaths by Type 
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation. Figures display the 
number of opioid overdose deaths in the United States by category. The numbers inside each bar indicate the percent 
of total opioid overdose deaths attributable to that category. 
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Appendix Figure 1- 3. Impact of Part D on Prescription Drug Insurance Rates 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Sample is restricted to adults aged 55 to 
74 (N=50,579).  Figure displays probability of having any prescription drug coverage at any point during the year, 
adjusted by MEPS survey weights. Individuals are defined as having prescription drug coverage if at least one of the 
following is true: 1) they have a private source of insurance coverage, 2) they reported positive third party payments 
for prescriptions purchased during the year, or 3) they have a Medicare Part D plan.   
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Appendix Figure 1- 4. Proportion of Total Prescription Drug Spending by Source 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. Sample is restricted to adults aged 55 to 
74 (N=50,579). Figures display percentage of total prescription drug spending paid by each source, adjusted by 
MEPS survey weights.   
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Appendix Figure 1- 5. Out-of-Pocket Prices of Prescription Painkillers over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Figures display the mean 
OOP spending per day supply of each NDC, weighted by 2003 utilization of the NDC. Prices are adjusted to 2009 
dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Pharmaceutical Producer Price Index
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Appendix Figure 1- 6. Utilization of Prescription Painkillers over Time 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74 (N=50,579). Figures display the mean number of days supplied per person, adjusted by MEPS 
survey weights.  
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1-H. Appendix 1 Tables 
Appendix Table 1- 2. Classification of Prescription Painkillers in MEPS 
Drug 
Common 
Brands 
Opioids – Prescription pain relief drugs whose distribution is controlled by the DEA because 
they have potential for abuse and may lead to psychological or physical dependence
Butorphanol Stadol 
Codeine 
Codeine & Acetaminophen 
Dihydrocodeine & Acetaminophen 
Dihydrocodeine & Aspirin 
Fentanyl Durageic, Actiq 
Hydrocodone Hysingla 
Hydrocodone & Acetaminophen Lortab, Lorcet, Vicodin, Norco 
Hydrocodone & Aspirin Damason 
Hydrocodone & Ibuprofen Vicoprofen 
Hydromorphone Dilaudid 
Levorphanol Levo Dromoran 
Meperidine Demerol 
Meperidine & Promethazine Meprozine 
Morphine MS Contin, Kadian, Avinza 
Nalbuphine Nubain 
Opium 
Oxycodone Oxycontin, Roxicodone 
Oxycodone & Acetaminophen Percocet, Endocet, Roxicet 
Oxycodone & Aspirin Endodan, Percodan 
Oxycodone & Ibuprofen Combunox 
Oxymorphone Opana 
Pentazocine & Acetaminophen Talacen 
Propoxyphene Darvon 
Propoxyphene & Acetaminophen Darvocet, Propacet 
Propoxyphene & Aspirin 
Tapentadol Nucynta 
Tramadol Ryzolt 
Tramadol & Acetaminophen Ultracet 
Unknown Opioids 
Non-opioid painkillers – Pain relief drugs that are not controlled by the DEA but require a 
physician’s prescription
Acetaminophen & Acetaminophen 
Combinations 
Fioricet, Mapap, Midrin, Tylenol 
Almotriptan Axert 
Aspirin & ASA Combinations Aspirin, Ecotrin, Fiorinal 
Bromfenac Duract 
Celecoxib Celebrex 
Choline Magnesium Trisalicylate Trilisate 
Diclofenac Arthrotec, Cataflam, Voltaren 
Diflunisal Dolobid 
Dihydroergotamine mesylate Migranal 
Eletriptan Relpax 
Ergotamine Cafergot 
Etodolac Lodine 
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Fenoprofen 
Flurbiprofen Ansaid 
Frovatriptan Frova 
Ibuprofen Advil, Motrin 
Indomethacin Indocin 
Ketoprofen Oruvail 
Ketorolac Toradol 
Magnesium salicylate 
Meclofenamate 
Mefenamic acid Ponstel 
Meloxicam Mobic 
Methylprednisolone 
Methysergide maleate Sansert 
Nabumetone Relafen 
Naproxen Naprelan, Anaprox, Aleve 
Naratriptan Amerge 
Oxaprozin Daypro 
Piroxicam Feldene 
Prednisone 
Rizatriptan Maxalt 
Rofecoxib Vioxx 
Salsalate 
Sulindac Clinoril 
Sumatriptan Imitrex 
Tolmetin 
Valdecoxib Bextra 
Zolmitriptan Zomig 
Unknown Non-Opioid Painkillers 
Source: Author’s classification of drugs in Medical Expenditure Panel Survey Prescribed Medicines files. 
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Appendix Table 1- 3. Composition of the 2003 Basket of Pain Relief Drugs 
Proportion of All Painkillers 
Generic Drug Name Sample NDCs Treatment Group Control Group 
Opioids 
Hydrocodone & Acetaminophen 00406035705, 52544063401 0.031 0.051 
Methadone 00406345434, 00054457025 0.025 0.007 
Oxycodone 59011010010, 58177004104 0.021 0.015 
Propoxyphene & Acetaminophen 00378015505, 00603546628 0.014 0.016 
Oxycodone & Acetaminophen 00054465029, 00406053201 0.013 0.011 
Tramadol 00045065960, 00378415105 0.010 0.005 
Fentanyl 50458003405, 50458003505 0.008 0.001 
Codeine & Acetaminophen 00045051360, 63304056201 0.007 0.008 
Hydrocodone & Ibuprofen 00093516101 0.001 0.001 
Codeine 00054415625 0.001 0.001 
Morphine 60951065270 0.001 0.007 
Hydromorphone 00406324301 0.001 0.001 
Meperidine & Promethazine 00603442421, 58177002704 0.001 0.001 
Propoxyphene 00603545921 0.001 0.001 
Tramadol & Acetaminophen 00045065060 0.001 0.020 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 
Celecoxib 00025152031, 00025152051 0.364 0.374 
Aspirin & ASA Combos 00182044810, 15127022894 0.303 0.183 
Diclofenac 00781178901, 00591033801 0.055 0.053 
Meloxicam 00597002901, 00597003001 0.040 0.037 
Naproxen 00093014901, 67253062210 0.028 0.070 
Ibuprofen 00009738701, 49884077705 0.026 0.058 
Acetaminophen & Combos 00603026321, 00143111501 0.010 0.018 
Nabumetone 00093101501, 00029485120 0.010 0.029 
Indomethacin 00172403060, 00378014301 0.013 0.001 
Diflunisal 00093075506 0.004 0.001 
Etodolac 51672401801, 00093112201 0.004 0.002 
Oxaprozin 00185014101, 49884072301 0.004 0.012 
Piroxicam 00093075701, 00378202001 0.003 0.006 
Sulindac 00378053101, 00591566001 0.003 0.005 
Flurbiprofen 00378009301, 00093071101 0.002 0.006 
Ketoprofen 00378575001 0.001 0.001 
Ketorolac 00378113401, 58177030104 0.001 0.001 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2003. This table excludes drugs that were 
removed from the market before 2006 (i.e. Vioxx, Bextra, etc).  
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Appendix Table 1- 4. Impact of Part D on Utilization of All Prescription Drugs 
Utilization (Prescriptions) Price (OOP Price per Prescription)
Elasticity 
(7)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1)
DD 
Coefficient 
(2)
Percent 
Change 
(3)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(4)
DD 
Coefficient 
(5)
Percent 
Change 
(6)
All Drugs 26.27 
2.95*** 
(0.82) 
11.2% 31.52 
-7.61***
(0.92) 
24.1% -0.45 
N 50,579 50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Columns 1 and 4 display the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Columns 2 and 5 display 
the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control 
for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. Columns 3 and 6 displays percent change from pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 5. Regression Results for Impact of Part D on Prescription Opioid Utilization 
(Days Supplied) by Drug 
Pre-2006 Mean 
(1) 
DD Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent Change 
(3) 
Hydrocodone 2.20 
2.94*** 
(0.67) 
133.6% 
Propoxyphene 2.64 
0.67 
(0.51) 
- 
Oxycodone 1.44 
0.42 
(0.58) 
- 
Tramadol 1.60 
0.50 
(0.52) 
- 
Codeine 0.56 
0.03 
(0.16) 
- 
Morphine 0.24 
1.00*** 
(0.32) 
416.7% 
Fentanyl 0.34 
0.32 
(0.35) 
- 
Methadone 0.55 
-0.32 
(0.30) 
- 
Other Opioids 0.32 
-0.24* 
(0.13) 
-75.0% 
N 50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for 
sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, column 3 displays percent change from 
pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 6. Event Study Results for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkillers 
Panel A: Utilization (Days Supplied)  
Total MME 
(1) 
High Dose 
Opioids 
(2) 
Low Dose 
Opioids 
(3) 
Extended 
Release 
Opioids 
(4) 
Immediate 
Release 
Opioids 
(5) 
Year 2000 X Treatment 
-74.74 
(153.40) 
0.54 
(0.71) 
-1.93 
(1.60) 
-2.16** 
(0.87) 
0.46 
(1.68) 
Year 2001 X Treatment 
-195.01 
(139.42) 
0.13 
(0.67) 
-2.36* 
(1.37) 
-2.42*** 
(0.87) 
-0.44 
(1.36) 
Year 2002 X Treatment 
-142.99 
(189.07) 
0.18 
(0.70) 
-1.70 
(1.56) 
-1.51* 
(0.91) 
-0.09 
(1.52) 
Year 2003 X Treatment 
-221.74 
(147.02) 
-0.14 
(0.58) 
-2.79* 
(1.64) 
-1.93** 
(0.93) 
-1.46 
(1.56) 
Year 2004 X Treatment 
-46.92 
(123.19) 
-0.30 
(0.53) 
-0.35 
(1.50) 
-0.27 
(0.87) 
-0.63 
(1.43) 
Year 2006 X Treatment 
-54.51 
(219.06) 
-0.20 
(0.47) 
-0.65 
(1.57) 
-1.60 
(1.01) 
0.38 
(1.39) 
Year 2007 X Treatment 
186.37 
(250.61) 
0.49 
(0.71) 
5.18*** 
(1.98) 
0.23 
(1.35) 
5.02*** 
(1.69) 
Year 2008 X Treatment 
423.59 
(309.02) 
1.33 
(0.98) 
4.21* 
(2.19) 
0.78 
(1.45) 
4.69** 
(1.99) 
Year 2009 X Treatment 
568.72** 
(256.24) 
1.60 
(1.03) 
3.94* 
(2.09) 
1.23 
(1.34) 
4.30** 
(1.85) 
p-value for test that all pre-
2006 terms jointly equal 0 
0.51 0.82 0.32 0.03 0.87 
N 50,579 50,579 50,579 50,579 50,579 
Panel B: OOP Price (per Day Supplied) 
Total MME 
(1) 
High Dose 
Opioids 
(2) 
Low Dose 
Opioids 
(3) 
Extended 
Release 
Opioids 
(4) 
Immediate 
Release 
Opioids 
(5) 
Year 2000 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.33 
(0.84) 
0.57 
(0.50) 
0.00 
(0.57) 
0.53 
(0.57) 
Year 2001 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
5.16 
(3.68) 
-0.12 
(0.72) 
2.53 
(1.89) 
-0.26 
(0.66) 
Year 2002 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
1.09 
(3.97) 
0.38 
(0.55) 
0.82 
(3.17) 
0.24 
(0.43) 
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Year 2003 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
5.68* 
(3.26) 
-0.30 
(0.46) 
1.21 
(2.45) 
0.26 
(0.40) 
Year 2004 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.41 
(5.40) 
0.65 
(0.47) 
-2.07 
(4.21) 
1.16** 
(0.55) 
Year 2006 X Treatment 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-4.22 
(6.96) 
0.23 
(0.55) 
-1.50 
(4.59) 
-0.49 
(0.52) 
Year 2007 X Treatment 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
5.79 
(5.41) 
-1.25** 
(0.63) 
1.25 
(2.24) 
-0.97 
(0.62) 
Year 2008 X Treatment 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
0.33 
(0.26) 
-0.57 
(0.53) 
-1.02 
(0.79) 
-0.33 
(0.50) 
Year 2009 X Treatment 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
2.01** 
(0.89) 
-0.70 
(0.56) 
0.05 
(0.49) 
-0.34 
(0.69) 
p-value for test that all pre-
2006 terms jointly equal 0 
0.88 0.39 0.53 0.80 0.29 
N 1,664 308 1,356 223 1,441 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Table displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and each year indicator. The year 2005 is omitted as 
the base year.  Regressions in Panel A control for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, 
race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS 
survey weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS. Regressions in Panel B include a 
treatment group indicator and year fixed effects. Data are weighted by 2003 level of utilization of the NDC.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 7. Falsification Tests for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller 
Utilization (Days Supplied) 
“Treatment” as Ages 
45-54 
(1) 
“Treatment” as Ages 
35-44 
(2) 
“Treatment” as Ages 
25-34 
 (3) 
“Treatment” as Ages 
18-24 
 (4) 
All Painkillers 
0.99 
(1.72) 
0.57 
(1.39) 
0.18 
(1.40) 
-0.16 
(1.42) 
Opioids 
1.22 
(0.98) 
-0.79 
(0.77) 
-1.23 
(0.77) 
-1.43* 
(0.76) 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
0.22 
(1.43) 
1.25 
(1.15) 
1.23 
(1.13) 
1.28 
(1.18) 
N 74,703 77,310 74,883 63,708 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. The control group consists 
of individuals aged 55-64, and the column header provides the definition of the “treatment” group. Each cell 
displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions 
control for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and 
include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors 
account for the complex design of the MEPS.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 8. DD Results with Two Post Periods for Impact of Part D on Prescription 
Painkiller Utilization (Days Supplied) 
Treatment X 2004-05 
(1) 
Treatment X Post-2006 
(2) 
N 
(3) 
All Painkillers 
4.03* 
(2.40) 
5.76** 
(2.38) 
50,579 
Opioids 
1.63 
(1.17) 
5.39*** 
(1.30) 
50,579 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 
2.43 
(2.21) 
0.88 
(2.10) 
50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the 
2004-05 indicator. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-
2006 indicator. Regressions control for sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, 
and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, 
and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 9. Sensitivity Analyses for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller 
Utilization (Days Supplied) 
Panel A: Alternative Specifications 
No 
Demographic 
Controls 
(1) 
Omit 
Years 
2004-05 
(2) 
Omit 
Ages 
63-64 
(3) 
Alternative 
Treatment 
(4) 
 Treatment 
X Year FE 
(5) 
 Control for 
Health 
Status 
(6) 
Treatment X Year 
FE and Control for 
Health Status 
 (7) 
All Painkillers 
4.31* 
(2.26) 
5.90** 
(2.39) 
4.82** 
(2.35) 
3.59 
(2.28) 
4.85 
(4.11) 
3.87* 
(2.27) 
4.53 
(4.00) 
Opioids 
4.72*** 
(1.21) 
5.38*** 
(1.30) 
4.95*** 
(1.20) 
3.11*** 
(1.18) 
4.50** 
(2.19) 
4.53*** 
(1.23) 
4.30** 
(2.13) 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
0.06 
(2.00) 
1.02 
(2.11) 
0.29 
(2.11) 
0.48 
(2.05) 
1.27 
(3.50) 
-0.18 
(2.02) 
1.12 
(3.47) 
N 50,579 40,539 45,700 47,929 50,579 50,579 50,579 
Panel B: Include Additional Years of Data 
Years 1996-
2009 
(1) 
Years 2000-
2015 
(2) 
Years 1996-
2015 
(3) 
All Painkillers 
5.88***
(2.14) 
7.73*** 
(1.86) 
9.37*** 
(1.65) 
Opioids 
5.34*** 
(1.17) 
7.23*** 
(0.97) 
7.86*** 
(0.91) 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
1.18 
(1.86) 
1.35 
(1.71) 
2.55* 
(1.50) 
N 65,363 87,899 102,683 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey. In Panel A, years of analysis are 
restricted to 2000 to 2009. Each cell displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and 
the post-2006 indicator. Unless otherwise specified, regressions control for sex, marital status, household income, 
educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data 
are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 10. DD Results for Impact of Part D on Number of Painkiller Prescriptions 
(Number of Prescriptions) 
Utilization (Prescriptions)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1)
DD 
Coefficient 
(2)
Percent 
Change 
(3)
Painkillers 
All Painkillers 1.96 
0.11 
(0.11) 
- 
Opioids 0.73 
0.18*** 
(0.07) 
24.7%
Non-Opioid Painkillers 1.23 
-0.07 
(0.07) 
- 
Opioids, by Dosage 
High Dose Opioids 0.15 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-
Low Dose Opioids 0.59 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
28.8%
Opioids, by Release 
Extended Release 
Opioids 
0.12 
0.05 
(0.03) 
Immediate Release 
Opioids 
0.62 
0.13** 
(0.05) 
21.0%
N 50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for 
sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, column 3 displays percent change from 
pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 11. Heterogeneous Effects for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller 
Utilization by Household Income 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
Less than 125% FPL 
All Painkillers 51.70 
8.31 
(5.66) 
- 
Opioids 16.50 
5.54 
(3.44) 
- 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 38.06 
3.29 
(4.96) 
- 
N 9,259 
125-400% FPL 
All Painkillers 41.65 
6.37* 
(3.61) 
15.3% 
Opioids 9.47 
7.88*** 
(2.08) 
83.2% 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 33.49 
-0.77 
(3.08) 
- 
N 21,191 
Greater than 400% FPL 
All Painkillers 31.45 
0.10 
(2.96) 
- 
Opioids 6.58 
0.53 
(1.46) 
- 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 25.93 
-0.55 
(2.59) 
- 
N 20,129 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for 
sex, marital status, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the 
MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, column 3 displays percent change from pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 12. Robustness Checks for Impact of Part D on Prescription Painkiller 
Utilization 
Ages 
50-79 
(1) 
Ages 
51-78 
(2) 
Ages 
52-77 
(3) 
Ages 
53-76 
(4) 
Ages 
54-75 
(5) 
Ages 
55-74 
(6) 
Ages 
56-73 
(7) 
Ages 
57-72 
(8) 
Ages 
58-71 
(9) 
Ages 
59-70 
(10) 
Ages 
60-69 
(11) 
All 
Painkillers 
4.22** 
(1.79) 
4.01** 
(1.84) 
4.11** 
(1.91) 
4.51** 
(2.01) 
4.75** 
(2.17) 
4.33* 
(2.30) 
4.45* 
(2.38) 
5.00** 
(2.48) 
4.61* 
(2.66) 
3.45 
(2.85) 
2.17 
(3.06) 
Opioids 
4.71*** 
(1.00) 
4.64*** 
(1.03) 
4.65*** 
(1.06) 
4.78*** 
(1.09) 
4.98*** 
(1.15) 
4.81*** 
(1.23) 
4.91*** 
(1.29) 
5.24*** 
(1.37) 
5.06*** 
(1.44) 
4.28*** 
(1.53) 
3.11* 
(1.71) 
Non-Opioid 
Painkillers 
0.13 
(1.60) 
-0.07 
(1.63) 
-0.02 
(1.72) 
0.18 
(1.81) 
0.39 
(1.94) 
0.02 
(2.04) 
0.15 
(2.08) 
0.39 
(2.15) 
0.16 
(2.30) 
-0.41 
(2.45) 
-0.80 
(2.62) 
N 79,033 73,350 67,583 61,851 56,231 50,579 45,128 39,653 34,221 29,118 24,195 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
ages defined in the column header. Each cell displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group 
indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for sex, marital status, household income, educational 
attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted 
by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the complex design of the MEPS.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 13. DD Results for Impact of Part D on Any Purchase of Prescription 
Painkillers 
Utilization (Any Purchase)
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1)
DD 
Coefficient 
(2)
Percent 
Change 
(3)
Painkillers 
All Painkillers 0.35 
0.01 
(0.01) 
- 
Opioids 0.17 
0.01 
(0.01) 
- 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 0.26 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
- 
N 50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for 
sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, column 3 displays percent change from 
pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 14. Impact of Part D on Free Samples of Prescription Painkillers 
Number of Free Sample 
Prescriptions 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1)
DD 
Coefficient 
(2)
Percent 
Change 
(3)
All Drugs 0.96 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-20.8%
All Painkillers 0.09 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-22.2%
Opioids 0.01 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
- 
Non-Opioid Painkillers 0.08 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-25.0%
N 50,579 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 2000 to 2009. Sample is restricted to 
adults aged 55 to 74. Column 1 displays the pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for 
sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include age 
fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by MEPS survey weights, and standard errors account for the 
complex design of the MEPS. For statistically significant point estimates, column 3 displays percent change from 
pre-2006 mean. 
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 15. DD Results for Impact of Part D on Prices of OTC Painkillers 
Price (per Day Supplied) 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD 
Coefficient 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
OTC Painkillers 0.37 
0.06 
(0.06) 
- 
N 335,060 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Column 1 displays the 
pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group 
indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for householder’s sex, marital status, household income, 
educational attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
Data are adjusted by Nielsen survey weights, and standard errors are clustered on household.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 16. Event Study Results for Impact of Part D on Utilization of OTC 
Painkillers 
Utilization (Days 
Supplied) 
(1) 
Year 2004 X Treatment 
2.05** 
(0.91) 
Year 2006 X Treatment 
3.41*** 
(0.93) 
Year 2007 X Treatment 
-3.67*** 
(0.96) 
Year 2008 X Treatment 
-4.01*** 
(1.00) 
Year 2009 X Treatment 
-7.86*** 
(1.04) 
N 335,060 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Column 1 displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and each year indicator. The year 2005 is omitted as 
the base year. Regressions control for householder’s sex, marital status, household income, educational attainment, 
race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are adjusted by 
Nielsen survey weights, and standard errors are clustered on household.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 1- 17. Sensitivity Analyses for Impact of Part D on Utilization of OTC 
Painkillers 
No Controls 
(1) 
No Weights 
(2) 
No Household 
FE 
(3) 
Any Purchase 
Outcome 
(4) 
OTC 
Painkillers 
-3.46*** 
(0.98) 
-3.46*** 
(0.72) 
0.18 
(1.24) 
-0.01** 
(0.01) 
N 335,060 335,060 335,060 335,060 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Table displays the 
coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Results should be 
compared with those in Table 1-8. The outcome variable is “number of days supplied of OTC painkillers” for 
columns 1-3 and “any painkiller purchased” for column 4 (pre-2006 mean for “any painkiller purchased” is 0.79). 
Unless otherwise specified, regressions control for householder’s sex, marital status, household income, educational 
attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are 
adjusted by Nielsen survey weights, and standard errors are clustered on household.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
200 
Appendix Table 1- 18. Heterogeneous Effects for Impact of Part D on OTC Painkiller Utilization 
by Household Income 
Pre-2006 
Mean 
(1) 
DD Estimate 
(2) 
Percent 
Change 
(3) 
Less than 125% 
OTC Painkillers 61.28 
-1.97 
(3.75) 
- 
N 20,031 
125 to 400%  
OTC Painkillers 75.72 
-2.50* 
(1.33) 
-3.3% 
N 153,486 
Greater than 400% 
OTC Painkillers  80.33 
-5.81*** 
(1.96) 
-7.2% 
N 161,539 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Nielsen Household Consumer Panel 2004 to 2009. Column 1 displays the 
pre-2006 mean for the treatment group. Column 2 displays the coefficient on the interaction of the treatment group 
indicator and the post-2006 indicator. Regressions control for householder’s sex, marital status, educational 
attainment, race/ethnicity, and Census region, and include household fixed effects and year fixed effects. Data are 
adjusted by Nielsen survey weights, and standard errors are clustered on household.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
A
p
p
en
d
ic
es
 f
o
r 
C
h
a
p
te
r 
2
 
2
-A
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R
ev
ie
w
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
a
re
 P
a
rt
 D
 L
it
er
a
tu
re
 
A
pp
en
di
x 
T
ab
le
 2
- 
1.
 L
it
er
at
ur
e 
on
 th
e 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
In
tr
od
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
M
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ar
e 
P
ar
t D
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P
a
p
er
 
O
u
tc
o
m
es
 S
tu
d
ie
d
 
M
et
h
o
d
s/
D
a
ta
 
R
es
u
lt
s 
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 P
re
sc
ri
p
ti
o
n
 D
ru
g
 C
o
ve
ra
g
e
H
ei
ss
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
6)
. W
ho
 F
ai
le
d 
T
o 
E
nr
ol
l I
n 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
, A
nd
 W
hy
? 
E
ar
ly
 R
es
ul
ts
. H
ea
lt
h
 A
ff
a
ir
s.
D
ru
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 b
y 
so
ci
o-
de
m
og
ra
ph
ic
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
 
P
an
el
/c
oh
or
t;
 
R
et
ir
em
en
t 
P
er
sp
ec
ti
ve
s 
S
ur
ve
y 
A
ft
er
 th
e 
fi
rs
t y
ea
r 
of
 P
ar
t D
, o
nl
y 
7.
4%
 o
f 
el
de
rl
y 
A
m
er
ic
an
s 
re
m
ai
ne
d 
un
in
su
re
d.
 T
he
 r
em
ai
ni
ng
 
un
in
su
re
d 
ha
ve
 b
et
te
r 
se
lf
-a
ss
es
se
d 
he
al
th
, u
se
 f
ew
er
 
pr
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s,
 a
nd
 lo
w
er
 c
og
ni
ti
ve
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t s
co
re
s.
 
P
ar
t D
 w
as
 la
rg
el
y 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 in
 e
nr
ol
li
ng
 v
ul
ne
ra
bl
e 
su
bp
op
ul
at
io
ns
 –
po
or
 h
ea
lt
h,
 lo
w
 in
co
m
e,
 o
r 
co
gn
it
iv
e 
im
pa
ir
m
en
t. 
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 T
hi
s 
re
vi
ew
 c
ov
er
s 
st
ud
ie
s 
th
at
 e
va
lu
at
e 
im
pa
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
20
06
 in
tr
od
uc
ti
on
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. T
he
re
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
se
ve
ra
l s
tu
di
es
 th
at
 le
ve
ra
ge
 th
e 
P
ar
t D
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 g
ap
 (
do
nu
t h
ol
e)
 to
 u
nd
er
st
an
d 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
O
O
P
 p
ri
ce
s 
on
 d
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
ou
tc
om
es
. T
hi
s 
ta
bl
e 
do
es
 n
o
t c
ov
er
 th
e 
li
te
ra
tu
re
 o
n 
th
e 
P
ar
t D
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 g
ap
. 
201 
L
ev
y 
&
 W
ei
r.
 (
20
09
).
 T
ak
e-
up
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
: R
es
ul
ts
 F
ro
m
 th
e 
H
ea
lt
h 
an
d 
R
et
ir
em
en
t S
tu
dy
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
G
er
o
n
to
lo
g
y:
 S
o
ci
a
l 
S
ci
en
ce
s.
 
D
ru
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
; P
ar
t D
 ta
ke
 u
p;
 
S
ou
rc
e 
of
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
P
an
el
/c
oh
or
t;
 
H
R
S
 
D
ru
g 
un
in
su
ra
nc
e 
re
du
ce
d 
fr
om
 2
4%
 in
 2
00
4 
to
 7
%
 in
 
20
06
. T
he
 r
em
ai
ni
ng
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
 u
se
 f
ew
er
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
ns
 
an
d 
ha
ve
 lo
w
er
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g.
 T
ak
e 
up
 o
f 
P
ar
t D
 w
as
 
hi
gh
 (
60
%
) 
am
on
g 
un
in
su
re
d 
po
pu
la
ti
on
. 
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 D
ru
g
 U
ti
li
za
ti
o
n
, 
N
o
n
a
d
h
er
en
ce
, 
a
n
d
 O
O
P
 S
p
en
d
in
g
 
H
al
l e
t a
l. 
(2
00
7)
. T
ra
ns
it
io
n 
to
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
: A
n 
E
ar
ly
 S
na
ps
ho
t o
f 
B
ar
ri
er
s 
E
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 b
y 
Y
ou
ng
er
 D
ua
l E
li
gi
bl
es
 
w
it
h 
D
is
ab
il
iti
es
. A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
M
a
n
a
g
ed
 C
a
re
. 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
tr
an
si
ti
on
 f
ro
m
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
to
 P
ar
t D
 o
n 
dr
ug
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 a
m
on
g 
no
n-
el
de
rl
y 
di
sa
bl
ed
 a
du
lt
s 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; 
S
ur
ve
y 
of
 K
an
sa
s 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
T
ra
ns
it
io
n 
to
 P
ar
t D
 le
d 
to
 s
om
e 
ac
ce
ss
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
di
sa
bl
ed
. 2
0%
 o
f 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
re
po
rt
ed
 d
if
fi
cu
lt
y 
ob
ta
in
in
g 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
; 1
3%
 w
er
e 
re
qu
ir
ed
 to
 s
w
it
ch
 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
; 8
%
 s
to
pp
ed
 ta
ki
ng
 a
t l
ea
st
 o
ne
 d
ru
g.
 
L
ic
ht
en
be
rg
 &
 S
un
. (
20
07
).
 T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 
O
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 O
n 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
U
se
 B
y 
T
he
 E
ld
er
ly
. H
e
a
lt
h
A
ff
a
ir
s.
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g;
 
C
ro
w
d-
ou
t 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
W
al
gr
ee
ns
 
O
O
P
 c
os
ts
 r
ed
uc
ed
 b
y 
18
%
’ 
dr
ug
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
3%
. C
ro
w
d-
ou
t r
at
e 
w
as
 7
2%
: f
or
 e
ve
ry
 7
 
pr
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s 
pa
id
 f
or
 b
y 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t, 
on
ly
 2
 w
er
e 
ne
w
 
an
d 
5 
w
er
e 
cr
ow
de
d 
ou
t f
ro
m
 p
ri
va
te
 in
su
ra
nc
e.
 
W
es
t e
t a
l. 
(2
00
7)
. M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
A
cc
es
s 
an
d 
C
on
ti
nu
it
y:
 T
he
 E
xp
er
ie
nc
es
 o
f 
D
ua
l-
E
li
gi
bl
e 
P
sy
ch
ia
tr
ic
 P
at
ie
nt
s 
D
ur
in
g 
th
e 
F
ir
st
 4
 M
on
th
s 
of
 th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
B
en
ef
it
. 
A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
sy
ch
ia
tr
y.
 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
tr
an
si
ti
on
 f
ro
m
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
to
 p
ar
t D
 o
n 
dr
ug
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
du
al
-e
li
gi
bl
e 
ps
yc
hi
at
ri
c 
pa
ti
en
ts
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; 
S
ur
ve
y 
of
 
ps
yc
hi
at
ri
st
s 
A
cc
es
s 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
fo
r 
ps
yc
hi
at
ri
c 
pa
ti
en
ts
. 5
3%
 h
ad
 a
t 
le
as
t o
ne
 m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
ac
ce
ss
 p
ro
bl
em
 in
 2
00
6.
 A
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
w
it
h 
m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
ac
ce
ss
 p
ro
bl
em
s,
 2
7%
 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
ad
ve
rs
e 
cl
in
ic
al
 e
ve
nt
; 2
0%
 h
ad
 E
D
 v
is
it
. 
C
he
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
8)
. T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
P
sy
ch
ot
ro
pi
c 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 F
in
an
ci
al
 B
ur
de
n 
fo
r 
C
om
m
un
it
y-
B
as
ed
 S
en
io
rs
. P
sy
ch
ia
tr
ic
S
er
vi
ce
s.
 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
ps
yc
ho
tr
op
ic
 d
ru
gs
; 
O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; W
al
gr
ee
ns
 
P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 O
O
P
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 in
 to
ta
l p
ha
rm
ac
y 
re
im
bu
rs
em
en
ts
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 1
8%
 f
or
 a
nt
id
ep
re
ss
an
ts
, 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
21
%
 o
f 
an
ti
ps
yc
ho
ti
cs
, &
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
19
%
 f
or
 
be
nz
od
ia
ze
pi
ne
s 
(b
en
zo
di
az
ep
in
es
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fr
om
 
fo
rm
ul
ar
y)
. P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
ns
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 7
%
 f
or
 
an
ti
de
pr
es
sa
nt
s,
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
8%
 f
or
 a
nt
ip
sy
ch
ot
ic
s,
 
an
d 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
5%
 f
or
 b
en
zo
di
az
ep
in
es
.  
K
et
ch
am
 &
 S
im
on
. (
20
08
).
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
's 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
n 
E
ld
er
ly
 D
ru
g 
C
os
ts
 
an
d 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
. A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
M
a
n
a
g
ed
 C
a
re
. 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
W
ol
te
rs
 K
lu
w
er
 
H
ea
lt
h 
(p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
re
co
rd
s)
 
O
O
P
 c
os
ts
 p
er
 d
ay
 s
up
pl
ie
d 
re
du
ce
d 
by
 2
2%
; d
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 5
%
; i
m
pl
ie
d 
el
as
ti
ci
ty
 i
s 
-0
.2
2.
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S
hr
an
k 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
8)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
T
ra
ns
it
io
ni
ng
 to
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 D
ru
g 
C
ov
er
ag
e 
in
 S
en
io
rs
 D
ua
ll
y 
E
li
gi
bl
e 
fo
r 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
an
d 
M
ed
ic
ai
d.
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
th
e
A
m
er
ic
a
n
 G
er
ia
tr
ic
s 
S
o
ci
et
y.
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g;
 
M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
sw
it
ch
in
g 
am
on
g 
du
al
 
el
ig
ib
le
s 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; P
ha
rm
ac
y 
ch
ai
n 
da
ta
 
R
ed
uc
ti
on
 in
 c
op
ay
s 
fo
r 
al
l d
ru
gs
 s
tu
di
ed
, e
xc
ep
t 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
in
 b
en
zo
di
az
ep
in
e 
co
pa
ys
. 3
 ti
m
es
 g
re
at
er
 
ra
te
 o
f 
sw
it
ch
in
g 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
 f
or
 p
ro
to
n 
pu
m
p 
in
hi
bi
to
rs
, b
ut
 n
o 
ch
an
ge
 f
or
 o
th
er
 m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
. N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
al
l s
tu
dy
 d
ru
gs
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 th
e 
un
co
ve
re
d 
be
nz
od
ia
ze
pi
ne
s.
 
Y
in
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
8)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
B
en
ef
it
 o
n 
D
ru
g 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s.
 
A
n
n
a
ls
 o
f 
In
te
rn
a
l 
M
ed
ic
in
e.
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
W
al
gr
ee
ns
 
O
O
P
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
pe
r 
da
y 
su
pp
li
ed
 r
ed
uc
ed
 b
y 
9%
 a
nd
 
dr
ug
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
%
 in
 th
e 
fi
rs
t h
al
f 
of
 
20
06
. A
ft
er
 e
nr
ol
lm
en
t s
ta
bi
li
ze
d,
 O
O
P
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
3%
 a
nd
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 6
%
. 
Z
ha
ng
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
8)
. T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
B
en
ef
it
 o
n 
G
en
er
ic
 D
ru
g 
U
se
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
G
en
er
a
l
In
te
rn
a
l 
M
ed
ic
in
e.
 
G
en
er
ic
 d
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 
sp
en
di
ng
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
W
al
gr
ee
ns
 
M
od
es
t d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 u
se
 o
f 
ge
ne
ri
c 
dr
ug
s 
am
on
g 
no
n-
en
ro
ll
ee
s 
(o
dd
s 
ra
ti
o 
w
as
 0
.9
5)
, d
ri
ve
n 
by
 
an
ti
hy
pe
rl
ip
id
em
ic
s,
 a
nt
ih
is
ta
m
in
es
, N
S
A
ID
s,
 a
nd
 b
et
a 
bl
oc
ke
rs
.  
B
ri
es
ac
he
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. N
ur
si
ng
 H
om
e 
R
es
id
en
ts
 a
nd
 E
nr
ol
lm
en
t i
n 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
th
e 
A
m
er
ic
a
n
G
er
ia
tr
ic
s 
S
o
ci
et
y.
 
E
nr
ol
lm
en
t, 
pa
ym
en
t s
ou
rc
e,
 a
nd
 
dr
ug
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 a
m
on
g 
nu
rs
in
g 
ho
m
e 
re
si
de
nt
s 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; L
ar
ge
 
lo
ng
-t
er
m
 c
ar
e 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
pr
ov
id
er
 
B
y 
20
06
, 9
7%
 o
f 
nu
rs
in
g 
ho
m
e 
re
si
de
nt
s 
ha
d 
dr
ug
 
co
ve
ra
ge
. P
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
s 
pa
id
 o
ut
-o
f-
po
ck
et
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 f
ro
m
 1
1%
 in
 2
00
5 
to
 8
%
 in
 2
00
6.
 
A
ve
ra
ge
 m
on
th
ly
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
us
e 
pe
r 
re
si
de
nt
 in
 2
00
6 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 h
al
f 
a 
pr
es
cr
ip
ti
on
 r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 2
00
5 
le
ve
ls
. 
D
as
-D
ou
gl
as
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
B
en
ef
it
 is
 A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
it
h 
A
nt
ir
et
ro
vi
ra
l T
he
ra
py
 
In
te
rr
up
ti
on
s.
 A
ID
S
 a
n
d
 B
eh
a
vi
o
r.
A
R
V
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
H
IV
-i
nf
ec
te
d 
ho
m
el
es
s 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
on
 
A
cc
es
s 
to
 C
ar
e 
in
 
th
e 
H
om
el
es
s 
P
ar
t D
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
co
ns
um
er
 c
os
t s
ha
ri
ng
 f
or
 A
R
V
 
tr
ea
tm
en
t. 
O
dd
s 
of
 A
R
V
 in
te
rr
up
ti
on
s 
w
er
e 
6 
ti
m
es
 
hi
gh
er
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
w
it
h 
P
ar
t D
 c
ov
er
ag
e;
 m
aj
or
it
y 
ci
te
d 
co
st
 a
s 
pr
im
ar
y 
ba
rr
ie
r.
  
H
us
ka
m
p 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. P
ar
t D
 a
nd
 
D
ua
ll
y 
E
li
gi
bl
e 
P
at
ie
nt
s 
W
it
h 
M
en
ta
l 
Il
ln
es
s:
 M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
A
cc
es
s 
P
ro
bl
em
s 
an
d 
U
se
 o
f 
In
te
ns
iv
e 
S
er
vi
ce
s.
 P
sy
ch
ia
tr
ic
S
er
vi
ce
s.
 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
m
en
ta
l h
ea
lt
h 
se
rv
ic
es
 a
m
on
g 
du
al
 e
li
gi
bl
es
 
P
ro
pe
ns
it
y 
sc
or
e 
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
; 
S
ur
ve
y 
of
 
ps
yc
hi
at
ri
st
s 
44
%
 o
f 
du
al
-e
li
gi
bl
e 
pa
ti
en
ts
 r
ep
or
te
d 
a 
pr
ob
le
m
 
ac
ce
ss
in
g 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
. T
he
 li
ke
li
ho
od
 o
f 
ha
vi
ng
 a
n 
em
er
ge
nc
y 
ro
om
 v
is
it
 w
as
 s
ig
ni
fi
ca
nt
ly
 h
ig
he
r 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 a
 p
ro
bl
em
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 th
os
e 
w
ho
 d
id
 
no
t. 
Jo
yc
e 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 
A
ft
er
 2
 Y
ea
rs
. A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
M
a
n
a
g
ed
 C
a
re
. 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; M
C
B
S
 
90
%
 o
f 
se
ni
or
s 
ha
d 
co
ve
ra
ge
 a
t l
ea
st
 a
s 
ge
ne
ro
us
 a
s 
st
an
da
rd
 P
ar
t D
 b
y 
20
08
. 1
6%
 a
nn
ua
l d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 o
ut
-
of
- 
po
ck
et
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
an
d 
7%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
pr
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s.
 
203 
M
ad
de
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. C
os
t-
R
el
at
ed
 
M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
N
on
ad
he
re
nc
e 
an
d 
S
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 B
as
ic
 N
ee
ds
 F
ol
lo
w
in
g 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. 
JA
M
A
. 
C
os
t-
re
la
te
d 
m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
no
na
dh
er
en
ce
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
M
C
B
S
 
D
ec
li
ne
 in
 c
os
t-
re
la
te
d 
m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
no
na
dh
er
en
ce
. 
S
ic
ke
r 
di
sa
bl
ed
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 la
gg
ed
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
ts
.  
S
ch
ne
ew
ei
ss
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t O
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 C
ov
er
ag
e 
O
n 
D
ru
g 
U
se
 
A
nd
 C
os
t S
ha
ri
ng
 A
m
on
g 
S
en
io
rs
 
W
it
ho
ut
 P
ri
or
 D
ru
g 
B
en
ef
it
s.
 H
ea
lt
h
A
ff
a
ir
s.
 
U
ti
liz
at
io
n 
an
d 
O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 
cl
op
id
og
re
l, 
w
ar
fa
ri
n,
 P
P
Is
, &
 s
ta
ti
ns
 
am
on
g 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
 s
en
io
rs
 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
ns
 
di
sp
en
se
d 
fr
om
 3
 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
ch
ai
ns
 
55
%
 o
f 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
 p
at
ie
nt
s 
re
ce
iv
ed
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 a
ft
er
 P
ar
t D
 in
 2
00
6 
(m
os
tl
y 
in
it
ia
te
d 
in
 f
ir
st
 
ha
lf
 o
f 
ye
ar
).
 U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
st
at
in
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 2
2%
, 
P
P
Is
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 3
7%
, c
lo
pi
do
gr
el
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
1%
, 
w
ar
fa
ri
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 3
%
. O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 
52
%
 f
or
 s
ta
ti
ns
, 5
6%
 f
or
 P
P
Is
, 5
8%
 f
or
 c
lo
pi
do
gr
el
, 
an
d 
37
%
 f
or
 w
ar
fa
ri
n.
 
Z
iv
in
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. C
os
t-
R
el
at
ed
 
M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
N
on
ad
he
re
nc
e 
A
m
on
g 
B
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
 W
it
h 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n 
F
ol
lo
w
in
g 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. A
m
er
ic
a
n
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
G
er
ia
tr
ic
 P
sy
ch
ia
tr
y.
  
C
os
t-
re
la
te
d 
m
ed
ic
at
io
n 
no
na
dh
er
en
ce
 
In
te
rr
up
te
d 
ti
m
e 
se
ri
es
; M
C
B
S
 
N
on
ad
he
re
nc
e 
di
d 
no
t d
ec
li
ne
 a
m
on
g 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
w
it
h 
de
pr
es
si
ve
 s
ym
pt
om
s 
co
m
pa
re
d 
w
it
h 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
w
it
ho
ut
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
pt
om
s.
 P
ar
t D
 d
id
 n
ot
 im
pr
ov
e 
th
is
 d
is
pa
ri
ty
.  
B
as
u 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
0)
. I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
M
ed
ic
ar
e-
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
D
ua
l-
E
li
gi
bl
e 
B
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
’ 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s.
 H
ea
lt
h
S
er
vi
ce
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h
. 
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
fo
r 
el
de
rl
y 
du
al
 e
li
gi
bl
es
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
W
al
gr
ee
ns
 
C
om
pa
re
d 
to
 n
ea
r-
el
de
rl
y 
pa
ti
en
ts
 w
it
h 
M
ed
ic
ai
d,
 
el
de
rl
y 
pa
ti
en
ts
 w
it
h 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
d 
no
 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t c
ha
ng
e 
(p
os
it
iv
e 
or
 n
eg
at
iv
e)
 in
 O
O
P
 
sp
en
di
ng
, d
ay
s 
su
pp
li
ed
, o
r 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
ns
 
du
e 
to
 P
ar
t D
. 
M
il
le
tt
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
0)
. I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
S
en
io
rs
' O
ut
-o
f-
po
ck
et
 
E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
on
 M
ed
ic
at
io
ns
. A
rc
h
iv
es
o
f 
In
te
rn
a
l 
M
ed
ic
in
e.
 
O
O
P
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
P
an
el
/c
oh
or
t;
 
M
E
P
S
 
O
O
P
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 3
2%
 f
or
 a
ll
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s,
 b
y 
49
%
 f
or
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
 w
it
ho
ut
 
pr
ev
io
us
 d
ru
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 w
ho
 e
nr
ol
le
d 
in
 P
ar
t D
, b
y 
32
%
 
fo
r 
be
ne
fi
ci
ar
ie
s 
w
ho
 d
id
 n
ot
 e
nr
ol
l, 
an
d 
di
d 
no
t c
ha
ng
e 
si
gn
if
ic
an
tl
y 
fo
r 
du
al
 e
li
gi
bl
es
.  
M
ot
t e
t a
l. 
(2
01
0)
. E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
D
ru
g 
A
ff
or
da
bi
li
ty
 a
nd
 U
se
: 
A
re
 S
en
io
rs
 w
it
h 
P
ri
or
 H
ig
h 
O
ut
-o
f-
P
oc
ke
t D
ru
g 
S
pe
nd
in
g 
A
ff
ec
te
d 
M
or
e?
 
R
es
ea
rc
h
 i
n
 S
o
ci
a
l 
a
n
d
 A
d
m
in
is
tr
a
ti
ve
 
P
h
a
rm
a
cy
. 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
 f
or
 
pa
ti
en
ts
 w
it
h 
di
ff
er
en
t l
ev
el
s 
of
 p
re
-
P
ar
t D
 d
ru
g 
us
e 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
R
eg
io
na
l 
su
pe
rm
ar
ke
t 
ph
ar
m
ac
y 
ch
ai
n 
da
ta
 
18
%
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
 in
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g;
 4
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 d
ru
g 
us
e.
 R
ed
uc
ti
on
 in
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
w
as
 g
re
at
es
t f
or
 th
os
e 
w
it
h 
hi
gh
es
t p
re
-P
ar
t D
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n.
 
204 
Z
ha
ng
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
0)
. H
ow
 th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 D
ru
g 
B
en
ef
it
 C
ha
ng
ed
 th
e 
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 O
ut
-o
f-
P
oc
ke
t P
ha
rm
ac
y 
S
pe
nd
in
g 
A
m
on
g 
O
ld
er
 B
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
. 
Jo
u
rn
a
ls
 o
f 
G
er
o
n
to
lo
g
y 
S
er
ie
s 
B
: 
P
sy
ch
o
lo
g
ic
a
l 
S
ci
en
ce
s 
a
n
d
 S
o
ci
a
l 
S
ci
en
ce
s.
  
D
is
tr
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
am
on
g 
el
de
rl
y 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
L
ar
ge
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
 
in
su
re
r 
in
 
P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a 
O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
re
du
ce
d 
by
 1
3%
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
w
it
ho
ut
 
pr
ev
io
us
 c
ov
er
ag
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
ho
se
 w
it
h 
th
e 
hi
gh
es
t 
dr
ug
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
st
il
l p
ay
 a
 s
ub
st
an
ti
al
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
dr
ug
 
co
st
s 
O
O
P
.  
B
ri
es
ac
he
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 
an
d 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
U
se
 
an
d 
C
os
t B
ur
de
n.
 M
ed
ic
a
l 
C
a
re
.
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
O
O
P
 d
ru
g 
co
st
s 
P
an
el
/c
oh
or
t;
M
C
B
S
 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
fi
ll
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
.8
 in
 2
00
6 
an
d 
3.
4 
in
 
20
07
 (
ab
ov
e 
pr
e-
P
ar
t D
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
of
 0
.9
 f
il
ls
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
. 
O
O
P
 d
ru
g 
co
st
s 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 $
14
3 
in
 2
00
6 
an
d 
$1
48
 in
 
20
07
 (
ab
ov
e 
pr
e-
P
ar
t D
 in
cr
ea
se
s 
of
 $
12
 p
er
 y
ea
r)
.  
D
on
oh
ue
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
A
nt
id
ep
re
ss
an
t 
T
re
at
m
en
t, 
M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
C
ho
ic
e,
 a
nd
 
A
dh
er
en
ce
 A
m
on
g 
O
ld
er
 A
du
lt
s 
W
it
h 
D
ep
re
ss
io
n.
 A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
G
er
ia
tr
ic
 P
sy
ch
ia
tr
y.
 
A
nt
id
ep
re
ss
an
t u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
am
on
g 
ol
de
r 
ad
ul
ts
 w
it
h 
de
pr
es
si
on
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
L
ar
ge
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
 
in
su
re
r 
in
 
P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
od
ds
 o
f 
an
y 
an
ti
de
pr
es
sa
nt
 u
se
 a
m
on
g 
th
os
e 
w
ho
 p
re
vi
ou
sl
y 
la
ck
ed
 c
ov
er
ag
e,
 b
ut
 o
dd
s 
of
 u
se
 d
id
 
no
t c
ha
ng
e 
am
on
g 
th
os
e 
w
it
h 
li
m
it
ed
 p
ri
or
 c
ov
er
ag
e.
  
E
ng
el
ha
rd
t. 
(2
01
1)
. P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
C
ov
er
ag
e,
 D
ru
g 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
, 
an
d 
C
os
t-
R
el
at
ed
 N
on
-A
dh
er
en
ce
: 
E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 
E
xp
an
si
on
. W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
. 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n,
 C
os
t-
re
la
te
d 
no
n-
ad
he
re
nc
e 
 
F
ix
ed
 
ef
fe
ct
s/
P
an
el
; 
H
R
S
 P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
S
tu
dy
 
G
ai
ni
ng
 c
ov
er
ag
e 
le
ad
s 
to
 a
 1
5%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 u
ti
li
za
ti
on
 
an
d 
a 
20
-5
0%
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 c
os
t-
re
la
te
d 
no
n-
ad
he
re
nc
e.
 O
ve
ra
ll
 d
ru
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s;
 c
ro
w
d-
ou
t o
f 
73
%
.  
E
ng
el
ha
rd
t &
 G
ru
be
r.
 (
20
11
).
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 a
nd
 th
e 
F
in
an
ci
al
 P
ro
te
ct
io
n 
of
 
th
e 
E
ld
er
ly
. A
E
J:
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 P
o
li
cy
.  
P
ub
li
c 
vs
 p
ri
va
te
 d
ru
g 
sp
en
di
ng
; 
C
ro
w
d-
ou
t 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s;
 M
E
P
S
 
75
%
 c
ro
w
d-
ou
t o
f 
bo
th
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
co
ve
ra
ge
 a
nd
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
am
on
g 
th
e 
el
de
rl
y.
 L
ar
ge
 
re
du
ct
io
ns
 in
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
on
 a
ve
ra
ge
, b
ut
 th
e 
bu
lk
 o
f 
th
es
e 
ac
cr
ue
 to
 a
 s
m
al
l p
ro
po
rt
io
n 
of
 th
e 
el
de
rl
y 
(t
ho
se
 
w
it
h 
hi
gh
es
t s
pe
nd
in
g)
.  
Z
ha
ng
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
T
re
at
m
en
t o
f 
H
yp
er
te
ns
io
n.
 H
ea
lt
h
S
er
vi
ce
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h
. 
 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
an
ti
hy
pe
rt
en
si
ve
 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
 a
m
on
g 
se
ni
or
s 
w
it
h 
hy
pe
rt
en
si
on
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
L
ar
ge
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
 
in
su
re
r 
in
 
P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
an
ti
hy
pe
rt
en
si
ve
 u
se
 a
nd
 u
se
 o
f 
A
R
B
s 
ov
er
 
le
ss
 e
xp
en
si
ve
 a
lt
er
na
ti
ve
s.
 
M
ah
m
ou
di
 &
 J
en
se
n.
 (
20
14
).
 H
as
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 R
ed
uc
ed
 R
ac
ia
l/
E
th
ni
c 
D
is
pa
ri
ti
es
 in
 P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
U
se
 a
nd
 
S
pe
nd
in
g?
 H
ea
lt
h
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h
.
R
ac
ia
l/
et
hn
ic
 d
is
pa
ri
ti
es
 in
 d
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
an
d 
O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
T
ri
pl
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s;
 
M
E
P
S
 
P
ar
t D
 r
ed
uc
ed
 d
is
pa
ri
ti
es
 in
 d
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
H
is
pa
ni
c 
an
d 
W
hi
te
s,
 b
ut
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
di
sp
ar
it
ie
s 
in
 d
ru
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 b
et
w
ee
n 
B
la
ck
s 
an
d 
W
hi
te
s.
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Z
im
m
er
. (
20
15
).
 T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 a
nd
 D
em
an
d.
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 S
tu
d
ie
s.
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 th
er
ap
eu
ti
c 
cl
as
se
s 
fo
r 
w
hi
ch
 d
ru
gs
 w
er
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
; U
sa
ge
 
of
 d
ru
gs
 f
or
 s
pe
ci
fi
c 
m
ed
ic
al
 
co
nd
it
io
ns
 th
at
 ty
pi
ca
ll
y 
re
ce
iv
e 
dr
ug
-i
nt
en
si
ve
 th
er
ap
ie
s 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
M
E
P
S
 
N
um
be
r 
of
 th
er
ap
eu
ti
c 
cl
as
se
s 
to
 w
hi
ch
 s
en
io
rs
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
dr
ug
s 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
fo
ur
 c
la
ss
es
. 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
us
ag
e 
of
 d
ru
gs
 u
se
d 
to
 tr
ea
t u
pp
er
 r
es
pi
ra
to
ry
 
di
se
as
e,
 h
yp
er
te
ns
io
n,
 a
nd
 d
ia
be
te
s.
 
A
lp
er
t. 
(2
01
6)
. T
he
 A
nt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
E
ff
ec
ts
 
of
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
D
ru
g 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
. 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
af
te
r 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t 
bu
t b
ef
or
e 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
P
ar
t D
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
M
C
B
S
; M
E
P
S
 
P
eo
pl
e 
re
du
ce
d 
dr
ug
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ch
ro
ni
c 
(b
ut
 n
ot
 
ac
ut
e)
 d
ru
g 
in
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
io
n 
of
 P
ar
t D
’s
 im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
. 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
th
is
 a
nt
ic
ip
at
or
y 
ef
fe
ct
 r
ed
uc
es
 th
e 
es
ti
m
at
ed
 to
ta
l t
re
at
m
en
t e
ff
ec
t o
f 
P
ar
t D
. 
H
u,
 D
ec
ke
r,
 &
 C
ho
u.
 (
20
17
).
 T
he
 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
H
ea
lt
h 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
E
xp
an
si
on
 
on
 P
hy
si
ci
an
 T
re
at
m
en
t C
ho
ic
e:
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 a
nd
 P
hy
si
ci
an
 
P
re
sc
ri
bi
ng
. I
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
a
n
d
 M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t. 
P
hy
si
ci
an
 p
re
sc
ri
bi
ng
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
di
sc
on
ti
nu
it
y;
 
N
A
M
C
S
 
32
%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
s 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 o
r 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
pe
r 
vi
si
t a
nd
 a
 4
6%
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 g
en
er
ic
 d
ru
gs
 p
re
sc
ri
be
d 
or
 c
on
ti
nu
ed
 
fo
r 
th
e 
el
de
rl
y 
af
te
r 
P
ar
t D
. 
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 D
ru
g
 P
ri
ce
s 
D
ug
ga
n 
&
 S
co
tt
 M
or
to
n.
 (
20
10
).
 T
he
 
E
ff
ec
t o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
l P
ri
ce
s 
an
d 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
. 
A
m
er
ic
a
n
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 R
ev
ie
w
. 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 p
ri
ce
s 
E
xp
lo
it
 v
ar
ia
ti
on
 
ac
ro
ss
 d
ru
g 
cl
as
se
s 
in
 th
ei
r 
pr
e-
P
ar
t D
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
es
; I
M
S
 
H
ea
lt
h;
 M
E
P
S
 
P
ar
t D
 p
la
ns
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
ne
go
ti
at
ed
 lo
w
er
 p
ri
ce
 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
fo
r 
P
ar
t D
 e
nr
ol
le
es
 –
 a
pp
ro
xi
m
at
el
y 
20
%
 
lo
w
er
 th
an
 th
ey
 o
th
er
w
is
e 
w
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
be
en
. I
ns
ur
ed
 
cu
st
om
er
 is
 m
or
e 
pr
ic
e 
el
as
ti
c 
th
an
 u
ni
ns
ur
ed
 c
us
to
m
er
, 
be
ca
us
e 
in
 P
ar
t D
, i
ns
ur
an
ce
 is
 b
un
dl
ed
 w
it
h 
gr
ou
p 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 a
nd
 f
or
m
ul
ar
y 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
.  
D
ug
ga
n 
&
 S
co
tt
 M
or
to
n.
 (
20
11
).
 T
he
 
M
ed
iu
m
-T
er
m
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t 
D
 o
n 
P
ha
rm
ac
eu
ti
ca
l P
ri
ce
s.
 A
m
er
ic
a
n
E
co
n
o
m
ic
 R
ev
ie
w
. 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 p
ri
ce
s 
E
xp
lo
it
 v
ar
ia
ti
on
 
ac
ro
ss
 d
ru
g 
cl
as
se
s 
in
 th
ei
r 
pr
e-
P
ar
t D
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
m
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
es
; I
M
S
 
H
ea
lt
h;
 M
E
P
S
 
P
ar
t D
 p
la
ns
 s
uc
ce
ss
fu
ll
y 
ne
go
ti
at
ed
 lo
w
er
 p
ri
ce
s 
th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
fi
rs
t f
ou
r 
ye
ar
s 
of
 th
e 
pr
og
ra
m
.  
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L
ak
da
w
al
la
 &
 Y
in
. (
20
15
).
 I
ns
ur
er
s'
 
N
eg
ot
ia
ti
ng
 L
ev
er
ag
e 
an
d 
th
e 
E
xt
er
na
l 
E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. R
ev
ie
w
 o
f
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
a
n
d
 S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 p
ri
ce
s 
ne
go
ti
at
ed
 in
 
th
e 
no
n-
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
m
ar
ke
t 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
us
in
g 
in
su
re
rs
’ 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
 
ex
po
su
re
 to
 to
ta
l 
po
te
nt
ia
l P
ar
t D
 
en
ro
ll
m
en
t;
 
P
ha
rm
ac
y 
ch
ai
n 
da
ta
 
P
ar
t D
 lo
w
er
ed
 p
ri
ce
s 
fo
r 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 e
nr
ol
le
es
 b
y 
3.
7 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
. T
he
 e
xt
er
na
l c
om
m
er
ci
al
 m
ar
ke
t s
av
in
gs
 
am
ou
nt
 to
 $
1.
5 
bi
ll
io
n 
pe
r 
ye
ar
. 
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 H
o
sp
it
a
li
za
ti
o
n
s 
a
n
d
 O
th
er
 N
o
n
-D
ru
g
 M
e
d
ic
a
l 
S
p
en
d
in
g
 
Z
ha
ng
 e
t a
l. 
(2
00
9)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
D
ru
g 
an
d 
M
ed
ic
al
 
S
pe
nd
in
g.
 N
e
w
 E
n
g
la
n
d
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
M
ed
ic
in
e.
 
D
ru
g 
sp
en
di
ng
; O
th
er
 m
ed
ic
al
 
sp
en
di
ng
 (
E
D
, h
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
, 
ou
tp
at
ie
nt
, e
tc
) 
P
ro
pe
ns
it
y 
sc
or
e 
w
ei
gh
ti
ng
; L
ar
ge
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
A
dv
an
ta
ge
 
in
su
re
r 
in
 
P
en
ns
yl
va
ni
a 
P
ar
t i
nc
re
as
ed
 m
on
th
ly
 d
ru
g 
sp
en
di
ng
 b
y 
$4
1,
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 li
pi
d-
lo
w
er
in
g 
an
d 
an
ti
di
ab
et
ic
 
m
ed
ic
at
io
ns
, a
nd
 r
ed
uc
ed
 n
on
-d
ru
g 
m
on
th
ly
 m
ed
ic
al
 
ex
pe
nd
it
ur
es
 b
y 
$3
3.
 
A
fe
nd
ul
is
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
H
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
 
R
at
es
. H
ea
lt
h
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h
.
H
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
 r
at
es
 f
or
 8
 c
on
di
ti
on
s 
se
ns
it
iv
e 
to
 d
ru
g 
ad
he
re
nc
e 
(d
ia
be
te
s,
 
co
m
pl
ic
at
io
ns
, s
tr
ok
e,
 A
M
I,
 e
tc
) 
T
ri
pl
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
s;
 
H
C
U
P
 
P
ar
t D
 r
ed
uc
ed
 o
ve
ra
ll
 r
at
e 
of
 h
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
s 
by
 2
0.
5 
pe
r 
10
,0
00
, r
ep
re
se
nt
in
g 
ab
ou
t 4
2,
00
0 
ad
m
is
si
on
s.
  
L
iu
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
O
ut
-o
f-
P
oc
ke
t C
os
ts
 
fo
r 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
gs
, M
ed
ic
at
io
n 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
, H
ea
lt
h 
R
es
ou
rc
e 
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
, 
an
d 
P
re
fe
re
nc
e-
B
as
ed
 H
ea
lt
h 
U
ti
li
ty
. 
H
ea
lt
h
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h
. 
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 E
D
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n;
 
H
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
s;
 P
re
fe
re
nc
e-
ba
se
d 
he
al
th
 u
ti
li
ty
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
M
E
P
S
 
P
ar
t D
 r
ed
uc
ed
 d
ru
g 
co
st
s 
by
 $
18
0 
pe
r 
ye
ar
 a
nd
 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n 
by
 2
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
ns
 p
er
 y
ea
r.
 N
o 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t c
ha
ng
e 
in
 E
D
 u
se
, h
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
s,
 o
r 
pr
ef
er
en
ce
-b
as
ed
 h
ea
lt
h 
ut
il
it
y 
in
 th
e 
fi
rs
t y
ea
r 
of
 
im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
.  
 
M
cW
il
lia
m
s 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
1)
. 
Im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 a
nd
 
N
on
dr
ug
 M
ed
ic
al
 S
pe
nd
in
g 
fo
r 
E
ld
er
ly
 
A
du
lt
s 
W
it
h 
L
im
it
ed
 P
ri
or
 D
ru
g 
C
ov
er
ag
e.
 J
A
M
A
.
N
on
dr
ug
 m
ed
ic
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 H
R
S
 
&
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
cl
ai
m
s 
C
om
pa
re
d 
to
 b
en
ef
ic
ia
ri
es
 w
ho
 p
re
vi
ou
sl
y 
ha
d 
ge
ne
ro
us
 d
ru
g 
co
ve
ra
ge
, t
ho
se
 w
ho
 h
ad
 li
m
it
ed
 p
ri
or
 
co
ve
ra
ge
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
ed
 r
ed
uc
ti
on
 in
 n
on
dr
ug
 m
ed
ic
al
 
sp
en
di
ng
, d
ri
ve
n 
by
 in
pa
ti
en
t a
nd
 s
ki
ll
ed
 n
ur
si
ng
 
fa
ci
li
ty
 c
ar
e.
 N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 o
ut
pa
ti
en
t s
pe
nd
in
g.
 
K
ae
st
ne
r 
&
 K
ha
n.
 (
20
12
).
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t 
D
 a
nd
 I
ts
 E
ff
ec
t o
n 
th
e 
U
se
 o
f 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
gs
 a
nd
 U
se
 o
f 
O
th
er
 
H
ea
lt
h 
C
ar
e 
S
er
vi
ce
s 
of
 th
e 
E
ld
er
ly
. 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
o
li
cy
 A
n
a
ly
si
s 
&
 
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t.
 
D
ru
g 
ut
il
iz
at
io
n;
 O
ut
pa
ti
en
t a
nd
 
in
pa
ti
en
t s
er
vi
ce
s 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
(u
si
ng
 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
li
ke
li
ho
od
 o
f 
be
in
g 
un
in
su
re
d 
pr
e-
20
06
);
 M
C
B
S 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
pr
es
cr
ip
ti
on
s 
by
 3
0%
 p
er
 y
ea
r.
 N
o 
im
pa
ct
 o
n 
ou
tp
at
ie
nt
 
an
d 
in
pa
ti
en
t s
er
vi
ce
s.
  
207 
A
yy
ag
ar
i, 
S
ha
ne
, &
 W
eh
by
. (
20
17
).
 T
he
 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 o
n 
E
m
er
ge
nc
y 
D
ep
ar
tm
en
t V
is
it
s.
 H
ea
lt
h
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
E
D
 u
ti
liz
at
io
n 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
M
E
P
S
 
D
ec
li
ne
s 
in
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 E
D
 v
is
it
s 
fo
r 
no
n-
em
er
ge
nc
y 
ca
re
 b
ut
 n
ot
 f
or
 e
m
er
ge
nc
y 
ca
re
, s
ug
ge
st
in
g 
th
at
 P
ar
t D
 
m
ay
 h
av
e 
le
d 
to
 b
et
te
r 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f 
he
al
th
 a
nd
 
re
du
ce
d 
un
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
us
e 
of
 E
D
s.
 
K
ae
st
ne
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
7)
. E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
on
 
H
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 M
or
ta
li
ty
: E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
R
is
k
a
n
d
 I
n
su
ra
n
ce
. 
In
pa
ti
en
t h
os
pi
ta
l a
dm
is
si
on
s;
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s;
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
cl
ai
m
s 
(f
ee
 f
or
 s
er
vi
ce
 
on
ly
);
 M
C
B
S
 
G
ai
ni
ng
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
P
ar
t D
 
ca
us
ed
 a
 4
%
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 h
os
pi
ta
l a
dm
is
si
on
s,
 a
 2
-5
%
 
de
cr
ea
se
 in
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
in
pa
ti
en
t p
ay
m
en
ts
, a
nd
 a
 1
0-
15
%
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 in
pa
ti
en
t c
ha
rg
es
. N
o 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t e
ff
ec
t 
on
 m
or
ta
li
ty
.  
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 H
ea
lt
h
 O
u
tc
o
m
es
 
H
an
lo
n 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
3)
. R
ac
ia
l D
if
fe
re
nc
es
 
in
 A
nt
il
ip
em
ic
 U
se
 a
nd
 L
ip
id
 C
on
tr
ol
 in
 
H
ig
h 
R
is
k 
O
ld
er
 A
du
lt
s 
P
os
t M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. A
m
er
ic
a
n
 H
ea
rt
 J
o
u
rn
a
l.
U
ti
li
za
ti
on
 o
f 
an
ti
li
pe
m
ic
s;
 
C
ho
le
st
er
ol
 le
ve
ls
 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; 
H
ea
lt
hy
 A
gi
ng
 
an
d 
B
od
y 
C
om
po
si
ti
on
 
N
o 
si
gn
if
ic
an
t i
m
pa
ct
 o
n 
ch
ol
es
te
ro
l l
ev
el
s,
 in
 s
pi
te
 o
f 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
us
e 
of
 s
ta
ti
ns
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 a
nt
il
ip
em
ic
 d
ru
gs
. 
A
yy
ag
ar
i &
 S
ha
ne
. (
20
15
).
 D
oe
s 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
C
ov
er
ag
e 
Im
pr
ov
e 
M
en
ta
l H
ea
lt
h?
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
D
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
pt
om
s 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 H
R
S
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 n
um
be
r 
of
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
pt
om
s 
by
 1
5%
 a
nd
 
li
ke
li
ho
od
 o
f 
ex
pe
ri
en
ci
ng
 3
+
 d
ep
re
ss
iv
e 
sy
m
pt
om
s 
by
 
21
%
. 
A
yy
ag
ar
i. 
(2
01
6)
. P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
C
ov
er
ag
e 
an
d 
C
hr
on
ic
 P
ai
n.
 
In
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
a
n
d
 M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t.
 
P
ai
n;
 a
ct
iv
it
y 
li
m
it
at
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 p
ai
n 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 H
R
S
 
5.
3%
 im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
n 
ac
ti
vi
ty
 li
m
it
at
io
ns
 d
ue
 to
 p
ai
n.
 
C
he
n,
 L
in
, &
 S
eo
. (
20
18
).
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t 
D
 I
m
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
H
ea
lt
h 
Im
pa
ct
 A
m
on
g 
O
ld
er
 A
du
lt
s 
in
 
th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
S
ta
te
s.
 I
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Jo
u
rn
a
l
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
 S
er
vi
ce
s.
 
S
el
f-
ra
te
d 
he
al
th
; M
en
ta
l h
ea
lt
h;
 
A
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
of
 d
ai
ly
 li
vi
ng
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 H
R
S
 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
S
tu
dy
 2
00
5-
07
 
In
cr
ea
se
d 
se
lf
-r
at
ed
 h
ea
lt
h.
 N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 m
en
ta
l h
ea
lt
h 
or
 a
ct
iv
it
ie
s 
of
 d
ai
ly
 li
vi
ng
 im
pa
ir
m
en
t. 
 
O
u
tc
o
m
e:
 M
o
rt
a
li
ty
 
D
un
n 
&
 S
ha
pi
ro
. (
20
17
).
 D
oe
s 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
 S
av
e 
L
iv
es
? 
A
m
er
ic
a
n
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 b
y 
co
nd
it
io
n 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
(b
y 
co
un
ty
);
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 f
il
es
; 
M
C
B
S
 
C
ar
di
ov
as
cu
la
r 
m
or
ta
li
ty
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 in
 c
ou
nt
ie
s 
m
os
t 
af
fe
ct
ed
 b
y 
P
ar
t D
. U
p 
to
 2
6,
00
0 
m
or
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
w
er
e 
al
iv
e 
in
 m
id
-2
00
7 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 P
ar
t D
. 
208 
H
uh
 &
 R
ei
f.
 (
20
17
).
 D
id
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t 
D
 R
ed
uc
e 
M
or
ta
li
ty
? 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 b
y 
co
nd
it
io
n 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
di
sc
on
ti
nu
it
y 
(a
ge
 
66
 v
s 
64
);
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 f
il
es
; 
M
E
P
S
 
P
ar
t D
 r
ed
uc
ed
 e
ld
er
ly
 m
or
ta
li
ty
 b
y 
2.
2%
 a
nn
ua
ll
y,
 
pr
im
ar
il
y 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
a 
re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 c
ar
di
ov
as
cu
la
r 
m
or
ta
li
ty
. N
o 
ef
fe
ct
 o
n 
ca
nc
er
. 
K
ae
st
ne
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
7)
. E
ff
ec
ts
 o
f 
P
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
D
ru
g 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
on
 
H
os
pi
ta
li
za
ti
on
 a
nd
 M
or
ta
li
ty
: E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 M
ed
ic
ar
e 
P
ar
t D
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
R
is
k
a
n
d
 I
n
su
ra
n
ce
. 
In
pa
ti
en
t h
os
pi
ta
l a
dm
is
si
on
s;
 
M
or
ta
li
ty
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s;
 
M
ed
ic
ar
e 
cl
ai
m
s 
(f
ee
 f
or
 s
er
vi
ce
 
on
ly
);
 M
C
B
S
 
G
ai
ni
ng
 p
re
sc
ri
pt
io
n 
dr
ug
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
P
ar
t D
 
ca
us
ed
 a
 4
%
 d
ec
re
as
e 
in
 h
os
pi
ta
l a
dm
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2-B. Appendix 2 Figures 
Appendix Figure 2- 1. Functional Limitations among the Elderly 
A. Proportion of Elderly Adults with Functional Limitations 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1996-2012. Sample is restricted to adults aged 65 and over 
(N=91,038). Figure displays proportion of adults who report “at least some difficulty” with the activity. Estimates 
include HRS sampling weights.   
B. Number of Limitations among those with Any 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1996-2012. Sample is restricted to adults aged 65 and over who have at 
least one functional limitation (N=24,418). Figure displays average number of functional limitations among adults 
who report at least one limitation. Estimates include HRS sampling weights.   
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Appendix Figure 2- 2. Informal Caregiving among the Nonelderly 
A. Proportion of Nonelderly Adults who Provide Caregiving 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 (N=101,423). 
Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.   
B. Caregiving Hours Per week among non-Elderly Caregivers 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 who spend greater 
than 0 hours per week caregiving for household or non-household adults (N=12,876). Estimates include ATUS 
sampling weights.    
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C. Distribution of Hours Spent Caregiving for Household Adults among Non-Elderly Caregivers 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 (N=101,423). For 
presentation purposes, those who spend more than 50 hours per week caregiving are omitted from this figure. 
Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.   
D. Distribution of Hours Spent Caregiving for Non-Household Adults among Non-Elderly 
Caregivers 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 (N=101,423). For 
presentation purposes, those who spend more than 50 hours per week caregiving are omitted from this figure. 
Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.  
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E. Trends in Proportion of Nonelderly Adults who Provide Caregiving 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 (N=101,423). 
Estimates include ATUS sampling weights.   
F. Trends in Caregiving Hours Per week among non-Elderly Caregivers 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-13. Sample is restricted to adults aged 27-64 who spend greater 
than 0 hours per week caregiving for household or non-household adults (N=12,876). Estimates include ATUS 
sampling weights.    
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Appendix Figure 2- 3. Event Study Results for ADL & IADL Limitations 
A. Any ADL or IADL limitation 
B. Any ADL limitation 
C. Any IADL limitation 
D. Number of ADL & IADL limitations 
E. Number of ADL limitations
F. Number of IADL limitations
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Figure displays coefficient and 
95% confidence intervals for the interaction of treatment and each year indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights, and standard errors are clustered 
at the individual level. 
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Appendix Figure 2- 4. Event Study Results for Non-Elderly Adults’ Time Spent Caregiving 
A. Any caregiving (Pooled) 
B. Any caregiving (Men)
C. Any caregiving (Women)
D. Hours caregiving (Pooled)
E. Hours caregiving (Men)
F. Hours caregiving (Women) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2009. Figure displays coefficient and 
95% confidence intervals for the interaction of treatment and each year indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights, and standard errors are robust.  
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Appendix Figure 2- 5. Event Study Results for Non-Elderly Adults’ Labor Force Outcomes 
A. Employed (Pooled) 
B. Unemployed (Pooled) 
C. Not in labor force (Pooled)
D. Employed (Men)
E. Unemployed (Men)
F. Not in labor force (Men)
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G. Employed (Women)
H. Unemployed (Women)
I. Not in labor force (Women)
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2009. Figure displays coefficient and 
95% confidence intervals for the interaction of treatment and each year indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights, and standard errors are robust.  
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2-C. Appendix 2 Tables 
Appendix Table 2- 2. Demographic Characteristics of HRS Sample 
Control group Treatment group 
Age 59.16 69.29 
Male 0.477 0.459 
Family income 82358.4 59697.6 
Less than high school 0.163 0.241 
High school 0.311 0.350 
Some college 0.242 0.196 
College or more 0.281 0.213 
White, non-Hispanic 0.784 0.817 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.102 0.0907 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.0307 0.0220 
Hispanic 0.0828 0.0703 
Married 0.692 0.653 
Northeast 0.172 0.178 
Midwest 0.246 0.246 
South 0.384 0.376 
West 0.197 0.198 
Observations 56,520 49,765 
Source: Author’s calculations based on HRS 1996-2012. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. 
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Appendix Table 2- 3. Demographic Characteristics of ATUS Sample 
Control group Treatment group 
Age 44.40 50.24 
Male 0.498 0.407 
Family income  75457.7 66309.6 
Less than high school 0.103 0.122 
High school 0.298 0.379 
Some college 0.258 0.256 
College or more 0.341 0.243 
White, non-Hispanic 0.697 0.647 
Black, non-Hispanic 0.113 0.147 
Other, non-Hispanic 0.0539 0.0743 
Hispanic 0.136 0.132 
Married 0.673 0.551 
Number of people in household 3.042 3.246 
Northeast 0.179 0.192 
Midwest 0.246 0.201 
South 0.353 0.375 
West 0.221 0.231 
Weekend or holiday 0.299 0.297 
Observations 96,422 5,001 
Source: Author’s calculations based on ATUS 2003-2013. Estimates include ATUS sampling weights. 
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Appendix Table 2- 4. DD Estimates for Impact of Medicare Part D on Specific Limitations 
Pooled Married Not married Men Women 
Dressing 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.006) 
[μ=0.082] [μ=0.073] [μ=0.099] [μ=0.076] [μ=0.086] 
Bathing/showering 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.009* 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.053] [μ=0.043] [μ=0.072] [μ=0.042] [μ=0.063] 
Walking across room 
-0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
[μ=0.050] [μ=0.041] [μ=0.067] [μ=0.043] [μ=0.056] 
Getting in and out of 
bed 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.048] [μ=0.038] [μ=0.064] [μ=0.040] [μ=0.053] 
Eating 
-0.005** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
[μ=0.022] [μ=0.019] [μ=0.027] [μ=0.021] [μ=0.022] 
Shopping for groceries 
-0.009** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.009 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
[μ=0.068] [μ=0.056] [μ=0.092] [μ=0.051] [μ=0.082] 
Managing money 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
-0.011*** 
(0.003) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
-0.012*** 
(0.005) 
-0.008** 
(0.004) 
[μ=0.039] [μ=0.031] [μ=0.052] [μ=0.043] [μ=0.035] 
Preparing hot meals 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.006* 
(0.004) 
0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.045] [μ=0.039] [μ=0.055] [μ=0.041] [μ=0.047] 
Using a telephone 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.005 
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.006** 
(0.003) 
[μ=0.028] [μ=0.028] [μ=0.030] [μ=0.037] [μ=0.021] 
Taking medications 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.008*** 
(0.003) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.006 
(0.004) 
-0.007** 
(0.003) 
[μ=0.023] [μ=0.022] [μ=0.027] [μ=0.025] [μ=0.022] 
Observations 103,755 70,190 33,565 45,659 58,096 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. Individual-clustered standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 5. DD Estimates for Impact of Medicare Part D on Other HRS Outcomes 
Pooled Married Not married Men Women 
Any gross motor 
limitation 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.014) 
-0.007 
(0.010) 
0.001 
(0.010) 
[μ=0.217] [μ=0.184] [μ=0.278] [μ=0.171] [μ=0.255] 
Number of gross 
motor limitations 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.027 
(0.019) 
0.014 
(0.037) 
-0.032 
(0.024) 
0.001 
(0.026) 
[μ=0.426] [μ=0.357] [μ=0.560] [μ=0.344] [μ=0.495] 
Any fine motor 
limitation 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.004 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.011) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
0.001 
(0.008) 
[μ=0.127] [μ=0.113] [μ=0.153] [μ=0.114] [μ=0.137] 
Number of fine motor 
limitations 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
0.001 
(0.017) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
[μ=0.165] [μ=0.147] [μ=0.200] [μ=0.151] [μ=0.177] 
Very good/excellent 
self-assessed health 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.024** 
(0.011) 
0.028* 
(0.016) 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
0.024** 
(0.012) 
[μ=0.405] [μ=0.434] [μ=0.351] [μ=0.403] [μ=0.407] 
Regularly use 
prescription drugs 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.036*** 
(0.009) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
0.041*** 
(0.010) 
[μ=0.806] [μ=0.812] [μ=0.795] [μ=0.769] [μ=0.837] 
Any doctor visit 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.005) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
0.012* 
(0.007) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.945] [μ=0.950] [μ=0.937] [μ=0.937] [μ=0.952] 
Number of doctor 
visits 
0.454 
(0.337) 
0.321 
(0.398) 
0.790 
(0.613) 
0.391 
(0.424) 
0.519 
(0.513) 
[μ=10.00] [μ=9.71] [μ=10.58] [μ=9.67] [μ=10.27] 
Any home health care 
visit 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.069] [μ=0.060] [μ=0.086] [μ=0.063] [μ=0.074] 
Observations 103,755 70,190 33,565 45,659 58,096 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. Individual-clustered standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 6. Robustness Checks Using Different Age Groups for HRS Outcomes 
55-74 56-73 57-72 58-71 59-70 60-69 
Any ADL/IADL limitations 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.017** 
(0.008) 
-0.020** 
(0.008) 
Number ADL/IADL limitations 
[0-10] 
-0.056** 
(0.023) 
-0.058** 
(0.024) 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
-0.059** 
(0.026) 
-0.056** 
(0.027) 
-0.052* 
(0.027) 
Any ADL Limitations 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.012* 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.012 
(0.007) 
Number ADL limitations [0-5] 
-0.023* 
(0.014) 
-0.025* 
(0.014) 
-0.023 
(0.015) 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
-0.019 
(0.017) 
-0.020 
(0.017) 
Any IADL Limitations 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.015*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017*** 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.006) 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
Number IADL limitations [0-5] 
-0.032***
(0.011) 
-0.033*** 
(0.012) 
-0.033*** 
(0.012) 
-0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.031** 
(0.013) 
Any gross motor limitation 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
Number of gross motor 
limitations 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.019 
(0.019) 
-0.019 
(0.020) 
-0.020 
(0.021) 
-0.015 
(0.022) 
-0.022 
(0.022) 
Any fine motor limitation 
0.000 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.007) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
Number of fine motor 
limitations 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
-0.005 
(0.010) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
Very good/excellent self-
assessed health 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.026*** 
(0.010) 
0.021** 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.018 
(0.011) 
0.016 
(0.011) 
Regularly use prescription 
drugs 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.008) 
0.032*** 
(0.009) 
0.024*** 
(0.009) 
0.023** 
(0.009) 
0.013 
(0.010) 
Any doctor visit 
0.010** 
(0.004) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.009* 
(0.005) 
0.008 
(0.005) 
0.009 
(0.005) 
0.010* 
(0.006) 
Number of doctor visits 
0.454 
(0.337) 
0.312 
(0.356) 
0.277 
(0.391) 
0.305 
(0.391) 
0.281 
(0.406) 
-0.035 
(0.442) 
Any home health care visit 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.004) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
Observations 103,755 93,664 83,400 72,861 62,791 52,513 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. Individual-clustered standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 7. Sensitivity Analyses for HRS Outcomes 
Control for 
Medicare 
Advantage 
penetration 
Non-
clustered 
errors 
Exclude 
ages 63-
64 
Exclude 
year 2004 
Excludes 
years 
2010+ 
No 
controls 
Individual 
FE 
Any ADL/IADL 
limitations 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.020*** 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.007) 
-0.014** 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
Number ADL/IADL 
limitations [0-10] 
-0.056** 
(0.023) 
-0.056*** 
(0.018) 
-0.054** 
(0.025) 
-0.065*** 
(0.025) 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.053** 
(0.023) 
-0.023 
(0.017) 
Any ADL 
Limitations 
-0.011* 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.010 
(0.007) 
-0.015** 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.006) 
-0.008 
(0.006) 
Number ADL 
limitations [0-5] 
-0.024* 
(0.014) 
-0.023** 
(0.011) 
-0.022 
(0.015) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.014) 
-0.022 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.011) 
Any IADL 
Limitations 
-0.015*** 
(0.005) 
-0.015*** 
(0.004) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
-0.016*** 
(0.006) 
-0.011** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.005) 
-0.010* 
(0.005) 
Number IADL 
limitations [0-5] 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
-0.032*** 
(0.009) 
-0.032*** 
(0.012) 
-0.035*** 
(0.012) 
-0.029*** 
(0.011) 
-0.031*** 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.010) 
Any gross motor 
limitation 
-0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.009 
(0.008) 
0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.012* 
(0.007) 
Number of gross 
motor limitations 
-0.012 
(0.018) 
-0.012 
(0.014) 
-0.008 
(0.020) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.007 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.014) 
Any fine motor 
limitation 
0.000 
(0.006) 
0.000 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.006) 
0.007 
(0.006) 
Number of fine motor 
limitations 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.008 
(0.009) 
-0.012 
(0.009) 
-0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
Very good/excellent 
self-assessed health 
0.025*** 
(0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.007) 
0.028*** 
(0.010) 
0.025** 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.018* 
(0.010) 
0.014* 
(0.008) 
Regularly use 
prescription drugs 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.006) 
0.033*** 
(0.009) 
0.030*** 
(0.009) 
0.025*** 
(0.008) 
0.031*** 
(0.008) 
0.010 
(0.007) 
Any doctor visit 
0.011** 
(0.004) 
0.010*** 
(0.004) 
0.012** 
(0.005) 
0.010** 
(0.005) 
0.005 
(0.005) 
0.008* 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Number of doctor 
visits 
0.477 
(0.338) 
0.454 
(0.298) 
0.546 
(0.362) 
0.475 
(0.354) 
0.601* 
(0.352) 
0.394 
(0.333) 
-0.373 
(0.399) 
Any home health care 
visit 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.000 
(0.004) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
Observations 103,578 103,755 92,560 92,233 80,031 103,902 98,688 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
regressions also control for respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of 
residence, and marital status; age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. 
Unless otherwise indicated, individual-clustered standard errors are displayed in parentheses.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 8. DD Estimates for Impact of Household’s Part D Eligibility on Non-Elderly 
Adults’ Time Spent Caregiving (Detailed Activities) 
Pooled Men Women 
Physical care for household adults 
-0.026 
(0.118) 
0.173 
(0.109) 
-0.174 
(0.189) 
[μ=0.412] [μ=0.117] [μ=0.630] 
Looking after household adults (as a 
primary activity) 
0.004 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.010) 
0.013 
(0.035) 
[μ=0.025] [μ=0.014] [μ=0.034] 
Providing medical care to household 
adults 
-0.059 
(0.052) 
0.016 
(0.021) 
-0.117 
(0.090) 
[μ=0.118] [μ=0.029] [μ=0.183] 
Obtaining medical and care services 
for household adults 
-0.018 
(0.049) 
0.070 
(0.056) 
-0.083 
(0.074) 
[μ=0.094] [μ=0.005] [μ=0.159] 
Waiting associated with caring for 
household adults 
-0.036 
(0.049) 
0.034 
(0.075) 
-0.085 
(0.065) 
[μ=0.098] [μ=0.071] [μ=0.117] 
Caring for household adults, n.e.c. 
-0.027 
(0.033) 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.048 
(0.056) 
[μ=0.038] [μ=0.004] [μ=0.063] 
Helping household adults 
-0.013 
(0.027) 
0.030 
(0.028) 
-0.041 
(0.043) 
[μ=0.061] [μ=0.005] [μ=0.103] 
Organization and planning for 
household adults 
-0.016 
(0.015) 
0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.031 
(0.025) 
[μ=0.031] [μ=0.002] [μ=0.052] 
Picking up or dropping off household 
adults 
-0.029* 
(0.016) 
-0.034 
(0.023) 
-0.025 
(0.023) 
[μ=0.055] [μ=0.057] [μ=0.053] 
Waiting associated with helping 
household adults 
0.028*** 
(0.011) 
0.042*** 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.016) 
[μ=0.014] [μ=0.006] [μ=0.020] 
Helping household adults, n.e.c. 
0.006 
(0.020) 
0.052* 
(0.030) 
-0.027 
(0.027) 
[μ=0.018] [μ=<0.001] [μ=0.032] 
Observations 101,423 45,193 56,230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment 
group [μ] is in brackets.    * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 9. Heterogeneity Tests for Part D’s Impact on Non-Elderly Adults’ Time Use 
Men Women 
Caregiving 
(Any) 
Caregiving 
(hours per 
week) 
Observations 
Caregiving
(Any) 
Caregiving 
(hours per 
week) 
Observations 
In labor force 
0.017 
(0.020) 
0.451** 
(0.189) 
39,715 
-0.063*** 
(0.024) 
-0.807*** 
(0.282) 
41,958 
[μ=0.082] [μ=0.233] [μ=0.172] [μ=1.320] 
Not in labor 
force 
0.011 
(0.036) 
0.067 
(0.361) 
5,478 
0.014 
(0.028) 
-0.196 
(0.531) 
14,272 
[μ=0.088] [μ=0.592] [μ=0.144] [μ=1.655] 
No children 
in household 
0.033* 
(0.020) 
0.446** 
(0.193) 
22,497 
-0.040* 
(0.020) 
-0.623* 
(0.323) 
24,552 
[μ=0.074] [μ=0.303] [μ=0.164] [μ=1.503] 
Have children 
-0.040 
(0.039) 
0.148 
(0.322) 
22,696 
-0.018 
(0.040) 
-0.598 
(0.403) 
31,678 
[μ=0.119] [μ=0.342] [μ=0.154] [μ=1.260] 
Age 27-44 
0.023 
(0.027) 
0.302 
(0.251) 
22,785 
-0.062 
(0.042) 
-0.637 
(0.396) 
29,222 
[μ=0.070] [μ=0.303] [μ=0.143] [μ=0.927] 
Age 45-54 
0.025 
(0.032) 
0.531 
(0.332) 
12,785 
-0.010 
(0.040) 
-0.347 
(0.502) 
14,882 
[μ=0.094] [μ=0.339] [μ=0.200] [μ=1.624] 
Age 55-64 
-0.004 
(0.033) 
0.367 
(0.268) 
9,623 
-0.034 
(0.023) 
-0.780* 
(0.417) 
12,126 
[μ=0.096] [μ=0.289] [μ=0.151] [μ=1.589] 
White, non-
Hispanic 
0.018 
(0.023) 
0.275 
(0.211) 
31,828 
-0.048** 
(0.023) 
-0.675** 
(0.331) 
37,795 
[μ=0.093] [μ=0.361] [μ=0.179] [μ=1.451] 
Black, non-
Hispanic 
0.041 
(0.033) 
0.315 
(0.335) 
5,031 
-0.005 
(0.040) 
-0.336 
(0.588) 
8,031 
[μ=0.049] [μ=0.369] [μ=0.143] [μ=1.439] 
Other, non-
Hispanic 
-0.033 
(0.066) 
1.301* 
(0.774) 
2,371 
-0.104 
(0.080) 
-2.790 
(1.789) 
2,971 
[μ=0.088] [μ=0.079] [μ=0.227] [μ=3.768] 
Hispanic 
0.002 
(0.045) 
0.494 
(0.425) 
5,963 
0.055* 
(0.028) 
0.399 
(0.325) 
7,433 
[μ=0.082] [μ=0.148] [μ=0.047] [μ=0.491] 
Less than 
high school 
-0.029 
(0.053) 
0.272 
(0.358) 
4,232 
-0.007 
(0.067) 
0.159 
(0.626) 
5,071 
[μ=0.124] [μ=0.324] [μ=0.129] [μ=1.060] 
High school 
0.055** 
(0.025) 
0.491* 
(0.269) 
12,183 
-0.067** 
(0.030) 
-0.905*** 
(0.326) 
14,221 
227 
[μ=0.057] [μ=0.255] [μ=0.178] [μ=1.437] 
Some college 
-0.001 
(0.036) 
0.538 
(0.355) 
12,106 
-0.017 
(0.034) 
-0.994 
(0.735) 
16,672 
[μ=0.093] [μ=0.276] [μ=0.172] [μ=2.078] 
College or 
more 
0.004 
(0.039) 
0.089 
(0.330) 
16,672 
-0.013 
(0.030) 
-0.034 
(0.395) 
20,266 
[μ=0.094] [μ=0.439] [μ=0.134] [μ=0.851] 
Married 
-0.022 
(0.030) 
0.445* 
(0.241) 
28,882 
-0.038* 
(0.022) 
-0.556* 
(0.318) 
32,906 
[μ=0.057] [μ=0.338] [μ=0.178] [μ=1.726] 
Not married 
0.036* 
(0.021) 
0.316 
(0.220) 
16,311 
-0.026
(0.031) 
-0.673 
(0.455) 
23,324 
[μ=0.124] [μ=0.269] [μ=0.153] [μ=1.286] 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment 
group [μ] is in brackets.     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 10. DD Estimates for Impact of Household’s Part D Eligibility on Non-
Elderly Adults’ Labor Force Outcomes (Employed Adults Only) 
Pooled Men Women 
Full-time employed 
-0.006 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.022) 
0.003 
(0.029) 
[μ=0.812] [μ=0.914] [μ=0.719] 
Part-time employed 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.026 
(0.022) 
-0.003 
(0.029) 
[μ=0.188] [μ=0.086] [μ=0.281] 
Self-employed 
0.012 
(0.015) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
0.008 
(0.018) 
[μ=0.109] [μ=0.124] [μ=0.095] 
Wage earner 
-0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.014 
(0.025) 
-0.008 
(0.018) 
[μ=0.890] [μ=0.876] [μ=0.903] 
Work without pay 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
[μ<0.001] [μ=<0.001] [μ=0.002] 
Usual hours worked 
-0.013 
(0.654) 
0.897 
(0.973) 
-1.315 
(0.891) 
[μ=40.71] [μ=43.33] [μ=38.35] 
Observations 77,174 37,753 39,421 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment 
group [μ] is in brackets.     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 11. Sensitivity Analyses for ATUS Outcomes 
Control for Medicare Advantage penetration 
Pooled Men Women 
Caregiving (any) 
-0.013 
(0.013) 
0.017 
(0.017) 
-0.035* 
(0.018) 
Caregiving (hours per week) 
-0.186 
(0.166) 
0.382** 
(0.165) 
-0.602** 
(0.261) 
Observations 101,423 45,193 56,230 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. Unless otherwise indicated, all 
regressions also control for the respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, 
household size, marital status, and whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; 
and year fixed effects. Estimates include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in 
parentheses.  
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 12. DD Estimates for Impact of Household’s Part D Eligibility on Time Use 
of Non-Elderly Women Aged 55-64 
DD estimate Pre-2006 mean 
Sleeping 0.062 
(0.887) 
58.49 
Grooming -0.204 
(0.278) 
5.526 
Health-Related Self Care -0.034 
(0.543) 
0.876 
Personal Activities -0.045 
(0.052) 
0.0953 
Personal Care Emergencies -0.000 
(0.000) 
0 
Housework 1.826*** 
(0.670) 
6.324 
Food and Drink Preparation, 
Presentation, and Clean-up 
0.498 
(0.481) 
6.797 
Interior Maintenance, Repair, and 
Decoration 
-0.089 
(0.359) 
0.933 
Exterior Maintenance, Repair, and 
Decoration 
0.155 
(0.158) 
0.258 
Lawn, Garden, and Houseplants 0.068 
(0.439) 
1.723 
Animals and Pets 0.010 
(0.196) 
0.800 
Vehicles -0.023 
(0.050) 
0.0970 
Appliances, Tools, and Toys 0.008 
(0.032) 
0.0126 
Household Management 0.070 
(0.320) 
1.931 
Caring for and Helping Household 
Children 
-0.043 
(0.162) 
0.398 
Activities Related to Household 
Children's Education 
-0.045 
(0.041) 
0.0652 
Activities Related to Household 
Children's Health 
0.001 
(0.013) 
0.00456 
Caring for Household Adults -0.660 
(0.407) 
1.384 
Helping Household Adults -0.120* 
(0.073) 
0.205 
Caring for and Helping Non-
Household Children 
1.111*** 
(0.392) 
1.041 
Activities Related to Non-
Household Children's Education 
0.045* 
(0.023) 
0.00328 
Activities Related to Non-
Household Children's Health 
0.014 
(0.032) 
0.0216 
Caring for Non-Household Adults -0.534** 
(0.265) 
0.666 
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Helping Non-Household Adults 0.004 
(0.185) 
0.557 
Working -1.738 
(1.768) 
16.71 
Work-Related Activities 0.020 
(0.040) 
0.0386 
Other Income-Generating 
Activities 
-0.019 
(0.167) 
0.225 
Job Search and Interviewing 0.015 
(0.113) 
0 
Taking Class 0.017 
(0.127) 
0.203 
Extracurricular School Activities 
(except sports) 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Research or Homework 0.195* 
(0.106) 
0.0713 
Registration or Administrative 
Activities 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0 
Shopping (store, telephone, 
internet) 
-0.346 
(0.469) 
4.158 
Researching Purchases 0.015 
(0.010) 
0 
Security Procedures Related to 
Consumer Purchases 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Childcare Services -0.001* 
(0.001) 
0 
Financial Services and Banking -0.039 
(0.043) 
0.0695 
Legal Services -0.005 
(0.003) 
0.00250 
Medical and Care Services -0.432 
(0.273) 
0.840 
Personal Care Services -0.097 
(0.103) 
0.243 
Real Estate 0.019 
(0.025) 
0.0117 
Veterinary Services (excluding 
grooming) 
0.045 
(0.031) 
0.00421 
Security Procedures Related to 
Professional or Personal Services 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Household Services (not done by 
self) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
0.00304 
Home Maintenance, Repair, 
Decoration, and Construction (not 
done by self) 
0.136 
(0.088) 
0.0406 
Pet Services (not done by self and 
not veterinary care) 
-0.035 
(0.032) 
0.0316 
Lawn and Garden Services (not 
done by self) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0 
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Vehicle Maintenance and Repair 
Services (not done by self) 
0.037 
(0.033) 
0.00756 
Using Government Services 0.041 
(0.030) 
0 
Civic Obligations and Participation -0.005 
(0.072) 
0.0639 
Waiting Associated with 
Government Services or Civic 
Obligations 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
0.00170 
Security Procedures Related to 
Government Services or Civic 
Obligations 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Eating and Drinking 0.331 
(0.362) 
8.343 
Waiting Associated with Eating 
and Drinking 
0.014 
(0.009) 
0.00702 
Socializing and Communicating 0.250 
(0.547) 
4.341 
Attending or Hosting Social Events -0.076 
(0.248) 
0.712 
Relaxing and Leisure 0.196 
(1.373) 
28.37 
Arts and Entertainment (other than 
sports) 
-0.175 
(0.251) 
0.817 
Waiting Associated with 
Socializing, Relaxing, and Leisure 
-0.002 
(0.010) 
0.00910 
Participating in Sports, Exercise, or 
Recreation 
-0.153 
(0.250) 
1.234 
Attending Sports or Recreational 
Events 
0.047 
(0.062) 
0.0528 
Waiting Associated with Sports, 
Exercise, and Recreation 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
0.00668 
Security Procedures Related to 
Sports, Exercise, and Recreation 
0.000 
(0.000) 
0 
Religious or Spiritual Practices 0.261 
(0.261) 
1.208 
Administrative and Support 
Activities 
0.197 
(0.139) 
0.280 
Social Service and Care Activities 
(except medical) 
0.134 
(0.119) 
0.185 
Indoor and Outdoor Maintenance, 
Building, and Clean-Up Activities 
0.041 
(0.069) 
0.0399 
Participating in Performance and 
Cultural Activities 
0.098** 
(0.046) 
0.00990 
Attending Meetings, Conferences, 
and Training 
0.054 
(0.099) 
0.137 
Public Health and Safety Activities -0.016 
(0.014) 
0 
Waiting Associated with Volunteer 
Activities 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0 
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Security Procedures Related to 
Volunteer Activities 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Telephone Calls (to or from) 0.292* 
(0.164) 
0.811 
Waiting Associated with 
Telephone Calls 
0.000 
(.) 
0 
Travel Related to Personal Care -0.276 
(0.214) 
0.423 
Travel Related to Household 
Activities 
-0.137 
(0.097) 
0.338 
Travel Related to Caring for and 
Helping Household Members 
-0.104 
(0.140) 
0.322 
Travel Related to Caring for and 
Helping Non-Household Members 
-0.140 
(0.151) 
0.767 
Travel Related to Work -0.235 
(0.219) 
1.303 
Travel Related to Education -0.020 
(0.042) 
0.0476 
Travel Related to Consumer 
Purchases 
0.012 
(0.239) 
2.001 
Travel Related to Using 
Professional and Personal Care 
Services 
-0.049 
(0.109) 
0.417 
Travel Related to Using Household 
Services 
0.079 
(0.053) 
0.0207 
Travel Related to Using 
Government Services and Civic 
Obligations 
0.047* 
(0.025) 
0.00479 
Travel Related to Eating and 
Drinking 
-0.029 
(0.161) 
0.860 
Travel Related to Socializing, 
Relaxing, and Leisure 
0.044 
(0.229) 
1.239 
Travel Related to Sports, Exercise, 
and Recreation 
-0.045 
(0.059) 
0.188 
Travel Related to Religious or 
Spiritual Activities 
0.076 
(0.074) 
0.208 
Travel Related to Volunteering 0.110** 
(0.051) 
0.0791 
Travel Related to Phone Calls -0.051* 
(0.026) 
0.0388 
Security Procedures Related to 
Traveling 
-0.016 
(0.014) 
0.0128 
Observations 12,126 
Source: Author’s calculations based on American Time Use Survey, 2003-2013. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, marital status, and 
whether the interview was on a weekday or weekend; treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates 
include ATUS sampling weights. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 13. Impact of Part D on Non-Elderly Spouses’ Labor Force Outcomes (HRS) 
Pooled Men Women 
Employed 
0.007 
(0.018) 
-0.022 
(0.045) 
-0.004 
(0.021) 
[μ=0.386] [μ=0.494] [μ=0.370] 
Unemployed 
0.000 
(0.005) 
0.015 
(0.014) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
[μ=0.013] [μ=0.019] [μ=0.013] 
Retired 
0.023 
(0.017) 
-0.002 
(0.045) 
0.016 
(0.019) 
[μ=0.391] [μ=0.436] [μ=0.384] 
Partly retired 
0.008 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
[μ=0.073] [μ=0.082] [μ=0.072] 
Disabled 
0.001 
(0.006) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
[μ=0.037] [μ=0.043] [μ=0.036] 
Not in labor force 
-0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.010 
(0.014) 
[μ=0.173] [μ=0.008] [μ=0.197] 
Observations 34,572 13,485 21,087 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Health and Retirement Study, 1996-2012. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s household income, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, and marital status; 
age fixed effects; and year fixed effects. Estimates include HRS sampling weights. Individual-clustered standard 
errors are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 2- 14. Impact of Part D on Non-Elderly Adults’ Labor Force Outcomes (CPS) 
Pooled Men Women 
Employed 
-0.013*** 
(0.001) 
-0.023*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
[μ=0.943] [μ=0.925] [μ=0.958] 
Unemployed 
0.013*** 
(0.001) 
0.023*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.001) 
[μ=0.057] [μ=0.075] [μ=0.042] 
Not in labor force 
-0.006*** 
(0.001) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
-0.017*** 
(0.002) 
[μ=0.366] [μ=0.278] [μ=0.425] 
Full-time 
-0.003*** 
(0.001) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.005*** 
(0.002) 
[μ=0.838] [μ=0.898] [μ=0.789] 
Part-time 
0.003*** 
(0.001) 
0.006*** 
(0.002) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
[μ=0.162] [μ=0.102] [μ=0.211] 
Self-employed 
-0.001 
(0.001) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[μ=0.111] [μ=0.126] [μ=0.098] 
Wage-earner 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
[μ=0.888] [μ=0.872] [μ=0.900] 
Work without pay 
-0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.000*** 
(0.000) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
[μ=0.001] [μ=0.001] [μ=0.002] 
Usual hours worked 
-0.051 
(0.037) 
-0.018 
(0.053) 
-0.226*** 
(0.051) 
[μ=39.73] [μ=41.71] [μ=38.15] 
Observations 11,404,699 5,485,994 5,918,705 
Source: Author’s calculations based on Current Population Survey, 2000-13. Each cell displays the estimated 
coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for 
respondent’s age, sex, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, region of residence, household size, and marital status; 
treatment group indicator; and year fixed effects. Estimates include CPS sampling weights. Robust standard errors 
are displayed in parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* 
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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3-B. Appendix 3 Figures 
Appendix Figure 3- 1. Event Study Results for NHANES Outcomes 
Calories (kcal)  
Carbohydrates (gm) 
Total fat (gm) 
242 
Protein (gm) 
Total saturated fatty acids (gm) 
Cholesterol (mg) 
243 
Sugar (gm) 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHANES 2000-2012. Figure displays coefficient and 95% confidence 
intervals for the interaction of treatment and each year indicator. All regressions also control for the treatment group 
indicator, sex, age, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, household income, household size, and 
year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by NHANES sample weights.  
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Appendix Figure 3- 2. Trends Graphs for Additional BRFSS Outcomes 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from the sample. The treatment group is adults aged 60 to 64; the control group is adults 
aged 66 to 70.
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3-C. Appendix 3 Tables 
Appendix Table 3- 2. Demographic Characteristics of the BRFSS Sample 
Treatment Group (Ages 66-70) Control Group (Ages 60-64) Pre-
Treatment 
Difference 
Pre-Treatment 
(2001-05) 
Post-Treatment 
(2006-09) 
Pre-Treatment 
(2001-05) 
Post-Treatment 
(2006-09) 
Age 
67.97 
(1.424) 
67.92 
(1.431) 
61.86 
(1.412) 
61.85 
(1.421) 
6.11*** 
Female 
0.517 
(0.500) 
0.512 
(0.500) 
0.502 
(0.500) 
0.492 
(0.500) 
0.024*** 
Married 
0.660 
(0.474) 
0.672 
(0.469) 
0.699 
(0.459) 
0.703 
(0.457) 
-0.038*** 
Years 
Schooling 
13.12 
(2.346) 
13.38 
(2.289) 
13.36 
(2.282) 
13.70 
(2.269) 
-0.273*** 
Unemployed 
0.0140 
(0.118) 
0.0174 
(0.131) 
0.0341 
(0.182) 
0.0415 
(0.199) 
-0.021*** 
Household 
Income 
(Thousands) 
42.21 
(23.64) 
47.75 
(24.68) 
49.27 
(24.88) 
54.28 
(25.05) 
-7.07*** 
Household 
Size 
2.027 
(0.948) 
2.042 
(0.964) 
2.213 
(1.102) 
2.213 
(1.079) 
-0.178*** 
White 
0.803 
(0.398) 
0.783 
(0.412) 
0.787 
(0.409) 
0.773 
(0.419) 
0.017*** 
Black 
0.0848 
(0.279) 
0.0878 
(0.283) 
0.0882 
(0.284) 
0.0878 
(0.283) 
-0.004* 
Hispanic 
0.0654 
(0.247) 
0.0756 
(0.264) 
0.0717 
(0.258) 
0.0809 
(0.273) 
-0.006* 
Other Race 
0.0471 
(0.212) 
0.0532 
(0.224) 
0.0528 
(0.224) 
0.0582 
(0.234) 
-0.006** 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from the sample. The treatment group is adults aged 60 to 64; the control group is adults 
aged 66 to 70. Standard deviations are in parentheses. Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 3- 3. DD Regression Results for Additional NHANES Outcomes 
Pooled 
Unmarried 
Females Married Females 
Unmarried 
Males Married Males 
Total monounsaturated 
fatty acids (gm) 
1.682*** 
(0.535) 
0.968 
(0.920) 
1.655* 
(0.947) 
5.241*** 
(1.473) 
1.433 
(1.038) 
[μ=24.2] [μ=21.0] [μ=21.8] [μ=25.0] [μ=28.9] 
Total polyunsaturated 
fatty acids (gm) 
-0.199 
(0.378) 
0.619 
(0.723) 
-0.532 
(0.680) 
1.418 
(0.943) 
-0.732 
(0.695) 
[μ=14.3] [μ=12.9] [μ=13.7] [μ=13.8] [μ=16.5] 
Dietary fiber (gm) 
-0.559* 
(0.337) 
-0.294 
(0.564) 
-0.546 
(0.629) 
1.042 
(0.864) 
-1.092* 
(0.662) 
[μ=15.6] [μ=13.9] [μ=14.4] [μ=14.4] [μ=18.0] 
Vitamin A, RAE 
(mcg) 
8.121 
(41.680) 
-38.428 
(38.967) 
-62.326 
(46.594) 
-23.431 
(125.970) 
100.205 
(108.553) 
[μ=660.3] [μ=624.6] [μ=633.2] [μ=760.9] [μ=681.3] 
Thiamin (Vitamin B1) 
(mg) 
-0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.027 
(0.048) 
-0.031 
(0.051) 
0.195** 
(0.087) 
-0.053 
(0.055) 
[μ=1.5] [μ=1.3] [μ=1.3] [μ=1.5] [μ=1.7] 
Riboflavin (Vitamin 
B2) (mg) 
0.035 
(0.042) 
-0.045 
(0.061) 
0.005 
(0.070) 
0.059 
(0.131) 
0.108 
(0.089) 
[μ=2.0] [μ=1.7] [μ=1.8] [μ=2.2] [μ=2.2] 
Vitamin B12 (mcg) 
0.264 
(0.428) 
-0.035 
(0.292) 
-0.633 
(0.514) 
-1.141 
(1.109) 
1.698 
(1.152) 
[μ=4.9] [μ=4.0] [μ=4.5] [μ=6.7] [μ=5.6] 
Vitamin B6 (mg) 
-0.097** 
(0.039) 
-0.103 
(0.067) 
-0.063 
(0.065) 
-0.003 
(0.123) 
-0.138* 
(0.074) 
[μ=1.7] [μ=1.5] [μ=1.5] [μ=1.9] [μ=2.0] 
Vitamin C (mg) 
-2.113 
(3.052) 
-7.166 
(5.365) 
-2.446 
(5.705) 
14.276 
(8.707) 
-2.409 
(5.569) 
[μ=94.6] [μ=89.7] [μ=93.5] [μ=79.8] [μ=102.5] 
Vitamin E as alpha-
tocopherol (mg) 
-0.085 
(0.202) 
-0.088 
(0.362) 
-0.303 
(0.377) 
0.421 
(0.537) 
0.039 
(0.393) 
[μ=6.3] [μ=5.7] [μ=6.1] [μ=6.0] [μ=7.3] 
Vitamin K (mcg) 
-17.681*** 
(6.844) 
-28.501** 
(13.242) 
-9.015 
(9.086) 
-32.052 
(19.697) 
-6.936 
(14.974) 
[μ=99.6] [μ=113.5] [μ=87.6] [μ=95.6] [μ=95.8] 
Calcium (mg) 
-6.315 
(18.180) 
-1.026 
(30.541) 
5.573 
(34.388) 
34.692 
(54.730) 
-40.734 
(34.213) 
[μ=741.1] [μ=664.8] [μ=680.6] [μ=765.4] [μ=835.2] 
Iron (mg) 
0.005 
(0.299) 
-0.483 
(0.478) 
-0.647 
(0.555) 
1.529 
(0.946) 
0.300 
(0.582) 
[μ=14.5] [μ=12.4] [μ=13.3] [μ=15.3] [μ=16.9] 
247 
Zinc (mg) 
0.258 
(0.257) 
0.315 
(0.378) 
0.263 
(0.420) 
1.058 
(0.937) 
-0.060 
(0.528) 
[μ=10.3] [μ=8.9] [μ=9.0] [μ=10.9] [μ=12.3] 
Sodium (mg) 
-7.524 
(52.712) 
5.191 
(90.758) 
-75.062 
(90.019) 
234.142 
(155.829) 
3.584 
(103.094) 
[μ=2,835.8] [μ=2,462.3] [μ=2,574.0] [μ=2,918.4] [μ=3,336.1] 
Alpha-carotene (mcg) 
38.949 
(41.410) 
-36.823 
(86.453) 
-45.035 
(78.291) 
327.449*** 
(87.157) 
52.272 
(80.546) 
[μ=386.8] [μ=443.7] [μ=416.1] [μ=257.9] [μ=350.9] 
Beta-carotene (mcg) 
-341.736** 
(155.313) 
-439.613 
(304.800) 
-568.110* 
(291.961) 
231.409 
(366.917) 
-293.399 
(300.199) 
[μ=2,373.5] [μ=2,663.4] [μ=2,412.6] [μ=1,854.1] [μ=2,230.5] 
Caffeine (mg) 
21.220*** 
(7.765) 
2.881 
(13.711) 
9.035 
(11.926) 
36.341* 
(21.136) 
44.066*** 
(16.272) 
[μ=156.4] [μ=134.0] [μ=137.6] [μ=170.7] [μ=186.6] 
Alcohol (gm) 
-0.158 
(0.786) 
0.071 
(1.090) 
-0.812 
(1.011) 
-0.923 
(3.545) 
0.392 
(1.456) 
[μ=5.3] [μ=1.7] [μ=3.6] [μ=13.4] [μ=7.2] 
Observations 28,404 7,009 7,554 5,024 8,817 
Source: Author’s calculations based on NHANES 2000-2012. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the 
interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for the treatment group 
indicator, sex, age, race/ethnicity, educational attainment, marital status, household income, household size, and 
year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by NHANES sample weights. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Pre-
2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets.     
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 3- 4. Pre-Trends Tests for BRFSS Diet Outcomes 
Pre-Trends 
Fruit Juice 
-0.032 
(0.049) 
Fruit 
-0.004 
(0.059) 
Green Salad 
-0.016 
(0.035) 
Potatoes 
0.007 
(0.023) 
Carrots 
-0.025 
(0.035) 
Other Vegetables 
0.035 
(0.061) 
Observations 227,526 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2005. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from sample. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of 
treatment group and linear time trend. All regressions also control for sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, marital 
status, unemployment status, household income, household size, state unemployment rate, state-fixed effects, and 
quarter/year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. State-clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 3- 5. Potential Mechanisms for Diet Outcomes (BRFSS) 
DD Estimate 
Access to Care 
Insurance 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
[μ=0.880] 
Cost Barrier for Care 
-0.010*** 
(0.004) 
[μ=0.103] 
Personal Doctor 
0.007* 
(0.004) 
[μ=0.896] 
Observations 393,299 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from sample. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of 
treatment group and post-2006 indicator. All regressions also control for sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, marital 
status, unemployment status, household income, household size, state unemployment rate, state-fixed effects, and 
quarter/year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. State-clustered standard errors are in 
parentheses. Pre-2006 mean for treatment group [μ] is in brackets 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 3- 6. Robustness Checks for BRFSS Outcomes 
Ages 57-73 Ages 58-72 Ages 59-71 Ages 60-70 Ages 61-69 Ages 62-68 Ages 63-67 
Fruit Juice 
-0.290 
(0.310) 
-0.058 
(0.335) 
-0.063 
(0.361) 
-0.284 
(0.403) 
-0.580 
(0.476) 
-0.219 
(0.522) 
-1.072* 
(0.577) 
Fruit 
-1.673*** 
(0.361) 
-1.360*** 
(0.386) 
-1.152*** 
(0.407) 
-1.186*** 
(0.440) 
-0.750 
(0.493) 
-1.274** 
(0.560) 
-0.292 
(0.685) 
Green Salad 
-0.462** 
(0.208) 
-0.614*** 
(0.223) 
-0.597** 
(0.245) 
-0.590** 
(0.268) 
-0.761** 
(0.307) 
-0.676* 
(0.348) 
-0.588 
(0.449) 
Potatoes 
-0.134 
(0.123) 
-0.058 
(0.131) 
-0.017 
(0.143) 
0.006 
(0.157) 
-0.120 
(0.173) 
-0.004 
(0.195) 
0.068 
(0.239) 
Carrots 
-0.301 
(0.191) 
-0.326 
(0.208) 
-0.277 
(0.232) 
-0.338 
(0.223) 
-0.302 
(0.218) 
-0.288 
(0.256) 
-0.310 
(0.312) 
Other 
Vegetables 
-1.228*** 
(0.356) 
-1.246*** 
(0.384) 
-1.318*** 
(0.408) 
-1.158*** 
(0.446) 
-0.880* 
(0.505) 
-0.958* 
(0.575) 
-0.621 
(0.701) 
Observations 363,913 318,401 271,336 227,393 177,240 135,673 88,221 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Sample is restricted to include adults aged 60 to 70; 
adults aged 65 are excluded from sample. Each cell displays the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of 
treatment group and post-2006 indicator. State-clustered standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also control 
for sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, unemployment status, household income, household size, state 
unemployment rate, state-fixed effects, and quarter/year-fixed effects. Data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Appendix Table 3- 7. Sensitivity Analyses for BRFSS Outcomes 
No BRFSS Weights 
State-specific Time
Trend 
Fruit Juice 
0.015 
(0.199) 
-0.289 
(0.401) 
Fruit 
-0.710*** 
(0.238) 
-1.168*** 
(0.440) 
Green Salad 
-0.213 
(0.134) 
-0.590** 
(0.270) 
Potatoes 
-0.139 
(0.093) 
0.013 
(0.158) 
Carrots 
-0.196* 
(0.105) 
-0.347 
(0.223) 
Other Vegetables 
-0.609** 
(0.246) 
-1.154*** 
(0.446) 
Observations 227,393 227,393 
Source: Author’s calculations based on BRFSS 2001-2009. Adults aged 65 are excluded from sample. Each cell in 
displays the estimated coefficient for the interaction term of treatment group and post-2006 indicator. State-clustered 
standard errors in parentheses. All regressions also control for sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, marital status, 
unemployment status, household income, household size, state unemployment rate, state-fixed effects, and 
quarter/year-fixed effects. Unless otherwise indicated, data is adjusted by BRFSS sample weights. 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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o
m
ic
 R
ev
ie
w
:
P
a
p
er
s 
a
n
d
 P
ro
ce
ed
in
g
s.
 
Sh
ar
e 
of
 f
in
an
ci
al
 w
ea
lt
h 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 r
is
ky
 a
ss
et
s 
(s
to
ck
s,
 m
ut
ua
l f
un
ds
, 
et
c)
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 H
R
S
 
T
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f 
fi
na
nc
ia
l w
ea
lt
h 
in
ve
st
ed
 in
 
ri
sk
y 
as
se
ts
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 3
.2
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
, a
 7
.2
 p
er
ce
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
 r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 
th
e 
pr
e-
20
03
 m
ea
n.
 
A
C
A
 Y
o
u
n
g
 A
d
u
lt
 M
a
n
d
a
te
 
A
li
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
6)
. T
he
 A
C
A
’s
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 
C
ov
er
ag
e 
E
xp
an
si
on
 a
nd
 O
ut
-o
f-
P
oc
ke
t 
S
pe
nd
in
g 
by
 Y
ou
ng
 A
du
lt
s 
W
it
h 
B
eh
av
io
ra
l 
H
ea
lt
h 
C
on
di
ti
on
s.
 P
sy
ch
ia
tr
ic
 S
er
vi
ce
s.
O
O
P
 m
ed
ic
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
co
m
pa
ri
ng
 th
os
e 
ag
ed
 1
9-
25
 w
it
h 
th
os
e 
ag
ed
 2
7-
29
; M
E
P
S
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 O
O
P
 s
pe
nd
in
g,
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 
yo
un
g 
ad
ul
ts
 w
it
h 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
pr
ot
ec
ti
on
. 
H
an
. (
20
16
).
 T
he
 I
m
pa
ct
s 
of
 th
e 
A
ff
or
da
bl
e 
C
ar
e 
A
ct
 D
ep
en
de
nt
 C
ov
er
ag
e 
P
ro
vi
si
on
 o
n 
C
ol
le
ge
 G
ra
du
at
es
 w
it
h 
S
tu
de
nt
 L
oa
n 
D
eb
t. 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
. 
S
tu
de
nt
 lo
an
 d
eb
t a
nd
 
re
pa
ym
en
t 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 P
S
ID
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 s
tu
de
nt
 lo
an
 d
ef
au
lt
 r
at
e 
an
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
st
ud
en
t l
oa
n 
re
pa
ym
en
t r
at
e.
 
B
la
sc
ak
 &
 M
ik
he
d.
 (
20
18
).
 D
id
 th
e 
A
C
A
’s
 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 C
ov
er
ag
e 
M
an
da
te
 R
ed
uc
e 
F
in
an
ci
al
 D
is
tr
es
s 
fo
r 
Y
ou
ng
 A
du
lt
s.
 W
or
ki
ng
 
P
ap
er
. 
D
eb
t;
 D
el
in
qu
en
cy
; 
B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f;
 E
qu
if
ax
 c
on
su
m
er
 c
re
di
t 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
D
ec
re
as
ed
 p
as
t d
ue
 d
eb
t, 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 
de
li
nq
ue
nc
ie
s,
 a
nd
 p
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
fi
li
ng
 
fo
r 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
. S
tr
on
ge
st
 e
ff
ec
ts
 a
m
on
g 
in
di
vi
du
al
s 
li
vi
ng
 in
 c
ou
nt
ie
s 
w
it
h 
hi
gh
es
t p
re
-2
01
0 
un
in
su
ra
nc
e.
 
A
C
A
 M
e
d
ic
a
id
 E
x
p
a
n
si
o
n
 
253 
B
re
vo
or
t, 
G
ro
dz
ic
ki
, &
 H
ac
km
an
n.
 (
20
17
).
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
an
d 
F
in
an
ci
al
 H
ea
lt
h.
 W
or
ki
ng
 
P
ap
er
. 
U
np
ai
d 
m
ed
ic
al
 b
il
ls
; 
D
el
in
qu
en
cy
; C
re
di
t 
sc
or
es
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
co
m
pa
ri
ng
 e
xp
an
si
on
 a
nd
 
no
n-
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
at
es
; C
on
su
m
er
 
cr
ed
it
 p
an
el
 d
at
a 
E
xp
an
si
on
 r
ed
uc
ed
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s’
 m
ed
ic
al
 
de
bt
, r
ed
uc
ed
 d
el
in
qu
en
ci
es
, i
nc
re
as
ed
 
cr
ed
it
 s
co
re
s,
 a
nd
 im
pr
ov
ed
 te
rm
s 
of
 
cr
ed
it
 f
or
 lo
an
s.
 
A
ll
en
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
7)
. E
ar
ly
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
it
h 
R
ed
uc
ed
 P
ay
da
y 
B
or
ro
w
in
g 
in
 C
al
if
or
ni
a.
 H
ea
lt
h
 A
ff
a
ir
s.
P
ay
da
y 
(h
ig
h 
in
te
re
st
) 
lo
an
s 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
co
m
pa
ri
ng
 C
al
if
or
ni
a 
co
un
ti
es
 th
at
 e
xp
an
de
d 
w
it
h 
ot
he
r 
co
un
ti
es
 n
at
io
nw
id
e;
 C
on
su
m
er
 
F
in
an
ci
al
 S
er
vi
ce
s 
A
ss
oc
ia
ti
on
 
D
ec
re
as
ed
 n
um
be
r 
of
 p
ay
da
y 
lo
an
s 
ta
ke
n 
ou
t, 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 u
ni
qu
e 
bo
rr
ow
er
s,
 
an
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
pa
yd
ay
 d
eb
t. 
 
C
as
w
el
l &
 W
ai
dm
an
n.
 (
20
17
).
 T
he
 A
ff
or
da
bl
e 
C
ar
e 
A
ct
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
s 
an
d 
P
er
so
na
l 
F
in
an
ce
. M
ed
ic
a
l 
C
a
re
 R
es
ea
rc
h
 a
n
d
 R
ev
ie
w
.
B
an
kr
up
tc
y;
 M
ed
ic
al
 
co
ll
ec
ti
on
 b
al
an
ce
s;
 
C
re
di
t s
co
re
s 
T
ri
pl
e 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 m
od
el
s 
ex
pl
oi
ti
ng
 
pr
e-
20
14
 c
ou
nt
y-
le
ve
l u
ni
ns
ur
an
ce
 
ra
te
s 
an
d 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
ex
pa
ns
io
n;
 C
re
di
t 
bu
re
au
 d
at
a 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 c
re
di
t s
co
re
s,
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 
ba
la
nc
es
 p
as
t d
ue
, d
ec
re
as
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 
of
 h
ig
h 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
ol
le
ct
io
n,
 a
nd
 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
pr
ob
ab
il
ity
 o
f 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
. 
A
br
am
ow
it
z.
 (
20
18
).
 T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
A
C
A
 S
ta
te
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
s 
on
 M
ed
ic
al
 O
ut
-o
f-
P
oc
ke
t E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s.
 M
ed
ic
a
l 
C
a
re
 R
es
ea
rc
h
a
n
d
 R
ev
ie
w
. 
 
O
O
P
 m
ed
ic
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
co
m
pa
ri
ng
 e
xp
an
si
on
 a
nd
 
no
n-
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
at
es
; C
P
S
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 m
ed
ic
al
 O
O
P
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
fo
r 
lo
w
-i
nc
om
e 
pe
op
le
. 
G
al
la
gh
er
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
8)
. M
ed
ic
ai
d 
an
d 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 S
av
in
gs
 B
eh
av
io
r:
 N
ew
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 T
ax
 R
ef
un
ds
. W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
.  
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 s
av
in
gs
 
be
ha
vi
or
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 e
xp
lo
it
in
g 
st
at
es
’ 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
el
ig
ib
il
it
y 
ru
le
s;
 T
ax
 
da
ta
 
N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 s
av
in
gs
 b
eh
av
io
r 
fo
r 
av
er
ag
e 
lo
w
-i
nc
om
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d.
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
in
cr
ea
se
s 
re
fu
nd
 s
av
in
gs
 r
at
e 
fo
r 
th
os
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ci
ng
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
ha
rd
sh
ip
.  
H
u 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
8)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
th
e 
A
ff
or
da
bl
e 
C
ar
e 
A
ct
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
 o
n 
F
in
an
ci
al
 
W
el
lb
ei
ng
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
u
b
li
c 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
C
re
di
t s
co
re
; 
D
el
in
qu
en
cy
; 
C
ol
le
ct
io
ns
; B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
S
yn
th
et
ic
 c
on
tr
ol
 a
nd
 tr
ip
le
 d
if
fe
re
nc
e 
m
od
el
s;
 E
qu
if
ax
 c
on
su
m
er
 c
re
di
t 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
R
ed
uc
ed
 n
um
be
r 
of
 u
np
ai
d 
bi
ll
s 
an
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
de
bt
 s
en
t t
o 
co
ll
ec
ti
on
s.
 N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 c
re
di
t s
co
re
s 
an
d 
ba
nk
ru
pt
cy
. 
K
in
o,
 S
at
o,
 &
 K
aw
ac
hi
. (
20
18
).
 S
pi
ll
ov
er
 
B
en
ef
it
 o
f 
Im
pr
ov
ed
 A
cc
es
s 
to
 H
ea
lt
hc
ar
e 
on
 
R
ed
uc
in
g 
W
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 H
ou
si
ng
 a
nd
 M
ea
l 
A
ff
or
da
bi
li
ty
. I
n
te
rn
a
ti
o
n
a
l 
Jo
u
rn
a
l 
fo
r 
E
q
u
it
y
in
 H
ea
lt
h
. 
W
or
ry
 o
r 
st
re
ss
 a
bo
ut
 
pa
yi
ng
 r
en
t/
m
or
tg
ag
e 
an
d 
pu
rc
ha
si
ng
 f
oo
d 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 m
et
ho
d;
 
B
R
F
SS
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 p
ro
ba
bi
li
ty
 o
f 
be
in
g 
w
or
ri
ed
 
an
d 
st
re
ss
ed
 r
el
at
ed
 to
 p
ur
ch
as
in
g 
nu
tr
it
io
us
 m
ea
ls
, a
s 
w
el
l a
s 
pa
yi
ng
 th
e 
re
nt
/m
or
tg
ag
e.
 
M
il
le
r 
et
 a
l. 
(2
01
8)
. T
he
 A
C
A
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
 in
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
an
d 
F
in
an
ci
al
 H
ea
lt
h.
 
W
or
ki
ng
 P
ap
er
. 
C
ol
le
ct
io
ns
; M
ed
ic
al
 
co
ll
ec
ti
on
s;
 
D
el
in
qu
en
ci
es
; C
re
di
t 
ca
rd
 b
or
ro
w
in
g;
 P
ub
li
c 
re
co
rd
s;
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
E
ve
nt
 s
tu
dy
 d
es
ig
n 
ex
pl
oi
ti
ng
 
va
ri
at
io
n 
in
 e
nr
ol
lm
en
t i
nt
o 
H
ea
lt
hy
 
M
ic
hi
ga
n;
 T
ra
ns
un
io
n 
co
ns
um
er
 
cr
ed
it
 h
is
to
ry
 a
nd
 H
ea
lt
hy
 M
ic
hi
ga
n 
ad
m
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
da
ta
 
R
ed
uc
ed
 u
np
ai
d 
bi
ll
s,
 m
ed
ic
al
 b
il
ls
, o
ve
r 
li
m
it
 c
re
di
t c
ar
d 
sp
en
di
ng
, 
de
li
nq
ue
nc
ie
s,
 a
nd
 p
ub
li
c 
re
co
rd
s 
(s
uc
h 
as
 e
vi
ct
io
ns
).
  
L
ev
y,
 B
uc
hm
ue
ll
er
, &
 N
ik
pa
y.
 (
20
19
).
 T
he
 
Im
pa
ct
 o
f 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
E
xp
an
si
on
 o
n 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n.
 E
a
st
er
n
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
 J
o
u
rn
a
l.
H
ea
lt
h 
sp
en
di
ng
; N
on
-
he
al
th
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
(f
oo
d,
 
ho
us
in
g)
 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
co
m
pa
ri
ng
 e
xp
an
si
on
 a
nd
 
no
n-
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
at
es
; C
E
X
 
S
m
al
l r
ed
uc
ti
on
s 
in
 h
ea
lt
h 
sp
en
di
ng
. N
o 
ch
an
ge
 in
 n
on
-h
ea
lt
h 
co
ns
um
pt
io
n.
 
254
A
C
A
 
B
ou
dr
ea
ux
, G
on
za
le
s,
 &
 S
al
on
er
. (
20
17
).
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
F
in
an
ci
al
 B
ur
de
n 
D
ec
li
ne
d 
fo
r 
C
on
su
m
er
s 
in
 th
e 
N
on
gr
ou
p 
M
ar
ke
t. 
H
ea
lt
h
A
ff
a
ir
s.
O
O
P
 m
ed
ic
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; C
P
S
 
S
ha
re
 o
f 
no
ne
ld
er
ly
 p
eo
pl
e 
in
 th
e 
no
ng
ro
up
 in
su
ra
nc
e 
m
ar
ke
t e
xp
er
ie
nc
in
g 
m
ed
ic
al
 f
in
an
ci
al
 b
ur
de
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 a
ft
er
 
20
14
. 
M
cK
en
na
 e
t a
l. 
(2
01
8)
. T
he
 A
ff
or
da
bl
e 
C
ar
e 
A
ct
 A
tt
en
ua
te
s 
F
in
an
ci
al
 S
tr
ai
n 
A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 
P
ov
er
ty
 L
ev
el
. I
n
q
u
ir
y.
H
ea
lt
h 
ca
re
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
ra
in
 (
w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 
pa
yi
ng
 m
ed
ic
al
 b
il
ls
; 
pr
ob
le
m
s 
pa
yi
ng
 
m
ed
ic
al
 b
il
ls
) 
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
; N
H
IS
 
D
ec
re
as
e 
in
 p
ro
bl
em
s 
pa
yi
ng
 m
ed
ic
al
 
bi
ll
s,
 w
or
ry
 a
bo
ut
 m
ed
ic
al
 b
il
ls
, n
ot
 
ge
tt
in
g 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
ar
e 
du
e 
to
 c
os
t, 
an
d 
de
la
yi
ng
 m
ed
ic
al
 c
ar
e 
du
e 
to
 c
os
t. 
G
al
la
gh
er
, G
op
al
an
, &
 G
ri
ns
te
in
-W
ei
ss
. 
(2
01
9)
. T
he
 E
ff
ec
t o
f 
H
ea
lt
h 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
on
 
H
om
e 
P
ay
m
en
t D
el
in
qu
en
cy
: E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 
A
C
A
 M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 S
ub
si
di
es
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
P
u
b
li
c 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
H
om
e 
pa
ym
en
t 
de
li
nq
ue
nc
ie
s 
R
eg
re
ss
io
n 
di
sc
on
ti
nu
it
y 
ex
pl
oi
ti
ng
 
in
co
m
e 
el
ig
ib
il
it
y 
th
re
sh
ol
d 
to
 r
ec
ei
ve
 
M
ar
ke
tp
la
ce
 s
ub
si
di
es
 in
 n
on
-
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
ex
pa
ns
io
n 
st
at
es
; T
ax
 d
at
a 
S
ub
si
di
ze
d 
co
ve
ra
ge
 r
ed
uc
ed
 th
e 
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y 
of
 b
ei
ng
 d
el
in
qu
en
t o
n 
ho
m
e 
pa
ym
en
ts
.  
M
e
d
ic
a
id
 
L
ei
ni
ng
er
, L
ev
y,
 &
 S
ch
an
ze
nb
ac
h.
 (
20
10
).
 
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
s 
of
 S
C
H
IP
 E
xp
an
si
on
s 
fo
r 
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 W
el
l-
B
ei
ng
. F
o
ru
m
 f
o
r 
H
ea
lt
h
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s 
&
 P
o
li
cy
. 
H
ea
lt
h 
sp
en
di
ng
; N
on
-
he
al
th
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
D
if
f-
in
-d
if
f 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 e
xp
lo
it
in
g 
va
ri
at
io
n 
in
 S
C
H
IP
 e
xp
an
si
on
s;
 C
E
X
 
S
C
H
IP
 d
ec
re
as
ed
 m
ed
ic
al
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
an
d 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
ov
er
al
l e
xp
en
di
tu
re
s 
(m
os
tl
y 
tr
an
sp
or
ta
ti
on
 a
nd
 r
et
ir
em
en
t 
sa
vi
ng
s)
.  
S
om
m
er
s 
&
 O
el
le
ri
ch
. (
20
13
).
 T
he
 P
ov
er
ty
-
R
ed
uc
in
g 
E
ff
ec
t o
f 
M
ed
ic
ai
d.
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
P
ov
er
ty
; O
O
P
 m
ed
ic
al
 
sp
en
di
ng
 
P
ro
pe
ns
it
y 
sc
or
e 
m
et
ho
d;
 C
P
S
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d 
re
du
ce
d 
po
ve
rt
y 
ra
te
 b
y 
0.
7 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s.
 
G
ro
ss
 &
 N
ot
ow
id
ig
do
. (
20
11
).
 H
ea
lt
h 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
an
d 
th
e 
C
on
su
m
er
 B
an
kr
up
tc
y 
D
ec
is
io
n:
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 E
xp
an
si
on
s 
of
 
M
ed
ic
ai
d.
 J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
P
u
b
li
c 
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
 
C
on
su
m
er
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
E
xp
lo
it
 v
ar
ia
ti
on
 in
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
ex
pa
ns
io
ns
 f
ro
m
 1
99
2 
to
 2
00
4;
 p
ub
ic
 
da
ta
ba
se
 o
f 
ba
nk
ru
pt
ci
es
 f
ro
m
 
A
dm
in
is
tr
at
iv
e 
O
ff
ic
e 
of
 U
S
 C
ou
rt
s 
In
cr
ea
si
ng
 M
ed
ic
ai
d 
el
ig
ib
il
it
y 
re
du
ce
d 
pe
rs
on
al
 b
an
kr
up
tc
y 
bu
t n
ot
 b
us
in
es
s 
ba
nk
ru
pt
ci
es
.  
D
il
le
nd
er
. (
20
17
).
 M
ed
ic
ai
d,
 F
am
il
y 
S
pe
nd
in
g,
 a
nd
 th
e 
F
in
an
ci
al
 I
m
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 o
f 
C
ro
w
d-
O
ut
. J
o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f 
H
ea
lt
h
 E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
F
am
il
y-
le
ve
l m
ed
ic
al
 
sp
en
di
ng
 a
nd
 n
on
-
m
ed
ic
al
 s
pe
nd
in
g 
by
 
ca
te
go
ry
 
In
st
ru
m
en
ta
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 s
tr
at
eg
y 
to
 
es
ti
m
at
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
ad
di
ti
on
al
 f
am
il
y 
m
em
be
r 
be
co
m
in
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2)
. T
he
 O
re
go
n 
H
ea
lt
h 
In
su
ra
nc
e 
E
xp
er
im
en
t:
 E
vi
de
nc
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
F
ir
st
 Y
ea
r.
 T
h
e 
Q
u
a
rt
er
ly
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o
u
rn
a
l 
o
f
E
co
n
o
m
ic
s.
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. 
M
a
ss
a
ch
u
se
tt
s 
H
ea
lt
h
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&
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 (
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Appendices for Chapter 5 
5-A. Appendix 5 Tables 
Appendix Table 5- 1. Parallel Trends Tests 
Total Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All White Black Other Hispanic 
2010 X 
Expansion 
17.91 
(22.85) 
5.35 
(11.04) 
82.76 
(54.12) 
-45.54 
(63.35) 
29.16 
(23.27) 
2011 X 
Expansion 
45.69** 
(22.85) 
10.00 
(11.04) 
58.69 
(54.13) 
79.42 
(63.36) 
34.83 
(23.28) 
2012 X 
Expansion 
1.14 
(22.84) 
5.45 
(11.04) 
-0.82 
(54.11) 
-33.95 
(63.34) 
33.72 
(23.27) 
2014 X 
Expansion 
-7.12 
(22.84) 
23.62** 
(11.04) 
-47.78 
(54.10) 
-39.87 
(63.33) 
35.60 
(23.26) 
2015 X 
Expansion 
18.31 
(22.84) 
5.84 
(11.04) 
43.13 
(54.10) 
-9.55 
(63.33) 
34.03 
(23.26) 
N 14652 3666 3660 3660 3666 
Early Stage Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All White Black Other Hispanic 
2010 X 
Expansion 
36.54** 
(17.24) 
13.64 
(8.36) 
60.67 
(38.76) 
62.26 
(51.29) 
9.77 
(17.08) 
2011 X 
Expansion 
38.04** 
(17.24) 
11.28 
(8.37) 
55.05 
(38.76) 
71.76 
(51.30) 
14.25 
(17.08) 
2012 X 
Expansion 
18.48 
(17.24) 
6.14 
(8.36) 
55.52 
(38.75) 
5.79 
(51.28) 
6.54 
(17.08) 
2014 X 
Expansion 
15.99 
(17.23) 
26.36*** 
(8.36) 
31.01 
(38.74) 
-11.83 
(51.27) 
18.54 
(17.07) 
258 
2015 X 
Expansion 
29.40* 
(17.23) 
9.42 
(8.36) 
44.56 
(38.75) 
31.26 
(51.28) 
32.54* 
(17.08) 
N 14652 3666 3660 3660 3666 
Late Stage Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All White Black Other Hispanic 
2010 X 
Expansion 
-20.61 
(14.06) 
-6.18 
(6.55) 
25.24 
(37.52) 
-112.17*** 
(37.59) 
10.61 
(14.19) 
2011 X 
Expansion 
5.75 
(14.07) 
0.01 
(6.55) 
5.31 
(37.53) 
3.51 
(37.60) 
14.18 
(14.19) 
2012 X 
Expansion 
-15.03 
(14.06) 
1.98 
(6.55) 
-40.48 
(37.51) 
-44.53 
(37.58) 
22.75 
(14.19) 
2014 X 
Expansion 
-23.77* 
(14.06) 
0.50 
(6.55) 
-72.88* 
(37.51) 
-28.45 
(37.58) 
5.68 
(14.18) 
2015 X 
Expansion 
-10.80 
(14.06) 
-2.08 
(6.55) 
0.53 
(37.51) 
-40.97 
(37.58) 
-0.66 
(14.19) 
N 14652 3666 3660 3660 3666 
Unstaged Diagnoses Per 100,000 Population 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
All White Black Other Hispanic 
2010 X 
Expansion 
1.98 
(2.65) 
-2.10 
(1.98) 
-3.15 
(6.61) 
4.37 
(5.83) 
8.77 
(5.48) 
2011 X 
Expansion 
1.90 
(2.65) 
-1.28 
(1.98) 
-1.67 
(6.61) 
4.14 
(5.84) 
6.40 
(5.48) 
2012 X 
Expansion 
-2.32 
(2.65) 
-2.67 
(1.98) 
-15.86** 
(6.61) 
4.78 
(5.83) 
4.43 
(5.48) 
2014 X 
Expansion 
0.66 
(2.65) 
-3.24 
(1.98) 
-5.91 
(6.61) 
0.41 
(5.83) 
11.38** 
(5.48) 
2015 X 
Expansion 
-0.29 
(2.65) 
-1.50 
(1.98) 
-1.96 
(6.61) 
0.15 
(5.83) 
2.15 
(5.48) 
N 14652 3666 3660 3660 3666 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on SEER 2010 to 2015. Sample was restricted to first-time cancer diagnoses for 
adults aged 19 to 64. N=14,652 county-year observations. All regressions also control for county unemployment 
rate, whether the county is rural, percent of county that is female, percent that is over age 65, percent in poverty, 
state fixed effects, and year fixed effects. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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